By Horizonte Cubano News

For more than six decades, Washington has pursued one overriding objective toward Cuba:

Change.

Administrations have disagreed profoundly about how to achieve it.

Some have favored engagement.

Others have favored isolation.

Some have expanded travel and financial channels.

Others have tightened sanctions.

But behind virtually every American policy toward Cuba stands the same fundamental assumption: something in Cuba must change.

That raises a surprisingly difficult question.

What exactly would Washington consider success?

If the United States wants change in Cuba, it should be able to explain what that change looks like, how it would be measured, and what Washington would be prepared to do if meaningful change actually occurred.

Washington Has Already Stated Some of Its Goals

The current U.S. policy is not entirely ambiguous.

The White House has said that American policy should promote greater freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, increased free enterprise, and a stable and prosperous Cuba.

Washington has also emphasized directing economic benefits toward the Cuban people rather than institutions controlled by the Cuban government, military, intelligence, or security apparatus.

Those are identifiable objectives.

But objectives become meaningful only when governments establish ways to measure progress toward them.

If Cuba releases political prisoners, does that count?

If private businesses become more independent, does that count?

If Cubans gain greater access to private property and international commerce, does that count?

If Havana expands freedom of expression, does that count?

If the two governments reach agreements on migration, security, property claims or economic disputes, does that count?

And most importantly:

What would the United States offer in return for measurable progress?

Sanctions Are a Tool, Not an Objective

This distinction matters.

Sanctions are not themselves a foreign-policy outcome.

They are a tool intended to produce an outcome.

The effectiveness of a sanction therefore cannot be measured simply by how restrictive it is.

It must be measured by what it accomplishes.

If a sanction changes government behavior, that is measurable.

If it prevents money from reaching individuals responsible for repression, that is measurable.

If it protects American national-security interests, that is measurable.

But if a sanction remains in place decade after decade without producing its intended political result, policymakers should be willing to examine why.

That does not automatically mean removing the sanction.

It means evaluating it.

Serious policy requires measurement.

The Private Sector Provides a Test

Washington says it wants a Cuban private sector independent of government control.

That objective deserves attention because something important has already happened.

The United States itself recognizes a category of independent private sector entrepreneurs in Cuba.

Current Treasury regulations provide pathways for certain authorized transactions involving qualifying Cuban private businesses and entrepreneurs.

American regulations even distinguish between genuinely independent economic actors and prohibited Cuban officials or Communist Party officials.

That distinction is significant.

Washington is already acknowledging, through its own regulations, that the Cuban government and every Cuban business are not the same thing.

So here is a reasonable policy test:

If Cuba permits its private sector to expand, become more independent and conduct legitimate international commerce, should Washington make lawful commerce with those businesses easier?

If the answer is yes, then the United States has created an incentive for economic independence.

If the answer is no regardless of what Cuba does, then Havana has little reason to believe economic reform will produce any change in its relationship with Washington.

Foreign policy needs incentives as well as penalties.

Havana Must Be Tested Too

None of this places responsibility exclusively on Washington.

The Cuban government has its own decisions to make.

If Havana wants international recognition of its economic reforms, it must demonstrate that private businesses are actually private.

Entrepreneurs must be able to operate without political favoritism.

Ownership must be transparent.

Contracts must be enforceable.

Foreign suppliers must know who their counterparties really are.

Businesses should not secretly function as fronts for state or military-controlled enterprises.

And successful entrepreneurs should not have to fear that the government will arbitrarily change the rules after they invest.

The United States has legitimate reasons to demand these safeguards.

But safeguards can also become benchmarks.

And benchmarks create something that U.S.-Cuba policy has lacked for too long:

a measurable path forward.

Human Rights Need Benchmarks Too

The same principle applies to human rights.

Washington regularly criticizes Havana for political imprisonment, restrictions on expression and suppression of political opposition.

Those concerns should not disappear.

But the United States should specify what measurable improvements would produce measurable American responses.

Suppose Cuba releases a significant number of prisoners detained for political activity.

What happens next?

Suppose restrictions on private media are reduced.

What happens next?

Suppose Cubans receive greater freedom to travel, organize businesses or participate in civic life.

What happens next?

If the answer is always nothing, then American policy provides punishment without incentive.

Negotiation works differently.

Negotiation says:

If you do X, we are prepared to do Y.

Then both sides can decide whether the exchange serves their interests.

Property Claims Cannot Be Ignored

There is another issue Washington and Havana eventually must confront: unresolved American property claims.

Those claims have survived administration after administration.

They cannot simply be wished away.

But neither will they be resolved if Cuba remains permanently isolated from the economic mechanisms that could allow it to negotiate settlements and generate resources.

This is where economic reform, private investment, sanctions policy and historical claims begin to intersect.

