Categoría: Politica

  • An Open Letter to Angie Nixon: South Florida Is About More Than Cuba

    By Pastor Herrera Macuran | Horizonte Cubano News

    Dear Representative Angie Nixon,

    Some time ago, I sent a letter to your U.S. Senate campaign introducing myself and sharing my perspective on Florida, Cuba, and the political conversation taking place in our state.

    I did not receive a response. I understand that a statewide campaign receives an enormous amount of correspondence, and I do not know whether that first letter ever reached you personally.

    For that reason, I am writing again — this time publicly.

    I recently listened to you during a Miami television program. I came away convinced that there is a much larger conversation your campaign could be having with South Florida.

    That conversation is not primarily about Cuba.

    It is about the people who live here.

    South Florida Is Struggling

    South Florida is home to Cubans, Haitians, Venezuelans, Colombians, Nicaraguans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans and immigrants from throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

    It is also home to Black Americans, white working-class families and people who may have very different political histories but increasingly confront many of the same economic realities.

    Housing has become extraordinarily expensive.

    Rent consumes an increasing portion of workers’ incomes.

    Food, transportation, insurance and other necessities place enormous pressure on families.

    Agriculture, construction, hospitality, restaurants and numerous other industries depend heavily on immigrant workers.

    At the same time, immigration enforcement, detention and deportation have created fear and uncertainty for immigrant families.

    Behind every immigration statistic there can be a worker, a child, a spouse, an employer and a community.

    Cubans are affected.

    Haitians are affected.

    Venezuelans are affected.

    Other Latino and Caribbean communities are affected.

    And the consequences extend beyond immigrants themselves because these communities are deeply woven into Florida’s economy.

    These are issues worthy of a candidate for the United States Senate.

    There Is a Political Opportunity Here

    Representative Nixon, you have an opportunity to speak for people who often appear in political speeches but do not always believe politicians understand their daily lives.

    Talk to the construction worker struggling to pay rent.

    Talk to agricultural workers wondering what immigration policy means for their families.

    Talk to the Haitian family worried about whether the life they have built in Florida can suddenly disappear.

    Talk to Venezuelans, Cubans and other immigrants who came here seeking stability and opportunity.

    Talk to Black families, Latino families and white working-class families confronting the same grocery bills, insurance premiums and housing costs.

    There may be far more common ground among these Floridians than our political system acknowledges.

    That could be a powerful conversation.

    But there is another issue where I respectfully believe caution is necessary.

    Cuba Requires More Than a Slogan

    I am Cuban-American.

    I oppose policies that unnecessarily punish Cuban families. I believe the suffering of ordinary people should never become an instrument of political strategy.

    But I also do not believe that the United States embargo, by itself, is the cause of poverty in Cuba.

    Cuba’s economic condition cannot responsibly be explained without examining the decisions and failures of the Cuban government, the structure of its economy, decades of U.S. sanctions, its international relationships and more than sixty years of confrontation between Havana and Washington.

    All of those realities can be discussed simultaneously.

    Recognizing the failures of the Cuban system does not require supporting policies that hurt Cuban families.

    Questioning American sanctions does not require absolving the Cuban government of responsibility.

    That distinction is particularly important in South Florida.

    Listen Before Defining Cuba

    The Cuban question is politically and emotionally complicated.

    People in South Florida carry different histories: exile, imprisonment, separation, migration, lost property, family members remaining on the island and generations born in the United States.

    Entering that discussion requires listening.

    If Cuban poverty is presented primarily as the consequence of a U.S. «blockade,» many Cuban-American voters may stop listening before they ever hear what you have to say about housing, wages, healthcare, immigration or the cost of living.

    And that would be a lost opportunity.

    You do not have to agree with the traditional politics of Miami.

    You do not have to abandon your own principles.

    But understanding a community is different from simply adopting one side of a decades-old political argument.

    Make This Election About Florida

    My suggestion is simple:

    Do not allow Cuba to define your campaign in South Florida.

    Make this election about Florida.

    Make it about whether a family can afford a home.

    Make it about whether someone working forty hours a week can afford rent, groceries, transportation and insurance.

    Make it about agriculture and construction.

    Make it about workers.

    Make it about immigration policies and their human and economic consequences.

    Make it about the Haitian, Venezuelan, Cuban and other immigrant families who are part of Florida.

    Make it about Black, Latino and white families who may vote differently but frequently struggle with the same economic problems.

    Cuba deserves a serious discussion.

    But Florida’s voters deserve a campaign about their lives.

    I am not asking you to abandon your principles or adopt mine.

    I am asking you to listen.

    Listen to South Florida before allowing the politics of Cuba to speak louder than the people who actually live here.

    That conversation might surprise you.

    And it might also reveal that Floridians who appear politically divided have considerably more in common than Washington assumes.

    Respectfully,

    Pastor Herrera Macuran
    Horizonte Cubano News

    The facts first. Opinion second. Evidence always.

  • ¿QUÉ DIRÍA BOLÍVAR? EL PETRÓLEO DE VENEZUELA PERTENECE A VENEZUELA, NO A QUIENES OCUPAN EL PODER

    Por Horizonte Cubano News

    El petróleo de Venezuela no pertenece a un presidente, a un ministro, a un partido político ni a un grupo que circunstancialmente controle el poder.

    Tampoco pertenece a Washington.

    El petróleo venezolano constituye parte del patrimonio de una nación y de su pueblo. Por eso, cualquier acuerdo que pueda comprometer durante años una parte significativa de esa riqueza merece algo elemental en cualquier sociedad que pretenda llamarse republicana: transparencia, legalidad y rendición de cuentas.

    La cuestión adquiere todavía mayor importancia cuando se afirma que existen entendimientos relacionados con petróleo venezolano y los intereses estratégicos de Estados Unidos.

    La primera pregunta debería ser sencilla:

    ¿Dónde está el acuerdo?

    La segunda es todavía más importante:

    ¿Quién lo firmó, bajo qué autoridad jurídica y cuáles son exactamente las obligaciones asumidas por cada parte?

    ¿QUIÉN PUEDE COMPROMETER A ESTADOS UNIDOS?

    En Estados Unidos no basta con que una persona diga que está negociando “en nombre de Estados Unidos” para que automáticamente pueda comprometer jurídicamente a la nación.

    La Constitución establece un procedimiento específico para los tratados internacionales. El presidente tiene facultad para negociarlos, pero un tratado requiere el consejo y consentimiento del Senado, con el voto favorable de dos tercios de los senadores presentes.

    Al mismo tiempo, el sistema constitucional estadounidense también reconoce otras categorías de acuerdos internacionales, incluidos acuerdos ejecutivos que no necesariamente pasan por ese mismo procedimiento senatorial.

    Por eso, antes de afirmar que determinado acuerdo petrolero es legal o ilegal, hay que conocer algo fundamental:

    qué clase de instrumento jurídico es.

    Si existe un acuerdo relacionado con petróleo venezolano que compromete al Gobierno de Estados Unidos, deben conocerse su naturaleza jurídica, la autoridad utilizada para celebrarlo, las obligaciones asumidas, las partes que lo suscribieron y, cuando corresponda, la participación del Congreso.

    Y si no se trata de un acuerdo entre gobiernos, sino de contratos comerciales celebrados por compañías privadas, también debe decirse claramente.

    Una empresa privada estadounidense puede realizar operaciones comerciales internacionales cuando la ley, las licencias y las sanciones aplicables lo permitan.

    Pero una empresa privada no se convierte por ello en el Gobierno de Estados Unidos.

    Esa diferencia es fundamental.

    ¿QUIÉN ES EL DUEÑO DEL PETRÓLEO?

    También existe una pregunta que debe formularse desde Venezuela.

    ¿Quién tiene autoridad para comprometer los recursos petroleros venezolanos y bajo qué disposiciones de la Constitución y las leyes venezolanas?

    Ningún funcionario debería poder disponer de los recursos nacionales como si fueran patrimonio personal.

    Si Delcy Rodríguez, o cualquier otro funcionario venezolano, participó en acuerdos relacionados con los recursos petroleros del país, esos actos deben poder ser examinados conforme al derecho venezolano.

    Eso no significa declarar culpable a nadie anticipadamente.

    Significa exactamente lo contrario: exigir instituciones.

    Si los actos fueron legales, que se demuestre.

    Si existieron las autorizaciones necesarias, que se publiquen.

    Si existen contratos, que puedan conocerse en la medida permitida por la ley.

    Y si una investigación independiente determinara que cualquier funcionario violó las leyes venezolanas o excedió sus facultades, deberá responder ante la justicia con todas las garantías del debido proceso.

    Eso es Estado de derecho.

    VENEZUELA NO NECESITA CAMBIAR UNA DEPENDENCIA POR OTRA

    Durante generaciones, América Latina ha denunciado gobiernos que subordinaban los intereses nacionales a los intereses de potencias extranjeras.

    Ese principio no debería cambiar dependiendo de cuál sea la potencia extranjera.

    Estados Unidos no necesita gobernantes extranjeros obedientes.

    Necesita vecinos estables, instituciones legítimas, economías funcionales y gobiernos capaces de representar los intereses de sus propios ciudadanos.

    Y Venezuela tampoco necesita sustituir una dependencia política por otra.

    Un país soberano puede negociar con Estados Unidos.

    Puede vender petróleo a compañías estadounidenses.

    Puede recibir inversión extranjera.

    Puede reconstruir su industria energética con capital internacional.

    Puede establecer relaciones económicas profundas con Washington.

    Nada de eso significa entregar su soberanía.

    La diferencia está en las condiciones.

    Una negociación entre naciones soberanas debe producir beneficios verificables para ambas sociedades, no simplemente para quienes se encuentran circunstancialmente sentados alrededor de una mesa.

    ¿DÓNDE ESTÁ EL CONTRATO?

    Esta debería convertirse en una pregunta pública tanto en Caracas como en Washington.

    Si existe un gran acuerdo petrolero, debe explicarse qué es.

    ¿Es un tratado?

    ¿Es un acuerdo ejecutivo?

    ¿Es un acuerdo comercial?

    ¿Es una licencia?

    ¿Es un contrato entre PDVSA y una compañía privada?

    ¿Participa directamente alguna agencia del Gobierno estadounidense?

    ¿Quién recibe el petróleo?

    ¿Quién paga por él?

    ¿A qué precio?

    ¿Dónde se depositan los ingresos?

    ¿Durante cuánto tiempo estarán comprometidos los recursos?

    ¿Existe alguna garantía relacionada con reservas petroleras venezolanas?

    Estas preguntas no constituyen propaganda contra Estados Unidos ni contra Venezuela.

    Son preguntas elementales de transparencia pública.

    BOLÍVAR NO LUCHÓ PARA CAMBIAR DE AMO

    Existe además una dimensión histórica que los venezolanos no deberían olvidar.

    Simón Bolívar no cruzó montañas, organizó ejércitos y dedicó su vida a la independencia para que, dos siglos después, Venezuela simplemente cambiara una dependencia extranjera por otra.

    Francisco de Miranda no dedicó décadas a imaginar una América libre para que los recursos de las nuevas repúblicas terminaran administrándose sin conocimiento de sus pueblos.

    Antonio José de Sucre no combatió por una república sometida.

    José Antonio Páez, con todas las controversias posteriores de nuestra historia latinoamericana, formó parte de una generación que peleó para que Venezuela pudiera decidir su propio destino.

    Aquellos hombres tuvieron diferencias enormes entre ellos.

    Pero compartían una palabra:

    independencia.

    Probablemente se revolverían en sus tumbas si contemplaran a cualquier generación de latinoamericanos entregando voluntariamente la soberanía que ellos conquistaron con sangre.

    ESTADOS UNIDOS TAMBIÉN DEBE EXIGIR TRANSPARENCIA

    Esta discusión tampoco debe convertirse en un ataque contra Estados Unidos.

    Precisamente porque Estados Unidos es una república constitucional, sus ciudadanos tienen derecho a conocer bajo qué autoridad su gobierno compromete recursos, adopta obligaciones internacionales o establece acuerdos económicos estratégicos.

    El Congreso tiene importantes facultades constitucionales sobre legislación, apropiaciones y comercio, mientras que el Senado posee específicamente el papel constitucional de consejo y consentimiento respecto de los tratados.

    La separación de poderes existe precisamente para impedir que decisiones extraordinariamente importantes dependan exclusivamente de la voluntad de una sola persona.

    Por eso la transparencia beneficia a ambos pueblos.

    NEGOCIAR SÍ. ENTREGAR LA SOBERANÍA, NO.

    Horizonte Cubano News no sostiene que Estados Unidos y Venezuela no deban negociar.

    Sostenemos exactamente lo contrario.

    Washington y Caracas deberían negociar.

    Estados Unidos necesita estabilidad energética y económica en el hemisferio.

    Venezuela necesita inversión, tecnología, mercados y reconstrucción económica.

    Existe espacio para un acuerdo extraordinariamente beneficioso para ambas naciones.

    Pero una verdadera negociación debe realizarse entre países que se respetan.

    No entre amos y subordinados.

    No mediante intermediarios cuya autoridad nadie puede explicar.

    No mediante contratos secretos que comprometan riquezas pertenecientes a generaciones que todavía no han nacido.

    Y mucho menos bajo la idea de que los recursos naturales de una nación pertenecen al grupo que controla temporalmente el palacio presidencial.

    EL PETRÓLEO PERTENECE AL PUEBLO VENEZOLANO

    Los gobiernos pasan.

    Los presidentes pasan.

    Los ministros pasan.

    Los partidos pasan.

    Pero Venezuela permanece.

    Sus reservas petroleras forman parte del patrimonio nacional venezolano y cualquier administración de esos recursos debe realizarse conforme a la Constitución, las leyes y los intereses de Venezuela.

    Si existe un acuerdo extraordinario entre Washington y Caracas, publíquense sus fundamentos jurídicos.

    Explíquese quién negoció.

    Explíquese quién firmó.

    Explíquese quién autorizó.

    Explíquese quién recibe el dinero.

    Explíquese qué recibe Estados Unidos.

