By Pastor Herrera Macurán
Horizonte Cubano News
August 25, 2026 — Morning Edition
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that those calling for a military intervention in Cuba get exactly what they want.
Suppose the existing government collapses.
Suppose the military operation succeeds.
Suppose the old political order disappears faster than anyone expected.
Then comes the question that is rarely discussed with the same enthusiasm as the invasion itself:
Who governs Cuba the next morning?
Removing a government and building a legitimate political order are entirely different things.
A military victory can be achieved by military power.
Political legitimacy cannot.
And no serious policy toward Cuba can ignore that distinction.
Washington Cannot Choose Cuba’s Next Government
For decades, different organizations and personalities outside Cuba have presented visions for the country’s political future.
They have every right to participate in that debate.
But participation is not entitlement.
Living in exile, opposing the Cuban government, having suffered political persecution, or possessing influence in Washington does not automatically give anyone the right to govern eleven million people.
That decision belongs to Cubans.
Especially the Cubans who would have to live under the new political system.
The United States could encourage democratic institutions and defend fundamental freedoms. It could provide technical assistance for elections and reconstruction if requested by a legitimate Cuban authority.
But Washington should not select Cuba’s president, write its political program, or determine which exile organization deserves power.
A government installed primarily because Washington preferred it would begin its existence with a serious legitimacy problem.
Opposition Is Not the Same as Government
Opposing a government requires one set of abilities.
Governing a country requires another.
A functioning government must administer transportation, electricity, water, hospitals, schools, courts, ports, agriculture, telecommunications, public finances and local government.
It must collect revenue.
It must pay public employees.
It must maintain order.
It must resolve disputes.
It must establish economic rules that citizens and investors understand.
And it must do all of this while earning public confidence.
Political slogans cannot perform these functions.
Neither can decades-old credentials.
Anyone proposing a post-government political arrangement for Cuba must explain not simply who deserves power, but how the country would actually be governed.
Cuba Cannot Be Governed From Miami
Miami is an essential center of Cuban life outside the island.
Its Cuban community has preserved culture, family connections, political activism, businesses and institutions across generations.
Its voice matters enormously.
But Miami is not Cuba.
Havana is Cuba.
Santiago is Cuba.
Matanzas is Cuba.
Camagüey is Cuba.
Holguín is Cuba.
Pinar del Río is Cuba.
So are the towns and rural communities that rarely appear in American political discussions.
A future Cuban political system cannot be designed exclusively around the preferences of people who live outside the country.
The diaspora deserves a voice.
The population of the island deserves the decisive voice.
Those two realities must coexist.
What Happens to Cuba’s Existing Institutions?
There is another question rarely discussed.
A change of political system does not make an entire state disappear.
Teachers do not suddenly become unnecessary.
Doctors do not become unnecessary.
Railroad workers do not become unnecessary.
Engineers do not become unnecessary.
Municipal employees do not become unnecessary.
Civil servants do not become unnecessary.
A transition that attempts to classify every person who worked for the Cuban state as an enemy could destroy the administrative capacity necessary to keep the country functioning.
Accountability for serious abuses is one matter.
Collective punishment is another.
Cuba would need a process capable of distinguishing between those responsible for serious violations and millions of ordinary citizens who worked within state institutions simply because that was where employment existed.
A country cannot reconcile itself by declaring half of its population guilty and the other half victorious.
Revenge Cannot Become a Political Program
This may be one of the most difficult issues in any future Cuban transition.
There are genuine wounds.
There are political prisoners.
There are families separated by exile.
There are confiscated properties.
There are decades of anger, resentment and historical grievances.
Those matters cannot simply be erased.
But neither can revenge become the organizing principle of a new republic.
Justice requires institutions.
Evidence.
Courts.
Due process.
And rules that apply equally.
If Cuba ever undergoes a fundamental political transition, it will need mechanisms for truth, accountability, reconciliation and lawful resolution of historical claims.
Otherwise yesterday’s victims may become tomorrow’s persecutors, and the political cycle simply begins again under another flag.
The Armed Forces Question
Any serious transition plan must also address Cuba’s military and security institutions.
What happens to ordinary soldiers?
What happens to officers?
Who controls weapons and military installations?
Who protects borders and ports?
Who maintains public order while new civilian institutions are established?
Simply dissolving institutions without having functioning replacements could create precisely the instability a transition is supposed to prevent.
The objective should be civilian democratic authority over legitimate state institutions — not institutional chaos.
This requires planning long before anyone declares victory.
Elections Are Essential — But Elections Alone Are Not Enough
Free elections would be fundamental to establishing political legitimacy.
But an election is not simply putting ballot boxes in schools and inviting people to vote.
Political organizations need freedom to organize.
Candidates need access to voters.
Journalists need freedom to report.
Citizens need reliable information.
Election authorities must be trusted.
Voters need confidence that ballots will be counted honestly.
Courts must be capable of resolving disputes.
And competing political forces must agree that losing an election does not justify destroying the system.
Democracy is not merely election day.
It is the institutional agreement to live together the day after the election.
Cubans on the Island Must Be Heard Before Any Transition
Washington spends considerable time listening to people who claim to know what Cubans want.
Perhaps the better approach is simpler.
Ask Cubans.
Not only political activists.
Not only government officials.
Not only exile organizations.
Ask workers.
Ask farmers.
Ask entrepreneurs.
Ask students.
Ask professionals.
Ask retirees.
Ask Cubans who support the existing system.
Ask Cubans who oppose it.
Ask those who are tired of politics altogether.
The purpose of listening is not to obtain one predetermined answer.
It is to understand that a nation contains many answers.
That diversity is precisely what a future pluralistic Cuba would have to accommodate.
Cuba’s Future Must Be Cuban
The United States has legitimate interests in what happens in Cuba.
Geography guarantees that.
Migration, trade, security and regional stability ensure that Cuba will always matter to Washington.
But American interests should not be confused with ownership of Cuba’s political future.
The United States can encourage peaceful change.
It can defend human rights.
It can negotiate.
It can engage.
It can support economic opportunity.
It can insist that its own national interests be respected.
But ultimately, Cuba belongs to Cubans.
Not to Washington.
Not to Havana’s political elite.
Not to Miami.
Not to any foreign government.
And not to any organization that believes history has already granted it the right to rule.
Before anyone asks how to overthrow the Cuban government, there is a more important question:
What political system could earn the consent of the Cuban people afterward?
Until that question has a credible answer, discussions about military victory are dangerously incomplete.
Because the most difficult challenge would not be determining who controls Havana on the night a government falls.
It would be determining who has the legitimate right to govern Cuba the morning after.
Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.