By Horizonte Cubano News
The United States unquestionably has a Cuba policy.
It has an embargo.
It has sanctions.
It has restrictions.
It has lists of prohibited entities.
It has regulations governing travel, financial transactions and commerce.
It has laws defining the conditions under which assistance could be provided to a Cuban transition government.
It has political objectives involving democracy, human rights and private enterprise.
What is much less clear is whether all of those instruments form a coherent strategy capable of answering one fundamental question:
How does the United States get from the Cuba that exists today to the free, prosperous and democratic Cuba Washington says it wants tomorrow?
Policy tells you what you are doing.
Strategy explains how what you are doing gets you where you want to go.
After more than six decades, that distinction matters.
Sanctions Are Not a Strategy
Sanctions can be useful instruments of foreign policy.
They can restrict financial resources.
They can isolate individuals responsible for abuses.
They can create negotiating leverage.
They can protect national-security interests.
But sanctions themselves are not a destination.
The relevant question is not simply:
How much pressure can Washington place on Havana?
The relevant question is:
What political or economic behavior is that pressure designed to change, and what happens if Cuba actually changes it?
If there is no clear answer to the second question, pressure risks becoming permanent policy rather than strategic leverage.
Washington Should Define the Destination
The United States says it wants a democratic Cuba.
Fine.
What does the road from today’s Cuba to that Cuba look like?
Does it begin with economic reform?
Political-prisoner releases?
Expansion of private enterprise?
Greater freedom of expression?
Property rights?
Independent civic organizations?
Electoral reform?
Negotiations?
Some combination of all of them?
And perhaps most importantly:
Must everything happen before Washington responds to anything?
That is where strategy becomes necessary.
Cuba Does Not Have to Change in One Day
Political discussions about Cuba frequently imagine two completely different countries.
Today’s Cuba.
And a future democratic Cuba.
But there is an enormous space between those two points.
That space is called transition.
Transitions can take years.
They can advance.
They can stall.
They can reverse.
They can involve economic liberalization before political liberalization.
They can involve negotiations between people who profoundly distrust each other.
They can involve incremental compromises.
Washington should have a strategy for that space between the present and the desired future.
Build a Ladder, Not Just a Wall
For decades, American policy has been very good at constructing walls.
Restrictions.
Prohibitions.
Conditions.
Sanctions.
Perhaps it is time to construct something else alongside them:
A ladder.
A ladder does not eliminate pressure.
It creates a visible path upward.
Cuba takes a verifiable step.
Washington responds with a proportionate step.
Cuba takes another.
Washington responds again.
If Havana reverses course, Washington retains the ability to reverse incentives.
That is not appeasement.
That is leverage.
Step One: Protect the Cuban Family
Any American strategy should begin with one principle:
Do not confuse the Cuban government with the Cuban population.
A mother looking for medicine is not the Cuban government.
A farmer is not the Communist Party.
A mechanic is not Cuban intelligence.
A restaurant owner is not the Ministry of the Interior.
A private entrepreneur is not automatically GAESA.
Policy should increasingly distinguish between institutions Washington wants to pressure and people Washington says it wants to support.
That means evaluating sanctions partly by their effects on ordinary families.
Step Two: Strengthen Genuine Economic Independence
Washington already recognizes qualifying independent Cuban private-sector entrepreneurs under American regulations.
Build upon that principle.
Allow carefully verified independent businesses to establish legitimate commercial relationships where U.S. law permits.
Require beneficial-ownership disclosure.
Screen participants against sanctions lists.
Exclude military-controlled entities.
Require transparent payments.
Verify end users.
Then expand opportunities as Cuban economic freedom expands.
The objective should be straightforward:
Make Cuban citizens less economically dependent on the Cuban state.
Step Three: Establish Political Benchmarks
Economic reform cannot substitute indefinitely for political freedom.
Washington should therefore establish measurable political benchmarks.
Release of political prisoners.
Greater freedom of expression.
Independent civic organizations.
Greater legal protections.
Movement toward competitive elections.
Judicial independence.
The benchmarks should be public.
And so should the American response associated with each benchmark.
That creates incentives.
Step Four: Negotiate
Eventually Washington and Havana must talk.
Not because they trust each other.
They do not.
Not because either side must surrender its principles.
It should not.
They must talk because geography does not change.
Cuba will remain roughly 90 miles from Florida regardless of which political system governs Havana.
Migration matters.
Security matters.
Drug trafficking matters.
Property claims matter.
Environmental protection matters.
Commerce matters.
Telecommunications matter.
Regional stability matters.
Two neighboring countries can disagree profoundly and still negotiate.
Step Five: Address American Property Claims
A serious strategy cannot pretend certified American property claims do not exist.
They do.
And they will eventually require negotiation.
But there is an economic reality that should also be acknowledged:
A bankrupt Cuba cannot meaningfully compensate anybody.
