By Horizonte Cubano News
Cuba is not legally a “transition government” under the definition established by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.
That distinction matters.
The law establishes specific political conditions that must be satisfied before a Cuban government can receive that designation.
Cuba has not satisfied them.
But there is another question Washington should be asking:
Could Cuba already be entering a different kind of transition — an economic one?
And if the answer is even possibly yes, is the United States prepared to respond intelligently?
Something Is Changing in Cuba
Cuba remains a socialist state governed by the Communist Party.
That has not changed.
But parts of the Cuban economy are changing.
The government has announced a broad package of economic reforms.
Private businesses have become increasingly important.
Foreign investment is being reconsidered in areas previously dominated by the state.
Private companies are participating in activities that would have been difficult to imagine under Cuba’s traditional economic model.
Even energy — one of the most strategically sensitive sectors of the Cuban economy — is beginning to experience limited private participation.
None of this constitutes political transition.
But neither should Washington pretend that nothing is happening.
Transition Does Not Always Begin at the Presidential Palace
Americans often imagine political transitions as dramatic events.
A government falls.
A president resigns.
An election is announced.
A constitution changes.
But history is rarely so neat.
Sometimes political change is preceded by economic change.
New economic actors emerge.
Citizens become less dependent on the state.
Private property expands.
Businesses accumulate capital.
International commercial relationships develop.
People begin making economic decisions without waiting for government instructions.
Over time, those economic changes can alter the relationship between citizens and political power.
That possibility deserves serious attention in Cuba.
Helms-Burton Defines a Political Transition
The LIBERTAD Act established specific requirements for determining when a transition government exists in Cuba.
Among them are legalization of political activity, release of political prisoners, changes involving state-security structures and commitments to free and fair multiparty elections.
Those are substantial political requirements.
Today’s Cuban government does not meet that standard.
So Washington should not pretend otherwise.
But the law was written in 1996.
Thirty years later, Cuba presents a situation the architects of the law could not fully anticipate.
A private sector exists.
Cuban entrepreneurs engage in international commerce.
American regulations themselves recognize qualifying independent Cuban private-sector entrepreneurs.
And Cuba is experimenting with greater private participation in areas traditionally controlled by the state.
That creates a policy question that is not answered simply by declaring:
“Cuba has not yet met Section 205.”
What Happens Before Section 205?
This may be one of the most important questions in contemporary U.S.-Cuba policy.
Suppose Cuba moves gradually.
Suppose Havana expands private enterprise.
Then permits greater foreign investment.
Then gives entrepreneurs greater control over their businesses.
Then expands property rights.
Then permits greater access to international finance.
Then makes limited political reforms.
Then releases prisoners.
Then permits broader political participation.
At what point should Washington respond?
Only at the end?
Should the United States wait until every statutory requirement of a formal political transition has been satisfied before recognizing any positive movement?
Or should American policy use carefully calibrated incentives to encourage Cuba to keep moving?
Sanctions Should Create Leverage
This is where sanctions become strategically important.
A sanction should not merely punish.
A sanction should create leverage.
Leverage means:
If you do this, we are prepared to do that.
Cuba takes a measurable step.
Washington responds with a measurable step.
Cuba takes another.
Washington responds again.
The process continues as long as measurable progress continues.
If Cuba reverses course, Washington retains tools to respond.
That is negotiation.
And negotiation does not require trust.
It requires verification.
Imagine a Road Map
Washington could develop a public road map.
For example:
If Cuba expands genuinely independent private enterprise, the United States expands authorized private commercial channels.
If Cuba improves protections for private property, additional financing mechanisms become available.
If Cuba releases political prisoners, specific restrictions are suspended.
If Cuba permits independent civic organizations, another category of restrictions is reconsidered.
If Cuba commits to internationally monitored multiparty elections, Washington begins implementing the transition assistance contemplated by American law.
The specific sequence would require negotiation, legislation and legal review.
But the principle is straightforward:
Progress should produce opportunity.
Otherwise Washington is demanding movement while refusing to identify the destination.
The Cuban People Need to See the Road Too
This is not only a negotiation between governments.
Ordinary Cubans need to understand what change could mean for them.
A farmer should know what greater economic freedom might allow.
A private entrepreneur should know what international markets could become available.
A young Cuban should understand why remaining in Cuba and building a business might eventually become preferable to emigrating.
A family should understand what economic opportunities could accompany political reform.
That matters because the Cuban people will ultimately determine whether any transition succeeds.