    Explíquese qué recibe Venezuela.

    Y entonces dejemos que los ciudadanos juzguen.

    Porque después de más de dos siglos de independencia latinoamericana, existe un principio que no debería necesitar explicación:

    Venezuela puede negociar con Estados Unidos, pero Venezuela no pertenece a Estados Unidos.

    Y tampoco pertenece a quienes hoy gobiernan Venezuela.

    Venezuela pertenece a los venezolanos.


    Horizonte Cubano News — Análisis y Opinión

  • What Would Bolívar Say?

    There is an uncomfortable historical question hanging over this entire debate.

    More than two centuries ago, Venezuelans fought against Spanish colonial rule for the right to determine their own political destiny.

    Francisco de Miranda dreamed of independence before independence seemed possible.

    Simón Bolívar dedicated much of his life to breaking Spanish colonial power across northern South America.

    Antonio José de Sucre became one of the great military leaders of that struggle.

    José Antonio Páez fought in the campaigns that helped secure Venezuelan independence.

    They differed politically. They disagreed about government, institutions and the future of the new republics they helped create.

    But the fundamental principle for which their generation fought was unmistakable:

    Venezuela should determine Venezuela’s destiny.

    Imagine those men looking at their country today.

    Imagine Bolívar being told that Venezuela possesses one of the greatest petroleum reserves on Earth — and then being told that decisions potentially affecting tens of billions of barrels may have been negotiated without the Venezuelan people being able to examine the complete terms.

    Imagine Miranda asking who authorized the agreement.

    Imagine Sucre asking under whose Constitution it was approved.

    Imagine Páez asking whether Venezuela negotiated as a sovereign republic or whether political leaders negotiated from a position of dependence.

    They might be turning in their graves.

    Not because Venezuela is doing business with the United States.

    Independent nations do business with one another.

    Not because American companies want Venezuelan petroleum.

    International commerce is not colonialism.

    And not because Washington pursues American interests.

    Every government has a responsibility to defend the legitimate interests of its own citizens.

    The problem would arise if Venezuelan officials subordinated Venezuela’s national interest to the political interests of a foreign power.

    That would contradict the very concept of sovereignty for which generations of Venezuelans fought.

    Venezuela Should Not Exchange One Dependency for Another

    For years, Washington criticized Venezuela’s close relationships with Cuba, Russia, China and Iran.

    American officials argued that Caracas had allowed foreign governments to acquire excessive influence over Venezuelan affairs.

    Then the standard must remain the same when the foreign power is the United States.

    Venezuela should not belong politically to Havana.

    It should not belong to Moscow.

    It should not belong to Beijing.

    And it should not belong to Washington.

    Venezuela belongs to Venezuelans.

    The United States does not need servants in Caracas.

    It needs neighbors.

    It needs reliable commercial partners.

    It needs governments capable of negotiating agreements and honoring lawful contracts.

    And above all, if Washington truly supports democracy, it should want a Venezuelan government strong enough to tell the United States yes when cooperation benefits Venezuela — and no when it does not.

    That is what sovereignty looks like.

    The Oil Is Venezuelan

    This principle must remain at the center of the petroleum agreement.

    The oil beneath Venezuelan territory is not the personal property of whoever occupies Miraflores.

    It is not Donald Trump’s property.

    It is not Delcy Rodríguez’s property.

    It does not belong to a political party.

    And it certainly should not become the private patrimony of politically connected individuals on either side of the agreement.

    Venezuela may grant licenses.

    Venezuela may enter joint ventures.

    Venezuela may welcome American investment.

    Venezuela may sell enormous quantities of petroleum to American refineries.

    Those decisions can potentially benefit both nations.

    But they must be made lawfully, transparently and in Venezuela’s national interest.

    If an independent investigation eventually establishes that any Venezuelan official exceeded constitutional authority, violated Venezuelan law, engaged in corruption or improperly disposed of public resources, that person should face Venezuelan justice with full due process.

    The same standard should apply in Washington.

    If American officials acted within their lawful authority, publish that authority.

    If congressional authorization was required, Congress should exercise its constitutional role.

    If public money or property has been committed, the American people deserve to know how.

    Neither government should fear scrutiny if the agreement is legitimate.

    Independence Must Mean Something

    Bolívar and the independence generation did not fight Spain so that, two centuries later, Venezuela could simply choose another capital from which its destiny would be dictated.

    That would reduce independence to changing masters.

    The better future is something entirely different.

    A sovereign Venezuela.

    A democratic Venezuela.

    A prosperous Venezuela.

    A Venezuela capable of cooperating closely with the United States without becoming subordinate to it.

    A Venezuela whose petroleum wealth serves its citizens.

    A Venezuela whose leaders answer first to Venezuelan law.

    And a Venezuela where no foreign government — friend or adversary — gets to decide what Venezuelans themselves have the sovereign right to decide.

    Bolívar fought for independence from an empire. Venezuela should never have to surrender its independence to obtain an investment.

    What Would Bolívar Say?

    There is an uncomfortable historical question hanging over this entire debate.

    More than two centuries ago, Venezuelans fought against Spanish colonial rule for the right to determine their own political destiny.

    Francisco de Miranda dreamed of independence before independence seemed possible.

    Simón Bolívar dedicated much of his life to breaking Spanish colonial power across northern South America.

    Antonio José de Sucre became one of the great military leaders of that struggle.

    José Antonio Páez fought in the campaigns that helped secure Venezuelan independence.

    They differed politically. They disagreed about government, institutions and the future of the new republics they helped create.

    But the fundamental principle for which their generation fought was unmistakable:

    Venezuela should determine Venezuela’s destiny.

    Imagine those men looking at their country today.

    Imagine Bolívar being told that Venezuela possesses one of the greatest petroleum reserves on Earth — and then being told that decisions potentially affecting tens of billions of barrels may have been negotiated without the Venezuelan people being able to examine the complete terms.

    Imagine Miranda asking who authorized the agreement.

    Imagine Sucre asking under whose Constitution it was approved.

    Imagine Páez asking whether Venezuela negotiated as a sovereign republic or whether political leaders negotiated from a position of dependence.

    They might be turning in their graves.

    Not because Venezuela is doing business with the United States.

    Independent nations do business with one another.

    Not because American companies want Venezuelan petroleum.

    International commerce is not colonialism.

    And not because Washington pursues American interests.

    Every government has a responsibility to defend the legitimate interests of its own citizens.

    The problem would arise if Venezuelan officials subordinated Venezuela’s national interest to the political interests of a foreign power.

    That would contradict the very concept of sovereignty for which generations of Venezuelans fought.

    Venezuela Should Not Exchange One Dependency for Another

    For years, Washington criticized Venezuela’s close relationships with Cuba, Russia, China and Iran.

    American officials argued that Caracas had allowed foreign governments to acquire excessive influence over Venezuelan affairs.

    Then the standard must remain the same when the foreign power is the United States.

    Venezuela should not belong politically to Havana.

    It should not belong to Moscow.

    It should not belong to Beijing.

    And it should not belong to Washington.

    Venezuela belongs to Venezuelans.

    The United States does not need servants in Caracas.

    It needs neighbors.

    It needs reliable commercial partners.

    It needs governments capable of negotiating agreements and honoring lawful contracts.

    And above all, if Washington truly supports democracy, it should want a Venezuelan government strong enough to tell the United States yes when cooperation benefits Venezuela — and no when it does not.

    That is what sovereignty looks like.

    The Oil Is Venezuelan

    This principle must remain at the center of the petroleum agreement.

    The oil beneath Venezuelan territory is not the personal property of whoever occupies Miraflores.

    It is not Donald Trump’s property.

    It is not Delcy Rodríguez’s property.

    It does not belong to a political party.

    And it certainly should not become the private patrimony of politically connected individuals on either side of the agreement.

    Venezuela may grant licenses.

    Venezuela may enter joint ventures.

    Venezuela may welcome American investment.

    Venezuela may sell enormous quantities of petroleum to American refineries.

    Those decisions can potentially benefit both nations.

    But they must be made lawfully, transparently and in Venezuela’s national interest.

    If an independent investigation eventually establishes that any Venezuelan official exceeded constitutional authority, violated Venezuelan law, engaged in corruption or improperly disposed of public resources, that person should face Venezuelan justice with full due process.

    The same standard should apply in Washington.

    If American officials acted within their lawful authority, publish that authority.

    If congressional authorization was required, Congress should exercise its constitutional role.

    If public money or property has been committed, the American people deserve to know how.

    Neither government should fear scrutiny if the agreement is legitimate.

    Independence Must Mean Something

    Bolívar and the independence generation did not fight Spain so that, two centuries later, Venezuela could simply choose another capital from which its destiny would be dictated.

    That would reduce independence to changing masters.

    The better future is something entirely different.

    A sovereign Venezuela.

    A democratic Venezuela.

    A prosperous Venezuela.

    A Venezuela capable of cooperating closely with the United States without becoming subordinate to it.

    A Venezuela whose petroleum wealth serves its citizens.

    A Venezuela whose leaders answer first to Venezuelan law.

    And a Venezuela where no foreign government — friend or adversary — gets to decide what Venezuelans themselves have the sovereign right to decide.

    Bolívar fought for independence from an empire. Venezuela should never have to surrender its independence to obtain an investment.

  • America Does Not Need a Government in Caracas That Answers to Washington

    There is a larger principle at stake here.

    The United States of America does not need a Venezuelan government that answers to Washington.

    It needs a stable Venezuelan government that answers to the Venezuelan people.

    That distinction should define American policy.

    If the objective of the United States is genuinely to support democracy in Venezuela, Washington should not seek to replace one politically dependent system with another — one in which Venezuelan leaders remain in power because they are willing to accommodate American economic interests.

    That would not be democracy.

    It would simply change the direction of dependency.

    Venezuela should have a government capable of cooperating with the United States while remaining accountable to its own Constitution, its own institutions and its own citizens.

    Venezuela’s Oil Is Not the Personal Property of Those in Power

    The Venezuelan Constitution establishes an important principle.

    The country’s hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic.

    They are public-domain assets.

    They are not the personal property of Delcy Rodríguez.

    They were not the personal property of Nicolás Maduro.

    They are not the property of Donald Trump.

    And they are not assets that any temporary group occupying political power should be able to dispose of without the legal authority required under Venezuelan law.

    The Venezuelan people are ultimately the beneficiaries of that national patrimony.

    That is why the legal structure of this agreement matters so much.

    Investigate the Authority Before Judging the Agreement

    We should not declare Delcy Rodríguez guilty of violating Venezuelan law before examining the evidence.

    That would contradict the very rule-of-law principles we are demanding.

    Instead, Venezuela’s competent institutions — including ultimately independent courts and legislative institutions capable of exercising genuine oversight — should determine:

    What exactly was signed?

    Who signed it?

    Under what constitutional authority?

    Did the agreement require approval from the National Assembly?

    Was that approval obtained?

    Does the agreement transfer ownership of petroleum reserves, or merely grant development and production rights?

    What rights were granted to foreign governments or companies?

    For how long?

    What compensation does Venezuela receive?

    What obligations does Venezuela assume?

    And does the agreement comply with Venezuela’s Constitution and hydrocarbon laws?

    Those questions should be answered with documents, not political speeches.

    If Venezuelan Law Was Violated, There Must Be Accountability

    And here the principle should apply equally to everyone.

    If an independent investigation ultimately establishes that Delcy Rodríguez or any other Venezuelan official knowingly exceeded lawful authority, violated applicable Venezuelan law, improperly transferred public assets, engaged in corruption or committed another offense, that evidence should be presented to the appropriate judicial authorities.

    The official should receive due process.

    The government should present its evidence.

    The defense should have the opportunity to respond.

    And an independent court should decide.

    If no violation occurred, that should also be established publicly.

    That is the difference between justice and political revenge.

    We should demand for Venezuela exactly what we demand for the United States:

    Investigation before accusation.

    Evidence before conviction.

    Law before politics.

    Washington Should Welcome That Scrutiny

    The United States should not fear an independent Venezuelan examination of this agreement.

    It should welcome one.

    Because if the agreement is lawful, transparent and genuinely beneficial to Venezuela, independent scrutiny will strengthen it.

    And if the agreement cannot survive examination under Venezuelan constitutional law, Washington should want to know that before American companies invest tens of billions of dollars.

    Legal certainty protects American investors too.

    A contract whose legitimacy depends entirely upon the continued political survival of Delcy Rodríguez is not a secure 25-year investment.

    It is a political gamble.

    Democracy Means Venezuelans Decide

    The ultimate objective should therefore be simple.

    Not an anti-American Venezuela.

    Not a pro-American Venezuela.

    A democratic Venezuela.

    A Venezuela capable of selling petroleum to the United States.

    A Venezuela capable of doing business with Europe.

    A Venezuela capable of deciding which international partnerships serve its national interest.

    And a Venezuela whose elected government can say no to Washington when Washington’s proposal does not serve Venezuelan citizens.

    That is sovereignty.

    The United States does not strengthen democracy by selecting foreign leaders who will obey it.

    It strengthens democracy by respecting institutions capable of disagreeing with it.

    Venezuela’s petroleum can create enormous opportunities for cooperation between our countries.

    American companies can invest.

    American refineries can purchase Venezuelan crude.

    American technology can help rebuild Venezuelan production.

    Venezuelans can benefit from jobs, investment, taxes and economic reconstruction.

    There is nothing inherently wrong with any of that.

    But the transaction must satisfy a fundamental test:

    Does it serve the Venezuelan people under Venezuelan law?

    Not Delcy Rodríguez.

    Not Donald Trump.

    Not a political party.

    Not a group of connected businessmen.

    The Venezuelan people.

    If the answer is yes, publish the agreement and demonstrate it.

    If the answer is no, Venezuela’s democratic institutions should have the power to reject it.

    And if evidence ultimately establishes that public officials violated Venezuelan law in disposing of national resources, those officials should answer before Venezuelan justice — with evidence, due process and an independent court.

    Because petroleum may be beneath Venezuelan soil.

    But sovereignty resides with the Venezuelan nation.

