By Pastor Herrera Macurán
Horizonte Cubano News

For more than six decades, the United States and Cuba have carried an unresolved financial dispute worth billions of dollars.

This is not an estimate invented for a political speech.

According to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC), the two completed Cuban claims programs produced 5,913 awards with a combined certified principal amount of $1,902,202,284.95.

That is approximately $1.9 billion in principal alone.

And the United States government states clearly that these claims have not been settled with Cuba.

So after more than sixty years, there is a simple question that deserves a serious answer:

How exactly are these creditors going to get paid?

A certified claim can establish an obligation.

But a claim is not a check.

If American creditors ultimately want payment, Washington and Havana must eventually move beyond political confrontation and design a financial mechanism capable of producing actual money.

And that leads to an uncomfortable economic reality:

If American creditors want Cuba to pay billions of dollars in historical claims, Cuba must possess an economy capable of generating the money to pay them.

$1.9 Billion in Principal — Before Considering Decades of Interest

The numbers matter.

The original Cuban Claims Program was completed in 1972.

The Commission adjudicated 8,816 claims and determined that 5,911 were compensable, with an adjudicated principal value of:

$1,851,057,358.00

A second Cuban Claims Program was conducted decades later.

Two additional claims were certified, including one for:

$51,128,926.95

and another for:

$16,000.00

Taken together, the FCSC currently reports:

5,913 awards

with total principal of:

$1,902,202,284.95

That figure is principal.

The historical claims framework also involves interest considerations, meaning the economic exposure associated with resolving these decades-old obligations can be substantially greater than the original principal.

That is precisely why Washington and Havana need a negotiated settlement rather than another generation of political slogans.

A Claim Is Not the Same as a Payment

These claims represent legitimate unresolved financial issues between the United States and Cuba.

They should not simply disappear.

Property rights matter.

Contracts matter.

Compensation matters.

And any serious future normalization of economic relations between Cuba and the United States should address them.

But recognizing a debt and collecting a debt are two completely different things.

A creditor ultimately needs more than a certificate saying:

$1,000,000 owed.

Or:

$10,000,000 owed.

Or:

$50,000,000 owed.

The creditor eventually needs money.

And money requires cash flow.

Where Will $1.9 Billion — Plus Whatever Is Negotiated — Come From?

This is the question that should dominate the next phase of the discussion.

Suppose Washington and Havana sit down tomorrow and agree that the certified claims should finally be settled.

Where does Cuba obtain approximately $1.9 billion in principal, much less whatever additional amount might ultimately result from a negotiated settlement?

Cuba already faces enormous economic difficulties.

Its electrical system requires investment.

Railroads require investment.

Ports require investment.

Water infrastructure requires investment.

Agriculture requires equipment and financing.

Housing requires capital.

Industry requires modernization.

Foreign currency remains scarce.

The country has other international financial obligations as well.

Demanding billions of dollars from an economy in that condition may produce a politically satisfying statement.

It does not necessarily produce payment.

A serious settlement therefore requires an economic strategy.

Creditors Need a Cuba That Generates Revenue

This creates an unusual convergence of interests.

American creditors need repayment.

Cuba needs investment.

American businesses may eventually want access to commercial opportunities.

Cuban businesses need capital and markets.

Washington wants leverage.

Havana wants greater access to the international economy.

Those interests do not have to remain permanently incompatible.

A growing Cuban economy generates revenue.

Exports generate revenue.

Productive businesses generate revenue.

Tourism generates revenue.

Modern transportation can generate revenue.

Modern ports can generate revenue.

Energy investment can support revenue-producing industries.

Expanded lawful trade can generate revenue.

The question should therefore become:

Can part of Cuba’s future economic growth be structured to resolve its past financial obligations?

That is a much more useful question than waiting another sixty years.

Create a Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Mechanism

Washington and Havana should eventually negotiate a comprehensive claims settlement agreement.

The claims have already been waiting for decades.

The first major American claims program ended in 1972.

It is now 2026.

That means another 54 years have passed without a comprehensive settlement.

How much longer should creditors wait?

Ten more years?

Twenty?

Another fifty?

Instead, the governments should begin examining a structured settlement.

Claims would need to be categorized.

Principal amounts would need to be recognized according to whatever methodology the parties negotiate.

Interest would have to be addressed.

Payment schedules would have to be realistic.

Disputes would require resolution mechanisms.

And the legitimate rights of claimants would have to be protected.

The objective should not be demanding an economically impossible payment tomorrow.

The objective should be designing payments that actually arrive.

A Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Fund

One option deserves serious examination:

A dedicated Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Fund.

Imagine that Washington and Havana negotiate an agreement establishing a long-term mechanism for paying the approximately $1.9 billion in certified principal, together with whatever additional amounts are ultimately agreed upon.

The fund could potentially receive money from multiple negotiated sources over time.

Depending upon applicable American and Cuban law, those sources could be examined in connection with future commercial revenues, investment transactions, privatization proceeds where applicable, agreed government contributions, infrastructure concessions or other lawful revenue streams.

The precise structure would require extensive professional analysis.

Economists would have to model the revenue.

Lawyers would have to determine what American and Cuban law permits.

Financial institutions would have to establish mechanisms capable of processing payments.

Claimants would need representation.

