By Horizonte Cubano News
Cuba is changing.
Not as quickly as many Cubans would like. Not as deeply as some reformers have demanded. And certainly not enough to resolve an economic crisis that has been years in the making.
But something important is happening: Havana is allowing a larger role for private economic activity at precisely the moment when Cuba is experiencing one of the most serious economic crises in its modern history.
That should force Washington to answer a question it has avoided for too long:
What exactly does the United States want Cuba’s private sector to become?
An Opening That Should Not Be Ignored
Cuba has announced a broad package of economic measures that includes greater opportunities for private businesses and foreign investment.
Among the changes are steps involving fuel imports and distribution, medicines, agriculture, tourism and other areas traditionally dominated by the state.
No one should exaggerate what this means.
Cuba has not abandoned socialism. The Cuban government continues to control major sectors of the economy, and serious questions remain about regulation, property rights, access to financing, political interference and the ability of independent businesses to operate on genuinely competitive terms.
But refusing to recognize change because it is incomplete would be a mistake.
Economic openings create opportunities — and they create tests.
For Havana, the test is whether it is prepared to allow private Cuban businesses to become genuinely independent economic actors rather than merely emergency instruments used to compensate for the failures of the state economy.
For Washington, the test is different.
The United States must decide whether its objective is to weaken the Cuban government or to help build an economically independent Cuban population.
Those objectives are not always the same thing.
The Fuel Experiment Is Already Teaching Us Something
Energy provides an extraordinary example.
The United States has permitted certain fuel exports to Cuba when the transactions comply with U.S. export-control and sanctions requirements.
At the same time, Cuba has begun allowing greater private participation in fuel imports and distribution.
This creates something that would have seemed highly unlikely only a short time ago: a potential commercial space between American suppliers and Cuban private businesses.
But the early experience also contains a warning.
Scarcity, weak distribution systems and enormous differences in purchasing power can turn privately imported fuel into an expensive commodity available primarily to those who can afford it.
That is not a reason to close the door.
It is a reason to design the door better.
If Washington genuinely wants to support Cuba’s independent private sector, it should develop transparent rules that allow legitimate private Cuban enterprises to purchase authorized American products while preventing sanctioned entities or military-controlled companies from secretly benefiting from those transactions.
That requires compliance, not slogans.
Know-your-customer procedures.
Beneficial-ownership verification.
End-user documentation.
Transparent contracts.
Payment controls.
Auditable records.
And enforcement when businesses attempt to circumvent the rules.
This is how serious international commerce operates.
Sanctions Should Distinguish Between the State and the Citizen
For decades, American policy toward Cuba has repeatedly struggled with the distinction between putting pressure on a government and putting pressure on the economy in which ordinary people must survive.
That distinction matters more today because Cuba now has thousands of private economic actors.
A restaurant owner is not the Cuban government.
A private transportation operator is not the Communist Party.
A farmer is not the Ministry of the Interior.
A small manufacturer is not the Cuban military.
If an independently owned Cuban company can demonstrate its ownership, disclose its beneficial owners, establish a legitimate end use and comply with applicable American regulations, Washington should ask why lawful commerce with that company should not be encouraged.
The answer cannot simply be: because it is located in Cuba.
Havana Has Responsibilities Too
None of this gives the Cuban government a free pass.
If Havana wants the private sector to attract serious international suppliers and investors, it must provide something more valuable than political speeches: predictability.
Private companies need enforceable contracts.
Investors need rules that do not change overnight.
Entrepreneurs need access to banking.
Businesses need the ability to import and export without arbitrary interference.
Foreign companies need confidence that agreements will be respected.
And Cuban entrepreneurs must be allowed to succeed without becoming dependent on political connections.
Washington cannot create those conditions.
Havana must.
From Pressure to Leverage
There is also a larger strategic opportunity.
Economic engagement does not require the United States to abandon human rights concerns, democratic principles or targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for repression.
Quite the opposite.
Washington can maintain pressure against officials and entities it believes responsible for abuses while simultaneously creating legal pathways for commerce with genuinely independent Cuban businesses.
That would represent a significant change in philosophy:
Target the institutions responsible for repression while expanding economic space for the people living underneath them.
That approach deserves serious consideration.
Cuba’s Private Sector Could Become a Bridge
The most interesting consequence of Cuba’s economic opening may ultimately have little to do with ideology.
It may be practical.
American companies need customers.
Cuban businesses need suppliers, financing, technology, equipment and energy.
Cuban families need functioning businesses that create jobs and provide goods.
Those interests can intersect.
And when interests intersect, negotiation becomes possible.
The United States and Cuba do not need to agree politically before Americans and Cubans can begin identifying areas where legitimate private commerce benefits both societies.
In fact, carefully regulated private commerce could eventually become one of the mechanisms through which the two countries rebuild a minimum level of economic trust.
Washington Should Decide What Success Looks Like
For decades, American politicians have debated whether sanctions against Cuba are too strong or too weak.
Perhaps there is another question worth asking:
What outcome are the sanctions supposed to produce?
If the objective is a Cuban population less economically dependent on the state, then the growth of genuinely independent businesses should be considered an American strategic interest.
If the objective is greater economic freedom for Cubans, then successful Cuban entrepreneurs should not automatically be treated as extensions of their government.
And if the objective is eventually to create conditions for a different relationship between Cuba and the United States, private economic relationships may be one of the few places where that process can realistically begin.
Cuba’s economic reforms may fail.
Havana may retreat.
Washington may tighten restrictions further.
There are no guarantees.
But an opening now exists.
The intelligent response is neither blind enthusiasm nor automatic rejection.
It is to test it.
Verify ownership.
Protect transactions from sanctioned entities.
Demand transparency.
Allow legitimate commerce.
Measure the results.
And adjust policy according to evidence.
Because after more than six decades of confrontation, perhaps the most radical Cuba policy Washington could attempt is also the simplest:
Reward what works. Target what does not. And stop treating every Cuban economic actor as though they were the Cuban government.
Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States and the future of the hemisphere.