  • Who Had the Legal Authority to Sign the Venezuela Oil Deal for the United States?

    By Horizonte Cubano News

    The debate surrounding the enormous new oil arrangement between the United States and Venezuela has concentrated on barrels.

    Sixty-five billion barrels.

    Seventeen oil fields.

    More than $100 billion in projected investment.

    Hundreds of billions of dollars in potential Venezuelan government revenue.

    But before debating whether this is the greatest petroleum agreement in history or one of its most controversial, there is a more fundamental question.

    Who, legally, had the authority to commit the United States?

    President Donald Trump announced the agreement.

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reportedly played central roles in negotiating it.

    Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, has publicly described its economic dimensions.

    But negotiating an agreement and possessing legal authority to bind the United States are not necessarily the same thing.

    And that distinction matters enormously.

    Rubio Can Negotiate. But What Could He Sign?

    The Secretary of State is America’s principal diplomatic officer.

    Negotiating with foreign governments is unquestionably part of the State Department’s responsibilities.

    If President Trump instructed Secretary Rubio to negotiate with Venezuela, there is nothing inherently unusual about Rubio conducting those negotiations.

    But negotiation is only the beginning.

    The important legal question is:

    What did the United States ultimately agree to?

    A diplomatic understanding?

    A nonbinding political commitment?

    An executive agreement?

    A congressionally authorized executive agreement?

    A treaty?

    A commercial contract?

    An equity investment?

    A government guarantee?

    A purchasing agreement?

    Those are very different legal instruments.

    And they do not necessarily derive their authority from the same place.

    What About Pete Hegseth?

    The participation of the Secretary of Defense raises another interesting question.

    The Defense Department has legitimate interests in energy security.

    The American military consumes enormous quantities of fuel.

    National energy security can affect military readiness.

    The Strategic Petroleum Reserve can also have national-security implications.

    And the Pentagon possesses programs capable of supporting strategically important industries and investments.

    But the Secretary of Defense does not possess unlimited authority to commit the United States to commercial transactions simply because a project involves national security.

    If Hegseth participated in negotiations, the public should know:

    In what capacity?

    Was he representing the Defense Department?

    Was he acting as a presidential negotiator?

    Did he sign anything?

    Did the Pentagon make commitments?

    Did an agency within the Defense Department acquire financial interests?

    Did the government guarantee financing?

    Did the Pentagon commit to purchasing petroleum?

    Those answers should be contained in government documents.

    The President Has Broad Foreign-Affairs Power — But Not Unlimited Power

    The President possesses enormous authority in foreign affairs.

    Presidents negotiate with foreign governments constantly.

    They recognize governments.

    They direct diplomacy.

    And throughout American history, presidents have entered international agreements without submitting every agreement to the Senate as a treaty.

    These are often called executive agreements.

    That distinction is extremely important.

    Not every international agreement requires two-thirds approval by the Senate.

    So it would be legally inaccurate to declare automatically that the Venezuela arrangement is invalid simply because the Senate has not approved it.

    But the opposite claim would also be premature.

    A President cannot necessarily convert any transaction imaginable into a binding American obligation merely by calling it an executive agreement.

    The source of legal authority matters.

    The Constitution Gives the Senate a Specific Role

    Article II of the Constitution provides a clear procedure for treaties.

    The President negotiates and makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.

    If the Venezuela agreement is legally structured as an Article II treaty, therefore, the Senate unquestionably has a constitutional role.

    But modern American foreign relations are more complicated.

    Presidents frequently conclude executive agreements that do not go through the two-thirds Senate treaty process.

    Some rest on presidential constitutional authority.

    Others are based on authority previously granted by Congress.

    Others are congressional-executive agreements approved through legislation.

    Therefore the question is not simply:

    Did the Senate approve the Venezuela deal?

    The better question is:

    What kind of agreement is it?

    Without seeing the legal instrument, the public cannot answer that.

    Follow the Authority

    Every significant federal action should have a legal foundation.

    If the administration claims authority to acquire an interest in a petroleum company, identify the statute.

    If the government receives warrants or equity, identify the statutory authority.

    If the Pentagon facilitates financing, identify the program and legislation authorizing it.

    If the government agrees to purchase Venezuelan petroleum, identify the procurement authority.

    If the Strategic Petroleum Reserve receives petroleum, identify the statutory mechanism.

    If American taxpayers guarantee private investment, identify the appropriation and authorization.

    If no federal funds are involved, demonstrate that.

    This should not be difficult.

    The administration undoubtedly has lawyers.

    Those lawyers presumably examined the agreement.

    There should therefore be legal memoranda explaining why each agency involved possesses the authority it is exercising.

    Congress should request those documents.

    Can the United States Government Own Part of a Private Oil Company?

    This may become one of the most interesting questions surrounding the agreement.

    Recent reporting indicates that the arrangement may involve a private company in which the United States government receives a financial or equity interest.

    If that description is correct, we need considerably more information.

    Which federal agency owns the interest?

    Who holds the shares or warrants?

    Who exercises voting rights?

    Can the government appoint directors?

    Who receives dividends?

    Where does that money go?

    Can the interest be sold?

    What happens if the company becomes insolvent?

    Does the United States assume liabilities?

    What happens when Donald Trump leaves office?

    A government ownership interest is not Donald Trump’s personal property.

    It would belong to the United States.

    That means it requires an institutional legal framework capable of surviving presidents.

    Congress Controls the Purse

    There is another constitutional principle that cannot be ignored.

    Congress controls federal appropriations.

    If implementing this agreement eventually requires federal spending, loan guarantees or new statutory authority, the executive branch may need Congress.

    A President cannot simply create unlimited federal spending authority through an international agreement.

    This becomes particularly important when administration officials speak about investment approaching $100 billion.

    They say this will primarily come from private capital.

    Fine.

    Then identify it.

    If American taxpayers are not financing the agreement, demonstrate how the financial structure works.

    If government guarantees will encourage private investors, disclose those guarantees.

    If federal programs will absorb political or financial risk, disclose those programs.

    “Private investment” should not become a phrase used to conceal public risk.

    Does the Senate Have the Right to Review It?

    Yes — but we must be precise about what “review” means.

    If this is a formal treaty, the Senate’s constitutional advice-and-consent function is directly triggered.

    If it is an executive agreement, Senate approval by a two-thirds vote is not automatically required.

    But that does not mean Congress becomes irrelevant.

    Congress can conduct oversight.

    Committees can hold hearings.

    Members can request documents.

    Congress can question Cabinet officials.

    Congress can examine appropriations.

    Congress can legislate within its constitutional authority.

    And if implementation requires money Congress has not appropriated, Congress controls whether that money becomes available.

    The House of Representatives also matters.

    This should not be treated exclusively as a Senate question.

    When appropriations, commerce, federal property or statutory authorities are implicated, the institutional role belongs to Congress, not merely the Senate.

    Congress Should Ask Rubio and Hegseth to Explain

    Secretary Rubio and Secretary Hegseth reportedly helped negotiate this arrangement.

    Then Congress should invite them to explain it.

    Not as political theater.

    As constitutional oversight.

    Ask Secretary Rubio:

    What exactly did the State Department negotiate?

    What document was signed?

    Who signed it?

    What legal authority supports it?

    Is it binding under international law?

    Can a future president terminate it?

    Ask Secretary Hegseth:

    What commitments did the Defense Department make?

    Does the Pentagon own any interest in the project?

    Will defense funds be used?

    Will military petroleum purchases be involved?

    Are federal guarantees being offered?

    And ask both:

    Where is the agreement?

    A 25-Year Agreement Could Outlive Six Presidents

    This is why congressional scrutiny matters.

    Delcy Rodríguez says the bilateral energy arrangement will operate for approximately 25 years.

    Twenty-five years is not a temporary presidential initiative.

    Depending on election outcomes, that period could encompass six or seven presidential administrations.

    Other reporting suggests that particular field-development rights could potentially extend considerably longer.

    If those reports are accurate, some contractual rights could survive for generations.

    That makes institutional legitimacy essential.

    Donald Trump cannot guarantee who occupies the White House in 2030.

    Marco Rubio cannot guarantee who will be Secretary of State.

    Pete Hegseth cannot guarantee who will run the Pentagon.

    Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee who will govern Venezuela.

    Contracts designed to survive governments need stronger foundations than the personalities who negotiated them.

    What Happens Under the Next President?

    Imagine a Democratic president takes office after Trump.

    Can that president cancel the agreement?

    Imagine another Republican president disagrees with it.

    Can that president terminate it?

    Would the United States owe damages?

    Could the private company sue?

    Could Venezuela initiate international arbitration?

    Could investors make claims?

    What law governs?

    What forum resolves disputes?

    Those questions are impossible to answer responsibly without examining the actual legal documents.

    And What Happens if Venezuela Elects a New Government?

    The same problem exists on the Venezuelan side.

    Representative María Elvira Salazar has already raised concerns about Delcy Rodríguez’s legitimacy.

    If Venezuela eventually conducts competitive elections and a new government takes office, what happens to the agreement?

    Can Venezuela reconsider it?

    Would doing so constitute breach of contract?

    Would compensation be required?

    Could American companies sue Venezuela internationally?

    Would the United States government defend the agreement?

    Would American taxpayers become exposed?

    A deal intended to stabilize Venezuela should not contain legal uncertainty capable of destabilizing Venezuela later.

    This Is Why Transparency Matters

    Horizonte Cubano News is not arguing that the agreement is unconstitutional.

    We do not presently possess enough information to make that determination.

    Nor should critics declare the agreement illegal merely because they dislike Donald Trump.

    But supporters should not declare every legal question resolved merely because they trust him.

    The Constitution does not operate on trust.

    Government operates through authority.

    So identify the authority.

    Publish the relevant agreement.

    Identify the signatories.

    Identify the statutory basis.

    Identify the corporate structure.

    Identify the federal interest.

    Identify the financial commitments.

    Identify the duration.

    Identify the termination provisions.

    Identify the dispute-resolution mechanism.

    And identify which obligations survive a change of administration.

    Congress Should Review the Deal

    A transaction involving potentially 65 billion barrels of petroleum, 17 Venezuelan oil fields, tens of billions of dollars in investment and long-term American government interests deserves congressional examination.

    That does not mean Congress must reject it.

    Congress might conclude that it is an excellent agreement.

    Congress might decide additional legislation would make it stronger.

    Congress might discover weaknesses that should be corrected.

    Congress might determine that existing presidential authority is sufficient.

    That is what oversight is for.

    The objective should not be to defeat the agreement.

    The objective should be to determine whether the United States entered it lawfully and whether it protects the American public.

    One Simple Question

    Secretary Rubio is a lawyer.

    He understands the Constitution.

    He spent years in the United States Senate.

    He knows exactly what congressional oversight means.

    That makes the question particularly appropriate:

    Mr. Secretary, under what legal authority did the United States enter this agreement?

    If the answer is straightforward, publish it.

    If there is a statute, identify it.

    If there is an executive agreement, identify its constitutional or statutory basis.

    If there is a government contract, identify the contracting authority.

    If Congress authorized the program previously, identify the authorization.

    If Senate approval is unnecessary, explain why.

    There is nothing unreasonable about asking these questions.

    The American government may negotiate internationally.

    But when American officials commit American power, American property or American money, the American people have a right to understand the legal foundation.

    The bigger the agreement, the stronger the obligation to explain who had the authority to sign it.

    Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on constitutional government, Venezuela, Cuba, the United States and the future of the hemisphere.

  • The Venezuela Oil Deal May Be Historic. So Where Is the Contract?

    By Horizonte Cubano News

    President Donald Trump calls it the biggest oil deal in world history.

    Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, calls it an agreement capable of helping revive the Venezuelan economy.

    Representative María Elvira Salazar says the agreement can benefit both countries, although she argues that Rodríguez is the wrong person to guarantee its future.

    Those are extraordinary claims surrounding an extraordinary transaction.

    The numbers alone demand attention.

    More than 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan oil reserves.

    Seventeen strategic oil fields.

    A Venezuelan production target exceeding 1.5 million barrels per day.

    Potential private investment approaching $100 billion.

    Potential Venezuelan government revenue measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

    And some contractual rights reportedly extending for as long as 100 years.

    If this truly is one of the largest energy agreements ever negotiated, there is a remarkably simple question that Americans and Venezuelans should be asking:

    Where is the complete agreement?

    This Is Bigger Than Donald Trump

    Supporters of President Trump may believe this is an extraordinary strategic achievement.

    Perhaps it is.

    The agreement could eventually increase Venezuelan production, strengthen energy supplies in the Western Hemisphere, reduce Chinese influence and generate enormous revenues for a Venezuelan economy badly damaged by years of mismanagement, underinvestment and sanctions.

    Those possibilities deserve serious consideration.

    But an agreement involving tens of billions of dollars, enormous petroleum reserves and potentially century-long contractual rights cannot depend on whether one supports Donald Trump.

    Trump will eventually leave office.

    Venezuela will eventually have another government.

    The oil will remain.

    The contracts will remain.

    And potentially billions of barrels will remain subject to arrangements negotiated today.

    That is precisely why transparency matters.

    What Exactly Does the United States Own?

    Trump says the United States has secured majority control over more than 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan reserves.

    That phrase requires explanation.

    Does the United States government own petroleum reserves?

    Does a private company own them?

    Does Venezuela retain ownership while granting production rights?

    Does the United States own equity in a joint venture?

    Does Washington simply have preferential purchasing rights?

    How much of the reported 55 percent American control represents actual equity?

    How much represents contractual rights to purchase oil?

    Those distinctions are not technical trivia.

    They determine what the agreement actually means.

    Venezuela says it retains sovereignty over its natural resources.

    Washington says it has obtained majority control.

    Both propositions might potentially coexist under a carefully structured production agreement.

    But the public should not have to guess how.

    Publish the structure.

    Twenty-Five Years or One Hundred?

    Another issue requires clarification.

    Delcy Rodríguez has described a 25-year bilateral project involving 17 strategic oil fields.

    Other reporting indicates that the newly created operating structure may possess rights involving those fields for 100 years.