A future negotiation could establish measurable stages.

Cuba takes one step.

The United States takes another.

Cuba meets another benchmark.

Washington responds.

That is not surrender.

That is diplomacy.

What Would Success Look Like in Five Years?

Imagine Washington establishing a public Cuba policy scorecard.

Not propaganda.

Not slogans.

Actual measurements.

How many political prisoners have been released?

How many genuinely independent Cuban businesses are operating?

How much authorized trade is occurring between American and independent Cuban businesses?

Has access to information expanded?

Have bilateral migration disputes improved?

Have negotiations begun over certified property claims?

Has Cuba increased economic opportunities for ordinary citizens?

Has the United States reduced economic relationships with entities controlled by the Cuban military while expanding relationships with independent Cubans?

Those are outcomes that can be measured.

Then Americans could determine whether their Cuba policy was working.

And Cubans could understand exactly what Washington was asking them to accomplish.

Cuba Should Know What Is on the Other Side of the Door

This may be the most important issue.

If Washington asks Havana to change, Havana should know what happens if it does.

Does one restriction disappear?

Does a commercial authorization expand?

Does a diplomatic channel reopen?

Does a sanction get suspended?

Does negotiation begin on another issue?

The answer does not need to be everything at once.

In fact, it shouldn’t be.

Progress can be incremental.

But there must be something on the other side of the door.

Otherwise the United States is not creating leverage.

It is simply maintaining pressure.

And pressure without a defined destination can eventually become policy by inertia.

Define the Destination

The United States does not need to abandon its principles to negotiate with Cuba.

It does not need to abandon human rights.

It does not need to finance the Cuban military.

It does not need to ignore political prisoners.

It does not need to forget American property claims.

And it certainly does not need to accept every proposal Havana makes.

What Washington needs is something much simpler:

a definition of success.

Tell Havana what measurable changes matter.

Tell the Cuban people what opportunities those changes could create.

Tell American businesses what lawful economic activity Washington wants to encourage.

Tell Cuban private entrepreneurs what standards they must meet.

And tell the American public how we will know whether six decades of policy are finally producing results.

Because demanding change is easy.

Defining the change you are willing to recognize is much harder.

And if Washington truly wants a different Cuba, it should be prepared to explain what that Cuba would have to do — and what the United States would do in return.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

If Washington Wants Change in Cuba, It Should Define What Change Actually Means

By Horizonte Cubano News

For more than six decades, Washington has pursued one overriding objective toward Cuba:

Change.

Administrations have disagreed profoundly about how to achieve it.

Some have favored engagement.

Others have favored isolation.

Some have expanded travel and financial channels.

Others have tightened sanctions.

But behind virtually every American policy toward Cuba stands the same fundamental assumption: something in Cuba must change.

That raises a surprisingly difficult question.

What exactly would Washington consider success?

If the United States wants change in Cuba, it should be able to explain what that change looks like, how it would be measured, and what Washington would be prepared to do if meaningful change actually occurred.

Washington Has Already Stated Some of Its Goals

The current U.S. policy is not entirely ambiguous.

The White House has said that American policy should promote greater freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, increased free enterprise, and a stable and prosperous Cuba.

Washington has also emphasized directing economic benefits toward the Cuban people rather than institutions controlled by the Cuban government, military, intelligence, or security apparatus.

Those are identifiable objectives.

But objectives become meaningful only when governments establish ways to measure progress toward them.

If Cuba releases political prisoners, does that count?

If private businesses become more independent, does that count?

If Cubans gain greater access to private property and international commerce, does that count?

If Havana expands freedom of expression, does that count?

If the two governments reach agreements on migration, security, property claims or economic disputes, does that count?

And most importantly:

What would the United States offer in return for measurable progress?

Sanctions Are a Tool, Not an Objective

This distinction matters.

Sanctions are not themselves a foreign-policy outcome.

They are a tool intended to produce an outcome.

The effectiveness of a sanction therefore cannot be measured simply by how restrictive it is.

It must be measured by what it accomplishes.

If a sanction changes government behavior, that is measurable.

If it prevents money from reaching individuals responsible for repression, that is measurable.

If it protects American national-security interests, that is measurable.

But if a sanction remains in place decade after decade without producing its intended political result, policymakers should be willing to examine why.

That does not automatically mean removing the sanction.

It means evaluating it.

Serious policy requires measurement.

The Private Sector Provides a Test

Washington says it wants a Cuban private sector independent of government control.

That objective deserves attention because something important has already happened.

The United States itself recognizes a category of independent private sector entrepreneurs in Cuba.

Current Treasury regulations provide pathways for certain authorized transactions involving qualifying Cuban private businesses and entrepreneurs.