Washington Already Has a Legal Foundation
The United States does not have to start from zero.
The LIBERTAD Act itself declares that American policy should support Cuban self-determination and be prepared to provide humanitarian, developmental and other economic assistance during a transition.
It also contemplates assistance designed to facilitate movement toward representative democracy and a market economy.
And once the statutory conditions are met, the law provides mechanisms for economic assistance and steps toward removing the embargo.
The architecture exists.
The problem is that Americans and Cubans rarely hear anyone explain what that architecture would look like in practice in 2026.
Cuba Is Not Cuba of 1996
This point cannot be overstated.
Thirty years have passed.
Cuba’s infrastructure has deteriorated.
Its population has changed.
Millions of Cubans have migrated.
The electrical system is under extraordinary pressure.
Housing requires enormous investment.
Transportation requires modernization.
Agriculture requires capital and technology.
The railway requires reconstruction.
The private sector has emerged as an important economic actor.
The international financial system has changed.
Technology has transformed commerce.
And Cuba’s relationship with the Cuban diaspora has changed dramatically.
Any serious American transition policy must recognize today’s Cuba, not the Cuba policymakers imagined three decades ago.
Economic Transition Could Create Political Opportunity
There is another possibility Washington should consider.
Economic independence can create political independence.
A citizen whose livelihood depends entirely on the state is economically vulnerable to state power.
A citizen who owns a legitimate business, earns independent income, employs workers and trades internationally occupies a different position.
That does not automatically create democracy.
China demonstrates that market activity can coexist with authoritarian political control.
Other countries demonstrate similar complexities.
So Washington should not assume capitalism automatically produces political freedom.
But economic independence can create social space that did not previously exist.
That possibility should not be dismissed.
Havana Has to Decide How Far It Will Go
The Cuban government faces its own contradiction.
It needs private businesses because the state economy cannot currently satisfy many of the country’s needs.
But genuinely independent businesses create economic power outside the state.
How much independence is Havana actually prepared to tolerate?
Can entrepreneurs become wealthy?
Can businesses grow without political connections?
Can they hire freely?
Can they import?
Can they export?
Can they attract foreign investment?
Can they own substantial productive assets?
Can they criticize government policy without losing their businesses?
Those questions will reveal whether Cuba is experiencing genuine economic transformation or merely temporary economic accommodation.
Washington Should Prepare Before the Moment Arrives
The worst time to design transition policy is during a transition.
Washington should prepare now.
Congress should examine the 1996 framework.
Economists should update reconstruction estimates.
Lawyers should identify which sanctions can be modified administratively and which require congressional action.
American businesses should understand what future commercial opportunities could exist.
Cuban private entrepreneurs should be consulted.
Cuban civil society should be consulted.
Cuban Americans should participate.
International financial institutions should examine possible scenarios.
And the United States should begin thinking seriously about the economic reconstruction framework that would accompany a genuine political transition.
Preparation does not mean predicting that Cuba’s government will collapse tomorrow.
It means avoiding improvisation if circumstances change.
Do Not Confuse Transition With Collapse
This distinction may be the most important of all.
The objective should not be the collapse of Cuba.
It should be the successful transformation of Cuba.
Those are radically different outcomes.
Collapse means:
No electricity.
No functioning institutions.
No investment.
Mass migration.
Food shortages.
Crime.
Political instability.
Desperation.
Transition should mean something different:
Increasing economic freedom.
Increasing political freedom.
Functional institutions.
Investment.
Private enterprise.
Rule of law.
Infrastructure reconstruction.
And ultimately a government chosen freely by Cubans.
If Washington’s policy cannot distinguish between collapse and transition, then Washington does not yet have a complete Cuba strategy.
Cuba May Already Be Moving
We should be cautious.
Cuba has not become a democracy.
It has not satisfied the LIBERTAD Act’s definition of a transition government.
Its political system remains fundamentally unchanged.
But economically, something is moving.
Perhaps those reforms will fail.
Perhaps Havana will reverse them.
Perhaps they will remain too limited to produce meaningful transformation.
But perhaps they are also the beginning of something larger.
Washington should be prepared for all of those possibilities.
Because good foreign policy does not simply react to history after history happens.
It prepares for possibilities before they arrive.
Thirty years ago, Congress wrote a legal framework for a Cuban transition.
Today Cuba is changing economically while remaining politically unchanged.
That leaves Washington with a question it should answer now:
If economic transition begins before political transition, will American policy know how to recognize it — and how to use it to encourage what comes next?
Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.