    Those are dramatically different periods.

    Perhaps they refer to different layers of the transaction.

    If so, explain them.

    What lasts 25 years?

    What lasts 100 years?

    What happens after the first 25?

    Can Venezuela terminate the arrangement?

    Can the United States?

    Can a future democratically elected Venezuelan government renegotiate it?

    What penalties would apply?

    A contract potentially binding generations of Venezuelans deserves answers to those questions.

    Who Authorized Delcy Rodríguez?

    Representative María Elvira Salazar has identified another fundamental problem.

    She supports the economic concept but questions the person signing on Venezuela’s behalf.

    That contradiction cannot simply be ignored.

    If Delcy Rodríguez lacks sufficient democratic legitimacy to guarantee the agreement, then what legal authority allows her government to enter an agreement potentially affecting Venezuelan petroleum for decades?

    That question matters regardless of whether someone supports or opposes Rodríguez.

    International energy companies need legal certainty.

    Banks need legal certainty.

    Investors need legal certainty.

    The Venezuelan people need legal certainty.

    And the United States government should want legal certainty.

    A $100 billion investment program cannot operate indefinitely on political assurances.

    And Who Authorized Washington?

    There is another side to the constitutional question.

    What exactly has the United States government committed?

    The President possesses broad foreign-policy authority.

    The executive branch can negotiate with foreign governments.

    Federal agencies possess numerous statutory authorities.

    But if the United States government is acquiring an ownership interest, guaranteeing purchases, financing petroleum development or assuming financial obligations, Congress may have a role.

    That depends on the actual structure.

    Again:

    Show the agreement.

    If congressional authorization is unnecessary, explain the statutory authority.

    If congressional appropriations will eventually be required, say so.

    If private investors carry the entire financial risk, identify the mechanism.

    Transparency would resolve much of this debate.

    Who Is Putting Up $100 Billion?

    This may be the biggest unanswered financial question.

    Administration officials have spoken about approximately $100 billion in private investment.

    Excellent.

    From whom?

    Which companies have committed?

    How much has each committed?

    Are these binding commitments?

    Letters of intent?

    Projected investments?

    Government estimates?

    Will American taxpayers guarantee any portion of the financing?

    Will federal agencies provide loans?

    Loan guarantees?

    Insurance?

    Preferential purchasing agreements?

    What happens if private companies decide the risk is too great?

    Venezuela’s petroleum infrastructure requires enormous investment.

    Pipelines.

    Electricity.

    Drilling equipment.

    Ports.

    Upgraders.

    Refineries.

    Security.

    Roads.

    Housing and services for workers.

    Environmental remediation.

    Sixty-five billion barrels underground have enormous theoretical value.

    But oil underground does not lower gasoline prices.

    Oil must be financed, extracted, processed, transported, refined and sold.

    That takes money.

    And time.

    Who Is the Private Partner?

    The public also deserves clarity about the private companies involved.

    If private businesses are receiving access to one of the largest petroleum reserves on Earth, their ownership should be transparent.

    Who are the beneficial owners?

    How were they selected?

    Was there competitive bidding?

    What experience do they have?

    What financial capacity do they possess?

    What relationships do they have with American officials?

    What relationships do they have with Venezuelan officials?

    What compliance requirements apply?

    What anti-corruption protections exist?

    These questions should not be considered hostile to the agreement.

    They are necessary to protect it.

    Venezuela’s Oil Belongs to Venezuela

    Whatever contractual structure emerges, one principle should remain fundamental.

    Venezuela’s natural resources belong to Venezuela under Venezuelan law.

    Foreign investment can help develop those resources.

    American companies can provide capital.

    Technology can increase production.

    Long-term purchasing arrangements can provide stability.

    The United States can benefit.

    Venezuela can benefit.

    There is nothing inherently illegitimate about mutually beneficial petroleum commerce.

    But investment is different from ownership of another country’s natural patrimony.

    The agreement must make that distinction unmistakable.

    Otherwise, opponents will understandably describe the arrangement not as investment but as appropriation.

    María Elvira Salazar Has Identified the Agreement’s Central Contradiction

    Representative Salazar says the agreement can bring prosperity, stability and security.

    She also says Delcy Rodríguez and remnants of the Maduro system cannot represent Venezuela’s future.

    Those two positions create an unavoidable question.

    If Rodríguez cannot guarantee Venezuela’s political future, how can agreements negotiated under her authority guarantee Venezuela’s petroleum future for generations?

    Salazar’s answer appears to be that free elections and democratic institutions are ultimately necessary to make the arrangement durable.

    That is a reasonable argument.

    But it also strengthens the case for transparency now.

    A future Venezuelan democracy should not inherit a massive agreement it was never permitted to examine.

    Democracy Cannot Begin With a Secret Contract

    If Washington’s stated objective is eventually a democratic Venezuela, then the economic architecture being constructed today should be capable of surviving democratic scrutiny tomorrow.

    Publish the contracts.

    Publish the ownership structure.

    Publish the financial commitments.

    Publish the revenue-sharing formula.

    Identify the companies.

    Identify government guarantees.

    Explain congressional authority.

    Explain Venezuelan constitutional authority.

    Establish independent audits.

    Create anti-corruption safeguards.

    And disclose how revenues will reach the Venezuelan people.

    If the agreement is genuinely beneficial, transparency should strengthen it.

    Follow the Money

    Venezuela has already lived through decades in which enormous petroleum wealth failed to produce prosperity proportional to its resources.

    That cannot happen again.

    If production reaches 1.5 million additional barrels per day, where does the revenue go?

    How much goes to Venezuela?

    How much goes to operating companies?

    How much goes to the United States?

    How much services investment?

    How much services debt?

    How much reaches infrastructure, hospitals, electricity, schools and communities?

    How will Venezuelans verify those numbers?

    A new petroleum agreement should not merely change who controls the flow of money.

    It should change the level of accountability surrounding that money.

    This Could Be an Opportunity

    Horizonte Cubano News is not arguing that the United States should reject Venezuelan oil.

    Quite the opposite.

    A transparent energy partnership could benefit both countries.

    Venezuela needs enormous capital investment.

    The United States wants secure energy supplies.

    American companies possess technology and financing capacity.

    Venezuelans need jobs and economic recovery.

    There is room for mutual benefit.

    But the larger the opportunity, the greater the obligation to establish legitimacy.

    The Simplest Question

    Donald Trump says this is the biggest oil deal in world history.

    Then treat it like one.

    Do not ask Americans to understand it from a social-media post.

    Do not ask Venezuelans to trust promises.

    Do not ask investors to guess.

    Do not ask Congress to learn the details from newspapers.

    And do not ask future generations to honor obligations they cannot examine today.

    Publish the agreement.

    Let Venezuelan constitutional lawyers examine it.

    Let American lawyers examine it.

    Let Congress examine it.

    Let economists examine it.

    Let petroleum engineers examine it.

    Let investors examine it.

    And above all:

    Let the Venezuelan people examine what has been negotiated involving their country’s most valuable natural resource.

    Perhaps the agreement really is historic.

    Perhaps it really can help rebuild Venezuela.

    Perhaps it really can benefit American consumers.

    Perhaps it really can weaken China’s strategic influence in the hemisphere.

    If so, transparency will not destroy the agreement.

    Transparency will help legitimize it.

    The bigger the deal, the stronger the case for showing the public exactly what was signed.

    Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, Venezuela, the United States and the future of the hemisphere.

  • Florida’s Missing $10 Million: A Grand Jury Found the Money Was Misused — So Who Is Responsible?

    By Horizonte Cubano News
    August 27, 2026

    Florida taxpayers finally have an answer to one of the biggest questions surrounding the Hope Florida controversy.

    But that answer has produced an even bigger question.

    A Florida statewide grand jury concluded that $10 million connected to a Medicaid settlement was “misappropriated” and that taxpayer money was ultimately misused for political purposes.

    Yet no one has been criminally charged.

    So who made the decision?

    And how can $10 million in public money travel through a charitable foundation, nonprofit organizations and ultimately into political activity without anyone being held individually responsible?

    The $67 Million Settlement

    The controversy begins with a settlement involving Centene Corporation and the State of Florida.

    Florida reached an approximately $67 million settlement connected to Medicaid. According to the grand jury’s findings, the settlement initially contemplated money going back to the state.

    Then something changed.

    On September 12, 2024, a draft settlement provided approximately $62 million to the state and $5 million to the Hope Florida Foundation.

    One day later, the arrangement changed again.

    The state’s share became approximately $57 million, while Hope Florida’s portion doubled to $10 million.

    According to reporting on the grand jury’s findings, investigators could not identify an adequate explanation in the record for why the foundation’s allocation doubled overnight.

    That alone deserves an answer from Florida’s government.

    From Hope Florida to Political Activity

    Hope Florida is closely associated with Florida First Lady Casey DeSantis.

    After receiving the $10 million, the foundation distributed $5 million each to two nonprofit organizations.

    The money did not simply remain there.

    Approximately $8.5 million eventually went to Keep Florida Clean, a political committee involved in the campaign against Amendment 3, the 2024 Florida ballot initiative that sought to legalize recreational marijuana.

    James Uthmeier — then Governor Ron DeSantis’ chief of staff and now Florida’s attorney general — was closely connected to that political effort.

    The grand jury described the transfer of the money as part of a “sophisticated scheme to fund political activities.”

    That is not an accusation invented by political opponents.

    It is a conclusion contained in a grand jury report.

    The Most Troubling Finding: Nobody Takes Responsibility

    Perhaps the most remarkable part of this story is not simply where the money went.

    It is that investigators apparently could not establish who actually made the decision to send the $10 million to Hope Florida.

    The grand jury concluded that the money had been misappropriated but found insufficient evidence to criminally charge an individual.

    In other words, investigators could follow much of the money.

    What they could not establish beyond the necessary legal threshold was who should personally bear criminal responsibility for the original decision.

    That should concern Floridians regardless of political affiliation.

    Ten million dollars does not move itself.

    Someone proposes a transfer.

    Someone approves it.

    Someone signs documents.

    Someone knows where the money is going.

    Government accountability cannot end with the explanation that nobody remembers who made the decision.

    DeSantis Says No Law Was Broken

    Governor Ron DeSantis has defended his administration and maintains that the transaction was lawful.

    Attorney General James Uthmeier has also rejected allegations of wrongdoing, and DeSantis and his allies have attacked the investigation and the leaking of the grand jury report as politically motivated.

    Those defenses deserve to be reported.

    But they do not erase the central finding.

    A grand jury concluded that $10 million in taxpayer money was misappropriated and misused for political purposes.

    At the same time, the grand jury determined there was insufficient evidence to bring criminal charges against any particular person.

    Both facts matter.

    This Should Not Be a Republican or Democratic Question

    Florida’s taxpayers deserve something better than another partisan shouting match.

    If a Democratic governor’s administration had moved $10 million connected to Medicaid through a foundation associated with the governor’s spouse, and millions later reached political committees supporting that administration’s agenda, Republicans would rightly demand answers.

    Democrats should be held to exactly the same standard.

    Public money belongs to the public.

    The standard should therefore be simple:

    Follow the money. Identify who authorized the transfer. Determine whether every step complied with Florida and federal law. And make the complete record available to the public to the fullest extent legally permitted.

    Accountability should not depend on the political party occupying the governor’s mansion.

    The $10 Million Did Not Simply “Disappear”

    It is important to be precise.

    The money did not vanish without a trace.

    Investigators have reconstructed much of its path.

    The real mystery is responsibility.

    How did money originating in a major healthcare settlement end up helping finance political activity?

    Why was Hope Florida’s allocation increased from $5 million to $10 million in approximately one day?

    Who requested that change?

    Who approved it?

    Who understood where the money could ultimately go?

    And why, after an extensive investigation, can Florida taxpayers still not attach a name to that decision?

    Those questions remain legitimate even without criminal charges.

    Florida Deserves the Complete Answer

    This case is bigger than Ron DeSantis, Casey DeSantis, James Uthmeier, Ashley Moody or any single political campaign.

    It concerns a basic principle of democratic government:

    When public money moves, the public has the right to know who moved it, why it was moved and where it went.

    A finding that $10 million was misappropriated should not be the end of the story.

    It should be the beginning of the demand for transparency.

    Florida taxpayers should not have to accept a government in which millions of dollars can be moved through a chain of organizations for political purposes while everyone at the top says, effectively, that nobody knows who made the decision.

    The money has largely been traced.

    Now Florida needs to trace the responsibility.

    Horizonte Cubano News

  • Carlos Giménez, Cuba and the Politics of Starvation

    By Horizonte Cubano News

    There is a fundamental question Congressman Carlos Giménez should answer: Can you starve a government without starving the people who live under it?

    This is not a question based on political speculation. It arises directly from the congressman’s own public statements.

    In April 2025, Giménez advocated cutting important economic connections between the United States and Cuba, including travel and remittances. Explaining his strategy, he used unmistakable words:

    “efforts to basically starve the regime.”

    The congressman was referring to the Cuban government, not explicitly to the Cuban people. That distinction matters, and it should be acknowledged.

    But so should another distinction: governments do not stand in supermarket lines. Governments do not have children who need food. Governments do not depend on relatives abroad sending money to buy basic necessities.

    People do.

    From “Starve” to “Strangle”

    On August 19, 2026, during an interview on CNN, Giménez discussed the conflict with Iran and endorsed an economic blockade.

    His language was again striking. He advocated a strategy to:

    “strangle them economically.”

    Giménez then proposed arming resistance groups inside Iran.

    Within the same discussion, he introduced Cuba into the comparison, arguing that ordinary people in Iran and Cuba lack the weapons necessary to resist their governments.

    The congressman did not say during that CNN interview that the United States should “starve the Cuban people,” nor did he explicitly call for an invasion of Cuba.

    We should not put words in his mouth.

    His actual words are serious enough to deserve scrutiny.

    The Contradiction

    In February 2026, Giménez himself described the humanitarian reality in Cuba in stark terms: the economy was collapsing, shortages of food and medicine were severe, electricity and fuel were scarce, and “its people are starving.”