American regulations even distinguish between genuinely independent economic actors and prohibited Cuban officials or Communist Party officials.

That distinction is significant.

Washington is already acknowledging, through its own regulations, that the Cuban government and every Cuban business are not the same thing.

So here is a reasonable policy test:

If Cuba permits its private sector to expand, become more independent and conduct legitimate international commerce, should Washington make lawful commerce with those businesses easier?

If the answer is yes, then the United States has created an incentive for economic independence.

If the answer is no regardless of what Cuba does, then Havana has little reason to believe economic reform will produce any change in its relationship with Washington.

Foreign policy needs incentives as well as penalties.

Havana Must Be Tested Too

None of this places responsibility exclusively on Washington.

The Cuban government has its own decisions to make.

If Havana wants international recognition of its economic reforms, it must demonstrate that private businesses are actually private.

Entrepreneurs must be able to operate without political favoritism.

Ownership must be transparent.

Contracts must be enforceable.

Foreign suppliers must know who their counterparties really are.

Businesses should not secretly function as fronts for state or military-controlled enterprises.

And successful entrepreneurs should not have to fear that the government will arbitrarily change the rules after they invest.

The United States has legitimate reasons to demand these safeguards.

But safeguards can also become benchmarks.

And benchmarks create something that U.S.-Cuba policy has lacked for too long:

a measurable path forward.

Human Rights Need Benchmarks Too

The same principle applies to human rights.

Washington regularly criticizes Havana for political imprisonment, restrictions on expression and suppression of political opposition.

Those concerns should not disappear.

But the United States should specify what measurable improvements would produce measurable American responses.

Suppose Cuba releases a significant number of prisoners detained for political activity.

What happens next?

Suppose restrictions on private media are reduced.

What happens next?

Suppose Cubans receive greater freedom to travel, organize businesses or participate in civic life.

What happens next?

If the answer is always nothing, then American policy provides punishment without incentive.

Negotiation works differently.

Negotiation says:

If you do X, we are prepared to do Y.

Then both sides can decide whether the exchange serves their interests.

Property Claims Cannot Be Ignored

There is another issue Washington and Havana eventually must confront: unresolved American property claims.

Those claims have survived administration after administration.

They cannot simply be wished away.

But neither will they be resolved if Cuba remains permanently isolated from the economic mechanisms that could allow it to negotiate settlements and generate resources.

This is where economic reform, private investment, sanctions policy and historical claims begin to intersect.

A future negotiation could establish measurable stages.

Cuba takes one step.

The United States takes another.

Cuba meets another benchmark.

Washington responds.

That is not surrender.

That is diplomacy.

What Would Success Look Like in Five Years?

Imagine Washington establishing a public Cuba policy scorecard.

Not propaganda.

Not slogans.

Actual measurements.

How many political prisoners have been released?

How many genuinely independent Cuban businesses are operating?

How much authorized trade is occurring between American and independent Cuban businesses?

Has access to information expanded?

Have bilateral migration disputes improved?

Have negotiations begun over certified property claims?

Has Cuba increased economic opportunities for ordinary citizens?

Has the United States reduced economic relationships with entities controlled by the Cuban military while expanding relationships with independent Cubans?

Those are outcomes that can be measured.

Then Americans could determine whether their Cuba policy was working.

And Cubans could understand exactly what Washington was asking them to accomplish.

Cuba Should Know What Is on the Other Side of the Door

This may be the most important issue.

If Washington asks Havana to change, Havana should know what happens if it does.

Does one restriction disappear?

Does a commercial authorization expand?

Does a diplomatic channel reopen?

Does a sanction get suspended?

Does negotiation begin on another issue?

The answer does not need to be everything at once.

In fact, it shouldn’t be.

Progress can be incremental.

But there must be something on the other side of the door.

Otherwise the United States is not creating leverage.

It is simply maintaining pressure.

And pressure without a defined destination can eventually become policy by inertia.

Define the Destination

The United States does not need to abandon its principles to negotiate with Cuba.

It does not need to abandon human rights.

It does not need to finance the Cuban military.

It does not need to ignore political prisoners.

It does not need to forget American property claims.

And it certainly does not need to accept every proposal Havana makes.

What Washington needs is something much simpler:

a definition of success.

Tell Havana what measurable changes matter.

Tell the Cuban people what opportunities those changes could create.

Tell American businesses what lawful economic activity Washington wants to encourage.

Tell Cuban private entrepreneurs what standards they must meet.

And tell the American public how we will know whether six decades of policy are finally producing results.

Because demanding change is easy.

Defining the change you are willing to recognize is much harder.

And if Washington truly wants a different Cuba, it should be prepared to explain what that Cuba would have to do — and what the United States would do in return.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.