Governments would have to negotiate.

Investors would need protections.

But complicated financial problems are solved every day.

The fact that a problem is difficult does not justify leaving it unresolved forever.

Imagine a 20-Year Settlement

Consider a purely illustrative example.

Take the approximately $1.9 billion principal currently reported by the FCSC.

Ignoring interest and other negotiating adjustments for the moment, dividing $1.9 billion evenly across twenty years would represent approximately:

$95 million per year.

That does not mean $95 million annually is the correct settlement.

It is simply an illustration.

Real negotiations would have to address interest, claim priorities, payment schedules, Cuba’s capacity to pay, possible lump-sum discounts, financing structures and numerous other factors.

But the example demonstrates something important.

A figure that appears almost impossible as an immediate lump-sum payment can look very different when converted into a long-term financial structure.

That is what negotiation can accomplish.

Investment Could Help Produce the Money

Cuba needs enormous amounts of infrastructure investment.

Electricity.

Railroads.

Ports.

Water.

Telecommunications.

Agriculture.

Housing.

Tourism.

Manufacturing.

Transportation.

Those needs could eventually create economic opportunities.

A properly designed normalization process could examine whether economic development and debt settlement can reinforce one another.

Future infrastructure and commercial projects can generate revenues.

Subject to applicable laws and negotiated agreements, a portion of certain future revenue streams could potentially contribute to a claims settlement mechanism.

That would create a fundamentally different relationship between Cuba’s past and its future.

Development would help finance settlement.

And settlement could help create confidence for additional development.

Resolving Old Claims Could Unlock New Capital

Investors examine risk.

One of the questions any serious investor asks is:

What happens to my property?

Can contracts be enforced?

Can rules change after I invest?

Can my assets be taken?

How are disputes resolved?

Cuba’s unresolved confiscation history inevitably affects those questions.

Resolving the American claims could therefore produce a benefit extending far beyond the claimants themselves.

It could send a message to future investors:

Historical obligations are being addressed.

New investment will operate under clearer protections.

Contracts will matter.

Property rights will matter.

That credibility has economic value.

Creditors Should Ask What They Actually Want

American claimants and their successors should ultimately decide what arrangements they are willing to accept.

But there is a fundamental economic question worth asking.

Which has greater value?

A claim for a large amount that remains unpaid indefinitely?

Or a negotiated settlement producing actual payments over time?

Some creditors may prefer waiting.

Others may prefer settlement.

That choice belongs to them.

But after more than half a century without a comprehensive settlement, they deserve a realistic pathway toward payment.

Washington Must Participate Too

Cuba cannot realistically generate substantially greater economic activity with the United States while every major economic restriction remains permanently unchanged.

A claims settlement therefore should become part of a larger negotiation.

As Cuba makes verified payments and fulfills agreed economic obligations, Washington should be prepared to provide corresponding economic measures where existing executive authority permits.

Where congressional legislation is required, Congress should debate it.

The objective should be a road map.

Payment for normalization.

Reform for investment.

Compliance for expanded economic opportunity.

Verification at every stage.

Neither side should be expected to surrender everything at the beginning.

Both sides should be required to perform.

Stop Waiting for Regime Change to Solve a $1.9 Billion Problem

For decades, some have assumed that Cuba’s political system would eventually collapse and another government would resolve the claims.

Maybe Cuba will undergo fundamental political change someday.

Maybe it will not.

Nobody knows when.

That is not a financial strategy.

Creditors cannot deposit political predictions into bank accounts.

And waiting for an American military intervention is even less realistic as a debt-collection strategy.

An invasion is not a payment mechanism.

A regime change is not a payment schedule.

A political speech is not a wire transfer.

Negotiation is how governments settle international claims.

Indeed, the FCSC itself explains that its certifications were intended for use by the U.S. government in negotiating a future claims settlement agreement with Cuba.

The mechanism was always supposed to lead eventually toward negotiation.

It is time to use it.

Turn $1.9 Billion From a Historical Dispute Into a Financial Agreement

The numbers are now sitting in government records.

5,913 awards.

$1,902,202,284.95 in principal.

And still no comprehensive settlement.

Those numbers should not remain political museum pieces for another generation.

They should become the starting point for negotiations.

Imagine a different equation:

Cuba reforms.

Investment enters.

Businesses grow.

Infrastructure improves.

Economic activity generates revenue.

A negotiated portion of agreed revenues contributes to settling historical claims.

Creditors begin receiving payments.

Economic restrictions are progressively reconsidered as obligations are fulfilled.

Commercial relationships expand.

And Cuba becomes increasingly capable of paying precisely because its economy becomes increasingly capable of producing.

That would transform an unresolved dispute into an economic mechanism.

It would require lawyers.

Economists.

Financial specialists.

Investors.

Claimant representatives.

Government negotiators.

Infrastructure experts.

And professionals capable of connecting projects, capital, legal requirements and commercial opportunities across two countries separated by more than sixty years of political confrontation.

That will not be simple.

But complicated does not mean impossible.

After more than six decades, perhaps Washington and Havana should begin with the most basic accounting question of all:

How do we turn $1,902,202,284.95 on paper into money actually paid to creditors?

Because if American creditors truly want to be paid, they should also want something else:

A Cuba capable of paying them.

Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.