    Yet his prescription was more pressure.

    He called for cutting remaining financial flows to the Cuban government, including remittances and travel mechanisms he believes benefit the state.

    That produces an unavoidable question:

    If you already acknowledge that the Cuban people are starving, how much additional economic pressure can be applied before the strategy stops being pressure against the government and becomes additional suffering for the population?

    This is where slogans must give way to policy.

    Remittances Are Not an Abstract Concept

    Money sent from Miami, Hialeah, Tampa, New Jersey, Maryland or anywhere else in the United States does not exist only on a government balance sheet.

    For many Cuban families, that money helps purchase food, medicine and other necessities.

    Certainly, the Cuban government controls important portions of the economy and obtains revenue through transactions involving its citizens. That deserves examination.

    But eliminating a family’s ability to help a grandmother, mother, brother or child in Cuba requires something more convincing than the argument that economic suffering will eventually produce political change.

    After more than six decades of confrontation, Cubans deserve evidence that a policy will improve their lives—not another experiment conducted with their stomachs.

    We Oppose Repression Without Supporting Collective Punishment

    One does not have to defend the Cuban government to question this strategy.

    Cuba needs economic reforms. Cuba needs political reforms. Cuban citizens need greater freedoms, better living conditions and institutions accountable to them.

    But opposition to the Cuban government cannot require indifference toward the suffering of the Cuban people.

    Nor should American policy toward Cuba become a competition over who can impose the greatest amount of economic pain.

    If sanctions target officials responsible for repression, corruption or human-rights violations, make that case.

    If financial restrictions can be designed to prevent money from reaching sanctioned entities while preserving legitimate family assistance, develop those mechanisms.

    If negotiations can obtain measurable concessions benefiting ordinary Cubans, negotiate.

    But deliberately increasing economic desperation and simply hoping that desperation produces political change is not a serious long-term strategy.

    Congressman Giménez Should Answer

    Carlos Giménez represents thousands of Cuban Americans whose relatives still live on the island.

    Therefore, the questions are straightforward:

    Congressman, when you say “starve the regime,” how do you guarantee that you are not starving the people?

    If you acknowledge that Cubans are already hungry, what humanitarian safeguards accompany your maximum-pressure strategy?

    What happens if increased deprivation does not overthrow the government, but instead produces another massive migration crisis toward the United States?

    And finally:

    Is the objective of American policy to punish Cuba—or to create conditions in which Cubans can actually live better and become freer?

    Those are not communist questions.

    They are not Republican or Democratic questions.

    They are questions of responsible American foreign policy.

    Cuba does not need another generation trapped between an authoritarian government and policies that measure success by how much economic pressure the island can withstand.

    The Cuban people have already paid enough.

    It is time for Washington and Havana to begin measuring policy by something different:

    results.

  • Canada Refuses Trump’s Tariffs. So, Are We Invading Canada Too?

    By Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News
    August 23, 2026

    Canada has apparently committed a terrible offense.

    It said no to Washington.

    According to reports published Sunday, President Donald Trump accused Canada of imposing enormous tariffs on American farmers after bilateral trade negotiations failed.

    The United States has imposed new tariffs of 50 percent on approximately $20 billion in Canadian products, and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney says Canada will retaliate “dollar for dollar” beginning September 8.

    Trump responded angrily.

    So there is only one question left.

    When do we bomb Canada?

    Ottawa first?

    Toronto?

    Perhaps an aircraft carrier should be dispatched toward Montreal.

    Relax.

    Nobody is seriously proposing that.

    And that is precisely the point.

    Canada Said No

    Washington presented its conditions.

    Canada rejected them.

    The Canadian government says Washington introduced unacceptable conditions during the final hours of negotiations.

    The United States says Canada refused terms that had previously been discussed.

    Canada has now announced retaliation.

    Steel.

    Dairy products.

    Appliances.

    Agricultural machinery.

    Pulp and paper.

    Electronics.

    This is becoming a serious commercial confrontation between two neighboring countries.

    Yet despite the disagreement, nobody needs to prepare an invasion map.

    Why?

    Because countries disagree.

    Governments negotiate.

    Governments impose tariffs.

    Other governments retaliate.

    Diplomats argue.

    Businesses complain.

    Markets react.

    Politicians make speeches.

    Then, eventually, somebody returns to the negotiating table.

    That is international politics.

    Imagine Applying the Cuba Standard to Canada

    Now imagine applying some of the rhetoric routinely heard about Cuba to our northern neighbor.

    Canada refuses American demands?

    Regime change!

    Canada retaliates against American sanctions?

    Maximum pressure!

    Canada refuses to surrender?

    The Canadian government must fall!

    Mark Carney criticizes Washington?

    Send in the Marines!

    Of course, this sounds ridiculous.

    It is supposed to.

    Canada is a sovereign country.

    The United States does not possess the right to overthrow another country’s government simply because Washington dislikes its economic policies.

    So why does the language of military intervention become so casual when certain politicians discuss Cuba?

    No, Canada and Cuba Are Not the Same

    Before someone deliberately misunderstands the argument, let us make this absolutely clear.

    Canada and Cuba are profoundly different countries.

    Canada is a longstanding American ally and a constitutional democracy.

    Cuba has a one-party political system and a completely different historical relationship with Washington.

    The economic relationships are different.

    The security relationships are different.

    The political systems are different.

    This article is not claiming equivalence between Canada and Cuba.

    The comparison concerns something much simpler:

    How should governments resolve disputes?

    The answer cannot automatically become military force whenever Washington encounters a government it dislikes.

    We Negotiated With Communist China

    There is an even more inconvenient historical example.

    China.

    After the Chinese Communist Revolution, American citizens and companies had substantial property claims against the People’s Republic of China.

    The United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission certified approximately $196.9 million in principal in the relevant China claims programs.

    Did Washington invade Beijing to collect the money?

    No.

    Washington negotiated.

    In 1979, the United States and the People’s Republic of China reached a settlement under which China agreed to pay $80.5 million.

    There was an initial $30 million payment, followed by five annual installments of $10.1 million.

    Communist government.

    Confiscated American property.

    Major ideological disagreements.

    And what did Washington use?

    Diplomacy.

    Now Look at Cuba

    The United States currently has 5,913 certified awards involving Cuba representing approximately $1.902 billion in principal.

    Those claims remain unresolved.

    So what is the strategy?

    Wait another sixty years?

    Impose another hundred sanctions?

    Hope the Cuban government collapses?

    Talk about military intervention?

    Or perhaps try something America has successfully used before:

    Negotiate.

    If Washington could negotiate property claims with Communist China, Washington can at least explore negotiations with Cuba.

    Negotiation does not mean surrender.

    Negotiation means attempting to obtain something.

    American Creditors Cannot Deposit a Missile in the Bank

    This is where the discussion becomes almost absurd.

    Suppose tomorrow the United States invaded Cuba.

    What happens to the claims?

    Does a missile pay Exxon?

    Does a bomb compensate a family whose property was confiscated?

    Does destroying an electrical plant produce dollars for creditors?

    Does damaging a railroad generate money?

    Does destroying a port increase Cuba’s capacity to pay?

    Of course not.

    If American creditors want compensation, they ultimately need a Cuban economy capable of generating revenue.

    American creditors cannot deposit a missile in the bank.

    They can deposit a payment.

    That distinction should matter.

    War Is Extremely Expensive

    There is another accounting problem.

    Military operations cost money.

    Enormous amounts of money.

    Ships.

    Aircraft.

    Personnel.

    Logistics.

    Intelligence.

    Reconstruction.

    Humanitarian assistance.

    Veterans’ benefits.

    And, most importantly, human lives.

    Before anyone casually demands military intervention in Cuba, perhaps Congress should ask a basic question:

    How much would it cost?

    And then another:

    What exactly would America gain?

    If the objective is recovering approximately $1.9 billion in certified principal claims, spending potentially enormous sums destroying the debtor country’s productive capacity would be a rather peculiar collection strategy.

    The Cuban People Would Pay First

    And there is something much more important than accounting.

    Cubans would die.

    American service members could die.

    Families would be destroyed.

    Infrastructure would be damaged.

    Migration toward the United States could increase dramatically.

    The Florida Straits would not magically become peaceful because someone in Washington announced that military action would produce freedom.

    War has consequences.

    People who demand it should be required to explain those consequences.

    Canada Reminds Us What Normal Diplomacy Looks Like

    Washington and Ottawa are currently angry with each other.

    Trump says Canada has treated American farmers unfairly.

    Canada says Washington’s new conditions are unacceptable.

    Tariffs are increasing.

    Retaliation is coming.

    The rhetoric is getting hotter.

    And eventually?

    Someone will probably have to negotiate.

    Because that is what countries do.

    They defend their interests.

    They use leverage.

    They impose costs.

    They negotiate.

    They compromise.

    They sign agreements.

    Sometimes agreements fail and negotiations begin again.

    Nobody interprets the existence of negotiations as surrendering American sovereignty.

    Why Should Negotiation With Cuba Be Taboo?

    This is the question Washington should confront.

    Negotiating with Cuba does not require becoming communist.

    It does not require approving the Cuban government.

    It does not require abandoning concerns about human rights.

    It does not require forgiving property claims.

    In fact, negotiation may be precisely how those claims finally get paid.

    Washington can place difficult issues on the table:

    Certified American claims.

    Cuban counterclaims.

    Migration.

    Political prisoners.

    Human rights.

    Private enterprise.

    Banking.

    Energy.

    Trade.

    Investment protections.

    Agriculture.

    Transportation.

    And sanctions.

    Cuba will place its own demands on the table.

    Then both sides negotiate.

    That is diplomacy.

    And If Cuba Says No?

    Then Washington retains options.

    Maintain specific sanctions.

    Modify others.

    Apply diplomatic pressure.

    Work with allies.

    Offer incentives for measurable reforms.

    Withdraw incentives when commitments are violated.

    Negotiate again.

    Foreign policy contains an enormous space between doing nothing and dropping bombs.

    America should learn to operate inside it.

    So, Are We Invading Canada?

    No.

    Obviously.

    Canada is our neighbor, our ally and one of our most important economic partners.

    Our governments are having a serious dispute.

    They will fight politically.

    They will fight economically.

    They may exchange increasingly unpleasant statements.

    But nobody should expect American tanks rolling toward Ottawa.

    And perhaps the absurdity of that image should teach us something.

    When Canada rejects Washington’s demands, we understand instinctively that eventually governments must negotiate.

    When China confiscated American property, Washington ultimately negotiated.

    When governments around the world disagree with us, Washington routinely negotiates.

    So perhaps diplomacy should not suddenly become a dirty word when the conversation reaches an island ninety miles from Florida.

    The United States is powerful enough to defend its interests.

    It should also be confident enough to negotiate.

    Because sometimes the strongest sentence an American president can deliver is not:

    “Prepare the missiles.”

    It is:

    “Take a seat. We have some things to settle.”

    And fortunately for our Canadian friends, nobody needs to invade Ottawa to discover that.

    Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

  • He Committed a Crime and Served His Sentence. But Why Was a Cuban Father Sent to Africa?

    By Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News
    August 23, 2026

    Carlos Rodríguez López is not the perfect immigrant around whom politicians normally construct sympathetic immigration stories.

    We should acknowledge that immediately.

    According to reporting by El Nuevo Herald, citing a Telemundo report and public information, Rodríguez López had a cocaine-possession case dating to 2016 and two other cases categorized as felonies.

    His wife says he served 11 months in prison.

    He also had a final order of removal.

    Those facts matter.

    Immigration policy cannot be discussed honestly by hiding inconvenient facts.

    But another set of facts matters too.

    Rodríguez López is Cuban.

    He is 35 years old.

    His wife, Igrayne Ribot, is an American citizen.

    They have a daughter.

    And last Thursday, the United States government placed him on an aircraft and sent him not to Cuba, but thousands of miles away to:

    Liberia, West Africa.

    His wife says that when she finally spoke with him, he told her:

    “Mami, estoy en África.”

    That sentence should make Americans ask some questions.

    He Served His Criminal Sentence

    Let us begin where responsibility belongs.

    If Rodríguez López committed crimes, he should have faced the consequences established by law.

    According to his wife, he did.

    He served 11 months.

    Criminal punishment and immigration consequences, however, are legally distinct matters. A criminal conviction can create serious immigration consequences, including removal, depending upon the offense and the person’s immigration status.

    That is the law.

    But none of that answers the question confronting us today:

    Why Liberia?

    Deportation Is One Thing. Exile to an Unfamiliar Third Country Is Another.

    The United States has traditionally removed people to countries connected to their nationality or lawful residence, subject to applicable immigration law and international obligations.

    The growing use of third countries raises another set of questions.

    What relationship does Carlos Rodríguez López have with Liberia?

    Does he have family there?

    Does he speak the languages commonly used there?

    Does he have employment?

    Does he have legal residency?

    Can he work?

    Can he travel?

    Can he leave?

    How long may he remain?

    What happens when the period authorized by Liberia expires?

    Can Liberia eventually send him somewhere else?

    Those are not emotional questions.

    They are legal and policy questions.

    Americans deserve answers.

    Four Cubans Are Now in Liberia

    According to the reporting, Rodríguez López is not alone.

    Four Cubans were reportedly included in the first group sent under the arrangement:

    Carlos Rodríguez López.

    Leonardo Sánchez.

    Emilio Destrade.

    Darwin Hernández.

    They were among a group of 20 deportees of several nationalities transported to Liberia.

    That means we are no longer discussing a hypothetical policy.

    The policy is operating.

    People have been transported.

    Families have been separated.

    And the United States reportedly has an arrangement under which substantially more deportees could eventually be transferred there.

    Congress should know exactly how that arrangement works.

    Publish the Agreement With Liberia

    This should be simple.

    The American public should be able to examine the basic terms governing the transfer of deportees to Liberia, subject to legitimate redactions for genuinely sensitive information.

    How many people can Liberia accept?

    How much is the United States paying?

    What does Liberia agree to provide?

    What immigration status will deportees receive?

    Are they detained?

    Are they free to work?

    Can their families visit them?