If American creditors ultimately expect settlements, Cuba must develop the economic capacity to negotiate and honor those settlements.
That means economic growth and resolution of claims are not necessarily opposing objectives.
They can be connected.
A negotiated framework could combine compensation mechanisms, investment arrangements, bonds, long-term payments or other structures permitted by law.
Those possibilities should be studied rather than reduced to political slogans.
Step Six: Prepare the Reconstruction Plan
If Washington’s strategy succeeds, Cuba will need enormous investment.
Electricity.
Water.
Housing.
Railways.
Roads.
Agriculture.
Ports.
Telecommunications.
Hospitals.
Banking.
Private enterprise.
Commercial law.
Property registries.
Institutional capacity.
The United States should not wait until a transition begins to calculate those needs.
The planning should happen now.
Congress already established a legal foundation for assistance to a future Cuban transition in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.
Thirty years later, that framework needs a modern economic strategy behind it.
Call it a Marshall Plan.
Call it a Cuban Reconstruction Initiative.
The label is less important than the preparation.
Step Seven: Bring Private Capital to the Table
American taxpayers should not be expected to finance Cuba’s reconstruction alone.
Nor should they.
A successful strategy should mobilize multiple sources of capital.
Cuban private capital.
Cuban-American investment.
American companies.
International investors.
Development institutions.
Allied governments.
Commercial lenders.
Infrastructure financing.
And carefully targeted public assistance where appropriate.
The objective should be to use public policy to unlock substantially larger amounts of productive private investment.
Cuba should eventually finance its own prosperity.
Step Eight: Prevent Corruption
Billions of dollars entering a transitioning economy can produce opportunity.
They can also produce corruption.
Any reconstruction framework should therefore include safeguards from the beginning.
Competitive procurement.
Beneficial-ownership transparency.
Independent auditing.
Public reporting.
Anti-money-laundering controls.
Conflict-of-interest rules.
Congressional oversight of American funds.
No politically connected Cuban official should simply replace one privileged economic structure with another.
Political transition without institutional accountability can reproduce many of the problems it was supposed to eliminate.
Step Nine: Give Cubans a Reason to Stay
Perhaps the greatest measure of success would be remarkably simple.
Do Cubans still believe they must leave Cuba to have a future?
If the answer remains yes, something has failed.
A successful strategy should eventually allow a young Cuban to imagine:
Starting a business.
Buying a home.
Raising children.
Building savings.
Working professionally.
Investing.
Traveling.
Returning.
And growing old in Cuba without believing that emigration is the only path toward economic dignity.
That would be transformational.
Step Ten: Measure Everything
Washington should publish measurable objectives.
Not slogans.
Results.
Is private employment growing?
Are political prisoners being released?
Is freedom of expression expanding?
Is agricultural production increasing?
Is migration decreasing?
Is electricity becoming more reliable?
Are American claims moving toward settlement?
Are Cuban businesses gaining legitimate access to international markets?
Are families becoming economically stronger?
If the answer is no, change the strategy.
Foreign policy should be evaluated by outcomes, not by how long a policy has existed.
Avoid Two Disasters
There are two outcomes American policy should try to prevent.
The first is indefinite authoritarian stagnation.
The second is uncontrolled national collapse.
Neither serves the Cuban people.
Neither serves the United States.
Collapse could mean mass migration, humanitarian emergency, criminal activity, institutional breakdown and regional instability only 90 miles from Florida.
The objective should therefore not simply be:
Make the current system fail.
It should be:
Help create conditions in which something better can succeed.
Those are very different strategies.
Washington Has the Pieces
The United States already possesses many of the pieces.
Sanctions.
Diplomatic power.
Economic influence.
Private capital.
Humanitarian mechanisms.
A large Cuban-American community.
Commercial expertise.
International alliances.
And legislation contemplating assistance during a Cuban transition.
What remains unclear is how all those pieces fit together.
That is why Washington needs more than a Cuba policy.
It needs a Cuba strategy.
A strategy connecting:
Pressure to reform.
Reform to incentives.
Incentives to negotiation.
Negotiation to transition.
Transition to reconstruction.
Reconstruction to prosperity.
And ultimately:
Prosperity to stability.
The Final Question
After more than six decades, perhaps Washington should ask itself a very simple question.
If American Cuba policy works exactly as intended tomorrow, what happens the morning after?
Who keeps the electricity running?
Who prevents a migration crisis?
Who finances businesses?
Who stabilizes the banking system?
Who repairs infrastructure?
Who resolves property claims?
Who protects institutions?
Who prevents corruption?
Who gives Cuban families confidence that staying home is better than leaving?
If Washington cannot answer those questions, then Washington has prepared extensively for confrontation but insufficiently for success.
The United States has a Cuba policy.
Now it needs a strategy for what happens when that policy actually produces change.
Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States and the future of the hemisphere.