    Can they obtain legal representation?

    What happens if they fear persecution in another country?

    What prevents subsequent removal to a country where an individual may face torture or persecution?

    How long does Liberia agree to receive them?

    What happens when the agreement ends?

    These questions should not require investigative journalism to answer.

    Congress should demand the answers.

    What Happened to the Pending Appeal?

    The report concerning Rodríguez López raises another issue that deserves clarification.

    According to the information cited by El Nuevo Herald, he had a final removal order and a pending appeal when he was transferred.

    Those two facts are not necessarily contradictory; immigration litigation can continue after a removal order becomes final depending upon the nature of the proceeding.

    But they raise an obvious question:

    What exactly was pending when the government put him on the aircraft?

    Was the pending matter capable of preventing removal?

    Had a court denied a stay?

    Was the government legally authorized to execute the removal while that proceeding continued?

    Did his attorneys receive adequate notice?

    We should not assume the answer.

    We should demand it.

    Due process means determining what the law actually required in his case.

    A Criminal Record Does Not Eliminate Every Legal Protection

    This principle matters.

    Someone can commit a crime and still possess legal rights.

    The two ideas are not contradictory.

    Prisoners have constitutional rights.

    Defendants have rights.

    People facing deportation have whatever procedural protections American law provides for their circumstances.

    Even people whom society dislikes remain protected against government action that exceeds lawful authority.

    That is one of the fundamental differences between rule by law and rule by discretion.

    The question should never be:

    Is this person perfect?

    The question is:

    Did the government follow the law?

    His American Wife and Daughter Exist Too

    Immigration enforcement frequently focuses entirely on the individual being removed.

    But families experience the consequences.

    Rodríguez López’s wife is an American citizen.

    His daughter is part of an American family.

    Whatever mistakes he made, they did not commit those offenses.

    They now live thousands of miles from him.

    That does not automatically create a legal right for Rodríguez López to remain in the United States.

    But policymakers should acknowledge that immigration enforcement has consequences for American citizens too.

    When Congress designs immigration law, those consequences deserve consideration.

    Should There Be a Second-Chance Mechanism?

    His wife’s argument raises a broader policy question.

    Should some immigrants who committed offenses years earlier, completed their sentences, demonstrated rehabilitation and established substantial American family ties have a mechanism through which those circumstances can be considered?

    That question deserves debate.

    Not every crime should be treated alike.

    A violent repeat offender is not situated identically to someone convicted of a nonviolent offense years earlier.

    Length of residence matters.

    Rehabilitation matters.

    Family circumstances can matter.

    Subsequent conduct matters.

    Public safety must remain paramount.

    But immigration law should be capable of recognizing distinctions.

    Congress should debate whether clearly defined second-chance mechanisms are appropriate for certain long-term residents who satisfy rigorous requirements.

    That is a legislative question.

    Do Not Confuse Compassion With Open Borders

    Questioning this policy does not mean opposing deportation.

    The United States has immigration laws.

    Those laws must be enforced.

    Some individuals will ultimately have no lawful right to remain.

    Some should be removed.

    People presenting serious threats to public safety should be prioritized.

    But enforcement does not answer every question about where, how and under what conditions someone is removed.

    America can enforce its borders without abandoning transparency.

    America can deport people while respecting due process.

    America can punish crime without pretending rehabilitation never exists.

    And America can insist that government explain what happens when it transports people to countries with which they have no meaningful connection.

    Congress Needs to Investigate

    The Liberia arrangement has now affected Cubans, Venezuelans, Colombians and others.

    This is larger than one family.

    Congress should conduct oversight.

    The Department of Homeland Security should explain the legal criteria used to select people for third-country removal.

    The State Department should explain the agreement negotiated with Liberia.

    The administration should disclose the safeguards established for people transferred there.

    And Congress should determine whether existing law adequately governs these arrangements or whether legislation is necessary.

    Oversight is not obstruction.

    It is Congress doing its job.

    “Mami, Estoy en África”

    There is something extraordinarily revealing about those four words.

    A Cuban man with an American wife and daughter suddenly finds himself in West Africa.

    He has a criminal history.

    A final removal order.

    And according to the report, litigation was still pending.

    Maybe after examining the complete record we will conclude that every legal requirement was satisfied.

    If so, we should say so.

    Maybe we will discover that something went wrong.

    Then government should correct it.

    That is precisely why transparency matters.

    Immigration policy should not depend upon whether we sympathize with Carlos Rodríguez López.

    It should depend upon whether the United States followed its laws and whether the policy itself makes sense.

    His wife is asking for a second opportunity.

    Congress may ultimately decide how broadly second chances should exist.

    But before that debate even begins, Americans deserve an answer to a much simpler question:

    Why is an American citizen’s Cuban husband, after serving his criminal sentence, now living thousands of miles away in Liberia?

    And if this is going to become American immigration policy, Congress should demand to know exactly how it works.

    Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

  • Washington Negotiated With China. Why Not Cuba?

    By Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News
    August 23, 2026

    There is a misconception surrounding the unresolved American property claims against Cuba.

    Some speak as though negotiating compensation with Havana would represent an unprecedented concession.

    It would not.

    The United States has been here before.

    And one of the clearest examples involves a government with which Washington had profound ideological and geopolitical differences:

    The People’s Republic of China.

    American citizens and companies had claims resulting from nationalizations and other property takings after the Chinese Communist Revolution.

    The United States documented those claims.

    The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission certified them.

    For years they remained unresolved.

    Then Washington did something remarkably practical.

    It negotiated.

    And American claimants received money.

    Perhaps Cuba deserves the same pragmatic approach.

    The China Numbers

    The historical record is straightforward.

    The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission adjudicated American claims against the People’s Republic of China arising from nationalizations, expropriations and other property losses.

    According to the Department of Justice, the China programs ultimately involved:

    381 awards

    representing approximately:

    $196,858,296 in principal

    The United States did not receive the entire certified amount.

    Instead, Washington and Beijing negotiated.

    On May 11, 1979, the governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China concluded a formal claims settlement agreement.

    China agreed to pay:

    $80,500,000

    to the United States.

    Not $196.9 million.

    Not every dollar originally certified.

    $80.5 million.

    Why?

    Because international claims settlements are negotiations.

    The objective is not necessarily obtaining the theoretically largest number.

    The objective is reaching an agreement capable of producing actual payment.

    China Did Not Pay Everything at Once

    The payment structure is even more relevant to Cuba.

    China did not simply write Washington an $80.5 million check on the day the agreement was signed.

    The settlement established a payment schedule.

    China agreed to make an initial payment of:

    $30 million

    on October 1, 1979.

    Then China would make:

    Five annual payments of $10.1 million

    beginning October 1, 1980.

    The final installment was scheduled for 1984.

    Thirty million dollars initially.

    Five payments of $10.1 million.

    Total:

    $80.5 million.

    That is financial diplomacy.

    The Claimants Did Not Receive 100 Percent

    This is another important lesson.

    The settlement fund was smaller than the total principal value of the certified claims.

    Yet the agreement created something the claimants did not have before:

    money available for payment.

    The current FCSC summary reports that payments under the China claims programs amounted to an initial amount for qualifying awards plus a percentage of principal.

    In other words, Washington accepted a negotiated settlement rather than insisting indefinitely upon full nominal recovery.

    That is not unusual.

    Creditors make similar calculations throughout the financial world.

    What is worth more?

    One hundred percent of a debt that may never be collected?

    Or a negotiated percentage that actually gets paid?

    That question deserves consideration in the Cuban claims debate.

    Now Compare Cuba

    The Cuban numbers are much larger.

    The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission’s completed Cuba programs currently represent:

    5,913 awards

    with approximately:

    $1.902 billion in certified principal.

    And unlike China:

    there is still no comprehensive settlement.

    The original Cuba program was completed in 1972.

    The first China program was also completed in 1972.

    Look at what happened afterward.

    China:

    Claims certified.

    Negotiations.

    Agreement in 1979.

    Payments beginning in 1979.

    Final scheduled installment in 1984.

    Cuba:

    Claims certified.

    Decades of confrontation.

    No comprehensive claims agreement.

    No settlement fund.

    No general payment mechanism.

    And the creditors continue waiting.

    That comparison deserves attention.

    Washington Negotiated With Communist China

    This point matters politically.

    In 1979, China was not a liberal democracy.

    The Communist Party governed China.

    Washington had enormous disagreements with Beijing.

    Yet the United States did not conclude that ideological differences made financial negotiations impossible.

    President Jimmy Carter’s administration negotiated with the government that actually controlled the country and possessed the ability to enter into an agreement.

    That is what diplomacy requires.

    You negotiate with the government that exists.

    Not the government you wish existed.

    Negotiation Did Not Mean Approval

    The United States did not endorse every aspect of China’s political system by settling property claims.

    It settled a financial dispute.

    That distinction should be obvious.

    Washington can profoundly disagree with Havana about human rights, political freedoms, regional policy and other issues while simultaneously negotiating compensation for American claimants.

    One issue does not erase the others.

    Diplomacy allows governments to resolve specific disputes even when broader disagreements remain.

    The State Department Already Has a Role

    There is another similarity between the China and Cuba programs.

    The FCSC’s function was to determine claims.

    It was not created to conduct the final diplomatic settlement itself.

    The China claims were certified for use in future negotiations.

    The Cuba claims were likewise certified for potential use in a future negotiated settlement.

    And the Department of Justice currently makes clear that a Cuba settlement would involve the U.S. Department of State.

    Then perhaps the question should be directed there.

    Why are we not seriously exploring negotiations?

    Cuba Does Not Need to Pay $1.9 Billion Tomorrow

    The Chinese precedent demonstrates why insisting on an immediate full payment is unnecessary.

    Negotiations could address:

    Principal.

    Interest.

    Discounts.

    Payment periods.

    Claims priorities.

    Reciprocal Cuban claims.

    Blocked assets where applicable.

    Commercial arrangements.

    Financing.

    And other issues both governments bring to the table.

    The final settlement could differ substantially from the headline value of the certified claims.

    That would be for governments and claimants to evaluate.

    But first there must be negotiations.

    Imagine the Cuban Version

    Suppose Washington and Havana agreed upon a settlement amount after negotiations.

    That amount could potentially be paid over many years.

    There could be an initial payment.

    Annual installments could follow.

    A dedicated claims fund could receive the money.

    The United States could distribute payments according to legislation and the negotiated settlement.

    Other economic measures could be phased alongside Cuban compliance.

    That would not be identical to China.

    Cuba is Cuba.

    China is China.

    The legal, political and economic circumstances are different.

    But the precedent proves something important:

    Negotiated settlements are possible.

    Economic Normalization Can Help Produce Payment

    The China settlement occurred during a broader transformation of U.S.-China relations.

    The United States and China formally established diplomatic relations in January 1979.

    The claims agreement followed in May.

    Commercial relations subsequently expanded dramatically.

    The Cuban situation will obviously follow its own path.

    But there is a fundamental economic lesson.

    A country integrated into international commerce has greater capacity to generate foreign currency than an isolated and impoverished economy.

    If American claimants want Cuba to pay substantial financial obligations, they should have an interest in Cuba developing the economic capacity to make those payments.

    That means Washington should at least examine whether a negotiated claims settlement can become part of a broader process of economic normalization.

    The Objective Is Collection

    American policy should begin with the interests of the claimants.

    They have waited for decades.

    Some original claimants have died.

    Companies have changed.

    Claims have passed through generations and corporate successors.

    How much longer should everyone wait?

    If the objective is collecting money, policy should be evaluated according to whether it increases the probability of collection.

    Sanctions may provide negotiating leverage.

    Use that leverage.

    But leverage without negotiation eventually becomes simply permanent pressure.

    The purpose of leverage should be obtaining something.

    War Will Not Pay the Claims

    There is another reason the China precedent matters.

    Nobody needed to invade China to resolve the American property claims.

    Nobody needed to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party first.

    Washington negotiated with Beijing.

    Money was paid.

    That lesson should be remembered when people speak casually about military solutions for Cuba.

    War destroys economic capacity.

    Claims settlements require economic capacity.

    If American creditors want payment, destroying the infrastructure, businesses and productive assets of the debtor country would hardly be an intelligent collection strategy.

    Bombs do not pay creditors.

    Economic activity does.

    Cuba Is Not China — But We Can Learn From China

    No historical comparison is perfect.

    China’s size, strategic importance, blocked assets, economic circumstances and relationship with the United States were very different.

    We should not pretend otherwise.

    But precedents do not need to be identical to be useful.

    The China settlement demonstrates three principles applicable to Cuba.

    First:

    The United States can negotiate property claims with a communist government.

    Second:

    Washington can accept a negotiated amount below the nominal value of certified claims when doing so produces an actual settlement.

    Third:

    Payments can occur over time rather than through an impossible immediate lump sum.

    Those are valuable lessons.

    Mr. Secretary of State, Study the Precedent

    The State Department does not need to invent the concept of international claims settlement.

    American diplomatic history already contains numerous examples.

    China is one of them.

    The files exist.

    The agreement exists.

    The payment mechanism existed.

    American claimants received distributions.

    Study what worked.

    Study what would have to be different for Cuba.

    Consult the claimants.

    Consult Congress.

    Consult financial experts.

    Determine Cuba’s realistic payment capacity.

    Identify possible negotiating leverage.

    And determine whether a settlement framework can finally be developed.

    After more than sixty years, simply repeating that Cuba owes money is no longer sufficient.

    The objective should be collecting it.

    From $196.9 Million on Paper to $80.5 Million in a Fund

    That is perhaps the most important lesson from China.

    American claims represented approximately:

    $196.9 million in principal.

    The negotiated fund was:

    $80.5 million.

    And the money was actually paid according to an agreed schedule.

    That is the difference between a claim and a settlement.

    One exists on paper.

    The other creates money available for distribution.

    Cuba currently has approximately:

    $1.902 billion in certified principal claims.

    Those claims have remained unresolved for decades.

    Washington now has a choice.

    Continue waiting for some undefined political event that may occur someday.

    Or begin exploring whether diplomacy can transform those certificates into actual payments.

    China demonstrates that negotiation is not surrender.

    It is not ideological approval.

    And it is not forgetting confiscated property.

    It is how creditors begin getting paid.

    Washington negotiated with Beijing.

    American claimants received money.

    So after more than six decades of waiting, there is a perfectly reasonable question for the United States government:

    Why not negotiate with Cuba?

    Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

  • Mr. Secretary of State: It Is Time to Negotiate

    The United States government already has the claims.

    It already has the valuations.

    It already has decades of documentation.

    And the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has already done much of the work necessary to establish which claims were compensable and their certified principal amounts.

    What is missing is not another political speech.

    What is missing is negotiation.

    The FCSC itself states that settlement negotiations are not its responsibility. That responsibility belongs to the diplomatic process in which the U.S. Department of State would be involved.

    Then perhaps it is time for the Department of State to begin treating these claims as what they ultimately are:

    An unresolved international financial dispute that requires negotiation.

    There are currently 5,913 certified awards representing $1,902,202,284.95 in principal.

    They remain unpaid.

    Another ten years of confrontation will not pay them.

    Another fifty sanctions will not automatically pay them.

    Another political rally in Miami will not pay them.

    And waiting indefinitely for regime change will not pay them.

    Negotiation might.

    Diplomacy Is Not Surrender

    Opening negotiations with Havana would not require Washington to forgive the claims.

    Quite the opposite.

    The purpose of negotiations would be to obtain compensation.

    The United States should arrive at the negotiating table representing the interests of American claimants and demanding a credible settlement.

    Cuba would understandably negotiate the amount, interest, payment schedule and other outstanding bilateral claims.

    That is what governments do.

    The objective should be an enforceable agreement capable of transforming certified claims into actual payments.

    There Is Precedent

    The United States has resolved claims against governments with which it had profound political disagreements.

    Claims settlement is not an endorsement of another country’s political system.

    It is diplomacy applied to an outstanding financial obligation.

    The question Washington should ask is not whether it approves of the Cuban government.

    The question is whether negotiating with that government today offers American creditors a better possibility of recovering money than waiting indefinitely for another government to appear someday.

    After more than sixty years, the answer deserves serious consideration.

    Negotiate From Strength — But Negotiate

    Washington does not have to abandon leverage before negotiations begin.

    Sanctions relief, commercial access, investment opportunities and eventual broader economic normalization all have potential negotiating value.

    Use that leverage.

    Cuba wants greater access to capital and markets.

    The United States wants outstanding claims addressed.

    Those interests create the basis for negotiation.

    A settlement could establish measurable stages:

    Cuba makes payments.

    Washington provides agreed economic measures.

    Cuba implements additional obligations.

    Additional restrictions are reconsidered where legally possible.

    Compliance is verified.

    And the process continues.

    Where congressional action is required, Congress should participate.

    That is not appeasement.

    That is negotiation backed by leverage.

    Replace the Language of War With the Language of Settlement

    There are voices that continue talking about military intervention in Cuba.

    But an invasion will not deposit $1.9 billion into the accounts of American claimants.

    War could destroy precisely the infrastructure and productive capacity Cuba would need to generate revenue for compensation.

    If the objective is recovering money, destroying the debtor’s capacity to produce money makes little economic sense.

    American creditors need something very different.

    They need a Cuba capable of producing.

    A Cuba capable of attracting investment.

    A Cuba capable of exporting.

    A Cuba capable of generating revenue.

    And ultimately:

    A Cuba capable of paying its debts.

    The Department of State should therefore begin exploring whether the moment has arrived for serious government-to-government discussions over the certified American claims.

    Not because Washington should forget history.

    Not because Havana should receive a blank check.

    And certainly not because the United States should abandon its legitimate concerns about Cuba.

    But because foreign policy should eventually produce results.

    After more than sixty years, American creditors deserve more than promises that someday, somehow, someone will pay them.

    They deserve an attempt to negotiate a settlement.

    It is time to replace speculation about war with the difficult work of diplomacy.

    Mr. Secretary of State: the claims are certified. The numbers are known. The creditors are waiting.

    It is time to negotiate.

  • Mr. Díaz-Canel, We Agree That Cubans Are Suffering. Now Let’s Talk About Why.

    By Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News
    August 23, 2026

    President Miguel Díaz-Canel has said something with which many of us can agree:

    The Cuban people are suffering.

    In his recent interview with Brazil’s Folha de S.Paulo, the Cuban president described an extraordinarily difficult reality: prolonged blackouts, shortages of medicines, transportation problems, lack of fuel and growing difficulties affecting virtually every aspect of daily life.

    On this point, Mr. President, we do not need an ideological argument.

    The suffering is real.

    Where we need a much more serious conversation is over why it exists — and what both Havana and Washington are prepared to do about it.

    Because after more than sixty years, blaming only the other side is no longer sufficient.

    Washington Bears Responsibility for Washington’s Policies

    Let us begin with something that parts of the Cuban-American political establishment sometimes appear reluctant to acknowledge.

    American sanctions have consequences.

    When financial transactions become more difficult, there are consequences.

    When shipping becomes more complicated or expensive, there are consequences.

    When energy supplies are restricted, there are consequences.

    When companies fear doing business with Cuba because of American sanctions or possible secondary consequences, there are consequences.

    Those effects do not remain confined to an office of the Cuban government.

    Eventually they travel through the economy.

    And somewhere at the end of that economic chain is an ordinary Cuban.

    A mother.

    A pensioner.

    A worker.

    A child.

    A small entrepreneur.

    Recognizing this does not require defending the Cuban government.

    It requires recognizing reality.

    But Havana Must Accept Responsibility Too

    President Díaz-Canel cannot place sixty years of Cuban economic problems entirely at Washington’s door.

    American sanctions did not create every inefficient Cuban enterprise.

    They did not create every bureaucratic obstacle.

    They did not make every agricultural decision.

    They did not establish every restriction on private enterprise.

    They did not determine every monetary policy.

    They did not create every internal barrier confronting Cuban entrepreneurs.

    The Cuban government itself now acknowledges the need for significant economic changes and has recently expanded opportunities for private enterprise and investment.

    That is important.

    But it also raises an obvious question:

    If reforms are necessary today, why were so many of them delayed for so long?

    Washington should answer for Washington.

    Havana should answer for Havana.

    The Cuban people should not be required to choose which government’s mistakes they are permitted to criticize.

    Now Let Us Discuss the Debt History Created

    There is another subject both countries have avoided resolving for far too long.

    The properties confiscated after the Cuban Revolution.

    This is not merely political rhetoric.

    The United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission completed a formal claims process involving properties and other assets taken by the Cuban government.

    Thousands of claims were certified.

    Those claims did not disappear because decades passed.

    And they will not disappear because Washington and Havana prefer arguing about other subjects.

    They represent an unresolved financial dispute between our countries.

    It is time to negotiate it.

    Compensation Must Finally Enter the Conversation

    For decades, American policy has treated confiscated property as part of the historical justification for confrontation with Cuba.

    Fine.

    Then let us resolve the issue.

    Sit down.

    Identify the certified claims.

    Determine the legally recognized amounts.

    Distinguish among different categories of claims.

    Negotiate interest.

    Examine possible settlement mechanisms.

    Establish a timetable.

    And create a structure through which legitimate creditors can finally receive compensation.

    That is what negotiations are for.

    Repeating for another sixty years that Cuba confiscated American property will not compensate a single claimant.

    A settlement might.

    Cuba Cannot Pay Without an Economy Capable of Paying

    Here is where American policy encounters an obvious contradiction.

    If Cuba owes money, Cuba needs the economic capacity to pay it.

    A country experiencing severe shortages, limited access to international finance, deteriorated infrastructure, restricted trade and chronic economic crisis is not in an ideal position to settle billions of dollars in historical claims.

    So Washington must decide what it actually wants.

    Does it want the claims to remain permanent symbols of political confrontation?

    Or does it want creditors eventually to receive money?

    If the objective is compensation, then economic normalization must become part of the discussion.

    A Cuba capable of producing, trading, attracting legitimate investment and generating revenue is a Cuba more capable of paying its debts.

    That should be obvious.

    Put Everything on the Negotiating Table

    Imagine a serious negotiation between Washington and Havana.

    Not another symbolic meeting.

    A negotiation with measurable objectives.

    Certified property claims.

    Other legitimate outstanding claims between both governments.

    Economic sanctions.

    Banking restrictions.

    Commercial relations.

    Investment protections.

    Private enterprise.

    Migration.

    Human rights.

    Political prisoners.

    Security concerns.

    Energy.

    Transportation.

    Agriculture.

    And the gradual normalization of economic relations.

    Nothing should be automatically surrendered.

    Everything should be negotiable.

    The United States should demand concessions.

    Cuba should demand concessions.

    That is diplomacy.

    Create a Claims Settlement Fund

    One possibility deserves serious examination.

    A future agreement could establish a dedicated Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Fund.

    Payments could potentially come from several negotiated sources over time rather than requiring Cuba to produce an impossible lump-sum payment.

    For example, subject to law and negotiation, funding mechanisms could be connected to future commercial activity, agreed government payments, privatization or investment transactions, or other revenue streams acceptable to both governments.

    The details would require economists, lawyers, claimants, both governments and ultimately Congress where legislation is necessary.

    But the principle matters.

    Turn an unresolved historical grievance into a payable financial obligation.

    Creditors do not benefit from eternal confrontation.

    They benefit from getting paid.

    The Embargo Must Be Part of That Negotiation

    This is where American politics must become realistic.

    If Cuba enters into a credible, enforceable agreement to compensate legitimate claims and undertakes meaningful economic reforms, the United States should be prepared to discuss corresponding steps toward dismantling the embargo and broader sanctions architecture.

    Some restrictions can be addressed through executive authority.

    Others are embedded in federal law and would require congressional action.

    Then Congress should debate them.

    The objective should be a negotiated sequence.

    Cuba takes a measurable step.

    The United States takes a measurable step.

    Cuba complies with another obligation.

    Washington removes another restriction where legally possible.

    Verification follows.

    Progress produces progress.

    Failure produces consequences.

    That is more rational than demanding unconditional surrender from either side.

    Waiting for an Invasion Is Not a Financial Strategy

    There are people who continue imagining that someday the United States will invade Cuba, the existing government will disappear and all these historical problems will somehow be resolved afterward.

    That is not a serious strategy.

    There is no reason today to assume an American invasion of Cuba is imminent.

    And building economic policy around waiting for one would be irresponsible.

    What happens if there is no invasion in five years?

    Ten years?

    Twenty?

    Do the claimants simply continue waiting?

    Do their children inherit certificates representing disputes that neither government ever seriously attempted to settle?

    Eventually realism must replace fantasy.

    An invasion is not a debt-collection mechanism.

    Negotiation is.

    Mr. Díaz-Canel, This Requires Something From Cuba Too

    If Havana wants Washington to reconsider sanctions, Cuba must be prepared to discuss the issues Washington cannot simply pretend never happened.

    Confiscated property is one of them.

    Political and human-rights concerns are another.

    Economic transparency matters.

    Investment protections matter.

    The ability of businesses to operate under predictable rules matters.

    Foreign investors will not commit enormous amounts of capital to Cuba if they believe today’s investment can become tomorrow’s confiscation.

    Resolving historical claims would therefore accomplish something larger than compensating old creditors.

    It could help establish credibility for future investment.

    Cuba needs that credibility.

    And Washington Must Decide Whether It Wants Results

    American policymakers face their own choice.

    If the objective is permanent confrontation, continue doing what we have done.

    More sanctions.

    More speeches.

    More accusations.

    More waiting.

    But if the objective is producing measurable results, then negotiation should not be treated as surrender.

    Imagine what success could eventually look like:

    American claimants receiving compensation.

    Cuban private businesses gaining greater access to capital and markets.

    American companies entering lawful commercial opportunities.

    Cuban families experiencing greater economic opportunity.

    Migration pressure declining because more Cubans can imagine a future at home.

    Washington maintaining leverage through enforceable agreements rather than permanent isolation.

    And Havana accepting that access to greater economic normalization carries obligations.

    That would not solve every disagreement between our countries.

    It would solve something.

    After sixty years, that would already be progress.

    Let Us Begin With the Truth

    President Díaz-Canel is correct about one thing.

    Cubans are suffering.

    Now comes the harder part.

    Washington must acknowledge where American policy contributes to that suffering.

    Havana must acknowledge where its own policies created or intensified it.

    And both governments must stop treating unresolved historical disputes as political museum pieces.

    The confiscation claims should be negotiated.

    Legitimate creditors should be compensated.

    Cuba should implement serious reforms.

    The United States should be prepared to dismantle sanctions and, with Congress where necessary, move toward ending the embargo as verifiable agreements are fulfilled.

    Neither government will obtain everything it wants.

    That is precisely why negotiations exist.

    The alternative is another generation of sanctions, shortages, migration, political speeches and unpaid claims.

    And eventually we must ask:

    Who benefits from that?

    Certainly not the Cuban people.

    And certainly not creditors who have spent more than six decades waiting to be paid.

    Mr. Díaz-Canel, we agree that Cubans are suffering.

    Now let us finally have the harder conversation about why — and about what both governments are prepared to change.

    Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

  • Invading Cuba Is Not a Cuba Policy

    By Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News

    For more than six decades, Cuba has been trapped in a political confrontation that has produced plenty of slogans but very few durable solutions.

    Today, as Cuba faces one of the most serious economic and social crises in its modern history, some voices outside the island are once again presenting military intervention as the answer.

    It is easy to call for an invasion from a microphone, a television studio, a political rally, or the safety of another country.

    It is much harder to explain what happens the morning after the first bomb falls.

    An invasion is not a Cuba policy.

    It is the beginning of a war.

    Who Would Pay the Price?

    Any serious discussion about military intervention must begin with the people who would actually live through it.

    Cuban families would be caught between military forces. Civilian infrastructure could be damaged. Electricity, transportation, communications, hospitals, ports, food distribution, and water systems could be disrupted precisely when the population is already suffering from shortages.

    And the consequences would not remain inside Cuba.

    A major conflict only 90 miles from Florida could generate another migration emergency in the Caribbean, placing enormous pressure on the United States, neighboring countries, and regional governments.

    Those demanding intervention should therefore answer a simple question:

    Who pays the human price?

    The answer will not primarily be politicians in Washington or activists in Miami.

    It will be ordinary Cubans.

    Cuba Needs Change — But Cubans Need a Future

    Recognizing the dangers of military intervention does not require defending the Cuban government.

    Cuba needs profound economic reforms. It needs political reforms. It needs institutions capable of responding to the aspirations of younger generations and an economy that allows citizens to build prosperous lives without depending permanently on the state, remittances, or emigration.

    The Cuban government also has responsibilities it cannot indefinitely avoid.

    But Washington has responsibilities as well.

    For decades, American policy toward Cuba has moved repeatedly between sanctions, isolation, migration restrictions, diplomatic confrontation, and expectations that economic pressure would eventually produce political transformation.

    The results deserve serious examination.

    After more than sixty years, the fundamental political conflict remains unresolved, while millions of Cubans have left the island.

    Repeating policies simply because they are familiar is not strategy.

    The United States Should Defend Its Interests

    The United States has legitimate national-security interests in Cuba and the Caribbean.

    Washington should be concerned about migration, narcotics trafficking, foreign military or intelligence activity, regional instability, human rights, economic security, and the presence of strategic competitors close to American territory.

    But protecting those interests does not automatically require invading Cuba.

    A serious Cuba policy should combine diplomacy, economic engagement where legally possible, pressure against individuals and institutions responsible for abuses, support for legitimate private economic activity, migration agreements that are enforceable and humane, and direct communication between the two governments when American interests require it.

    Foreign policy should be judged by results, not by applause lines.

    Listen to Cubans — Including Those Who Live in Cuba

    There is another uncomfortable reality in the Cuba debate.

    Too often, people outside the island speak on behalf of eleven million people without actually asking them what they want.

    Cubans living on the island are not a political abstraction.

    They are workers, retirees, entrepreneurs, farmers, students, professionals, mothers and fathers trying to survive an extraordinarily difficult economic environment.

    Their opinions will not all be identical.

    Some want political transformation. Some prioritize economic stability. Some want greater private enterprise. Others simply want electricity, food, transportation, medicine, decent salaries, and the possibility of keeping their families together.

    A responsible American policy should be capable of listening to those voices without demanding ideological loyalty as the price of being heard.

    There Must Be Another Choice

    For too long, the Cuba debate has been presented as though only two alternatives exist:

    Accept the status quo or invade the island.

    That is a false choice.

    There is enormous political territory between unconditional acceptance and military intervention.

    Diplomacy exists.

    Negotiation exists.

    Economic engagement exists.

    Targeted pressure exists.

    Humanitarian cooperation exists.

    Migration agreements exist.

    Private-sector development exists.

    And, above all, patient political strategy exists.

    The objective should not be to win another ideological argument about Cuba.

    The objective should be to create conditions under which Cuban families can envision a future on their own island while the United States protects its legitimate interests and encourages peaceful economic and political evolution.

    Before Anyone Calls for War

    Those advocating military intervention should be required to answer several questions.

    How many Cuban civilian casualties would be acceptable?

    How many American casualties?

    Who would govern Cuba afterward?

    Who would rebuild the country’s infrastructure?

    How would Washington prevent a massive migration crisis?

    How long would American forces remain?

    How much would reconstruction cost American taxpayers?

    And what happens if the Cuban people themselves reject the political arrangements designed for them from abroad?

    These are not arguments for preserving the status quo.

    They are arguments for seriousness.

    Cuba unquestionably needs change.

    But destroying a country in order to change it would be one of the most dangerous mistakes the United States could make in the Caribbean.

    Cuba needs a future.

    The United States needs a strategy.

    And an invasion is not a strategy.

    Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

  • If American Creditors Want to Be Paid, Cuba Must Be Able to Pay

    By Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News

    For more than six decades, the United States and Cuba have carried an unresolved financial dispute worth billions of dollars.

    This is not an estimate invented for a political speech.

    According to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC), the two completed Cuban claims programs produced 5,913 awards with a combined certified principal amount of $1,902,202,284.95.

    That is approximately $1.9 billion in principal alone.

    And the United States government states clearly that these claims have not been settled with Cuba.

    So after more than sixty years, there is a simple question that deserves a serious answer:

    How exactly are these creditors going to get paid?

    A certified claim can establish an obligation.

    But a claim is not a check.

    If American creditors ultimately want payment, Washington and Havana must eventually move beyond political confrontation and design a financial mechanism capable of producing actual money.

    And that leads to an uncomfortable economic reality:

    If American creditors want Cuba to pay billions of dollars in historical claims, Cuba must possess an economy capable of generating the money to pay them.

    $1.9 Billion in Principal — Before Considering Decades of Interest

    The numbers matter.

    The original Cuban Claims Program was completed in 1972.

    The Commission adjudicated 8,816 claims and determined that 5,911 were compensable, with an adjudicated principal value of:

    $1,851,057,358.00

    A second Cuban Claims Program was conducted decades later.

    Two additional claims were certified, including one for:

    $51,128,926.95

    and another for:

    $16,000.00

    Taken together, the FCSC currently reports:

    5,913 awards

    with total principal of:

    $1,902,202,284.95

    That figure is principal.

    The historical claims framework also involves interest considerations, meaning the economic exposure associated with resolving these decades-old obligations can be substantially greater than the original principal.

    That is precisely why Washington and Havana need a negotiated settlement rather than another generation of political slogans.

    A Claim Is Not the Same as a Payment

    These claims represent legitimate unresolved financial issues between the United States and Cuba.

    They should not simply disappear.

    Property rights matter.

    Contracts matter.

    Compensation matters.

    And any serious future normalization of economic relations between Cuba and the United States should address them.

    But recognizing a debt and collecting a debt are two completely different things.

    A creditor ultimately needs more than a certificate saying:

    $1,000,000 owed.

    Or:

    $10,000,000 owed.

    Or:

    $50,000,000 owed.

    The creditor eventually needs money.

    And money requires cash flow.

    Where Will $1.9 Billion — Plus Whatever Is Negotiated — Come From?

    This is the question that should dominate the next phase of the discussion.

    Suppose Washington and Havana sit down tomorrow and agree that the certified claims should finally be settled.

    Where does Cuba obtain approximately $1.9 billion in principal, much less whatever additional amount might ultimately result from a negotiated settlement?

    Cuba already faces enormous economic difficulties.

    Its electrical system requires investment.

    Railroads require investment.

    Ports require investment.

    Water infrastructure requires investment.

    Agriculture requires equipment and financing.

    Housing requires capital.

    Industry requires modernization.

    Foreign currency remains scarce.

    The country has other international financial obligations as well.

    Demanding billions of dollars from an economy in that condition may produce a politically satisfying statement.

    It does not necessarily produce payment.

    A serious settlement therefore requires an economic strategy.

    Creditors Need a Cuba That Generates Revenue

    This creates an unusual convergence of interests.

    American creditors need repayment.

    Cuba needs investment.

    American businesses may eventually want access to commercial opportunities.

    Cuban businesses need capital and markets.

    Washington wants leverage.

    Havana wants greater access to the international economy.

    Those interests do not have to remain permanently incompatible.

    A growing Cuban economy generates revenue.

    Exports generate revenue.

    Productive businesses generate revenue.

    Tourism generates revenue.

    Modern transportation can generate revenue.

    Modern ports can generate revenue.

    Energy investment can support revenue-producing industries.

    Expanded lawful trade can generate revenue.

    The question should therefore become:

    Can part of Cuba’s future economic growth be structured to resolve its past financial obligations?

    That is a much more useful question than waiting another sixty years.

    Create a Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Mechanism

    Washington and Havana should eventually negotiate a comprehensive claims settlement agreement.

    The claims have already been waiting for decades.

    The first major American claims program ended in 1972.

    It is now 2026.

    That means another 54 years have passed without a comprehensive settlement.

    How much longer should creditors wait?

    Ten more years?

    Twenty?

    Another fifty?

    Instead, the governments should begin examining a structured settlement.

    Claims would need to be categorized.

    Principal amounts would need to be recognized according to whatever methodology the parties negotiate.

    Interest would have to be addressed.

    Payment schedules would have to be realistic.

    Disputes would require resolution mechanisms.

    And the legitimate rights of claimants would have to be protected.

    The objective should not be demanding an economically impossible payment tomorrow.

    The objective should be designing payments that actually arrive.

    A Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Fund

    One option deserves serious examination:

    A dedicated Cuba-U.S. Claims Settlement Fund.

    Imagine that Washington and Havana negotiate an agreement establishing a long-term mechanism for paying the approximately $1.9 billion in certified principal, together with whatever additional amounts are ultimately agreed upon.

    The fund could potentially receive money from multiple negotiated sources over time.

    Depending upon applicable American and Cuban law, those sources could be examined in connection with future commercial revenues, investment transactions, privatization proceeds where applicable, agreed government contributions, infrastructure concessions or other lawful revenue streams.

    The precise structure would require extensive professional analysis.

    Economists would have to model the revenue.

    Lawyers would have to determine what American and Cuban law permits.

    Financial institutions would have to establish mechanisms capable of processing payments.

    Claimants would need representation.

    Governments would have to negotiate.

    Investors would need protections.

    But complicated financial problems are solved every day.

    The fact that a problem is difficult does not justify leaving it unresolved forever.

    Imagine a 20-Year Settlement

    Consider a purely illustrative example.

    Take the approximately $1.9 billion principal currently reported by the FCSC.

    Ignoring interest and other negotiating adjustments for the moment, dividing $1.9 billion evenly across twenty years would represent approximately:

    $95 million per year.

    That does not mean $95 million annually is the correct settlement.

    It is simply an illustration.

    Real negotiations would have to address interest, claim priorities, payment schedules, Cuba’s capacity to pay, possible lump-sum discounts, financing structures and numerous other factors.

    But the example demonstrates something important.

    A figure that appears almost impossible as an immediate lump-sum payment can look very different when converted into a long-term financial structure.

    That is what negotiation can accomplish.

    Investment Could Help Produce the Money

    Cuba needs enormous amounts of infrastructure investment.

    Electricity.

    Railroads.

    Ports.

    Water.

    Telecommunications.

    Agriculture.

    Housing.

    Tourism.

    Manufacturing.

    Transportation.

    Those needs could eventually create economic opportunities.

    A properly designed normalization process could examine whether economic development and debt settlement can reinforce one another.

    Future infrastructure and commercial projects can generate revenues.

    Subject to applicable laws and negotiated agreements, a portion of certain future revenue streams could potentially contribute to a claims settlement mechanism.

    That would create a fundamentally different relationship between Cuba’s past and its future.

    Development would help finance settlement.

    And settlement could help create confidence for additional development.

    Resolving Old Claims Could Unlock New Capital

    Investors examine risk.

    One of the questions any serious investor asks is:

    What happens to my property?

    Can contracts be enforced?

    Can rules change after I invest?

    Can my assets be taken?

    How are disputes resolved?

    Cuba’s unresolved confiscation history inevitably affects those questions.

    Resolving the American claims could therefore produce a benefit extending far beyond the claimants themselves.

    It could send a message to future investors:

    Historical obligations are being addressed.

    New investment will operate under clearer protections.

    Contracts will matter.

    Property rights will matter.

    That credibility has economic value.

    Creditors Should Ask What They Actually Want

    American claimants and their successors should ultimately decide what arrangements they are willing to accept.

    But there is a fundamental economic question worth asking.

    Which has greater value?

    A claim for a large amount that remains unpaid indefinitely?

    Or a negotiated settlement producing actual payments over time?

    Some creditors may prefer waiting.

    Others may prefer settlement.

    That choice belongs to them.

    But after more than half a century without a comprehensive settlement, they deserve a realistic pathway toward payment.

    Washington Must Participate Too

    Cuba cannot realistically generate substantially greater economic activity with the United States while every major economic restriction remains permanently unchanged.

    A claims settlement therefore should become part of a larger negotiation.

    As Cuba makes verified payments and fulfills agreed economic obligations, Washington should be prepared to provide corresponding economic measures where existing executive authority permits.

    Where congressional legislation is required, Congress should debate it.

    The objective should be a road map.

    Payment for normalization.

    Reform for investment.

    Compliance for expanded economic opportunity.

    Verification at every stage.

    Neither side should be expected to surrender everything at the beginning.

    Both sides should be required to perform.

    Stop Waiting for Regime Change to Solve a $1.9 Billion Problem

    For decades, some have assumed that Cuba’s political system would eventually collapse and another government would resolve the claims.

    Maybe Cuba will undergo fundamental political change someday.

    Maybe it will not.

    Nobody knows when.

    That is not a financial strategy.

    Creditors cannot deposit political predictions into bank accounts.

    And waiting for an American military intervention is even less realistic as a debt-collection strategy.

    An invasion is not a payment mechanism.

    A regime change is not a payment schedule.

    A political speech is not a wire transfer.

    Negotiation is how governments settle international claims.

    Indeed, the FCSC itself explains that its certifications were intended for use by the U.S. government in negotiating a future claims settlement agreement with Cuba.

    The mechanism was always supposed to lead eventually toward negotiation.

    It is time to use it.

    Turn $1.9 Billion From a Historical Dispute Into a Financial Agreement

    The numbers are now sitting in government records.

    5,913 awards.

    $1,902,202,284.95 in principal.

    And still no comprehensive settlement.

    Those numbers should not remain political museum pieces for another generation.

    They should become the starting point for negotiations.

    Imagine a different equation:

    Cuba reforms.

    Investment enters.

    Businesses grow.

    Infrastructure improves.

    Economic activity generates revenue.

    A negotiated portion of agreed revenues contributes to settling historical claims.

    Creditors begin receiving payments.

    Economic restrictions are progressively reconsidered as obligations are fulfilled.

    Commercial relationships expand.

    And Cuba becomes increasingly capable of paying precisely because its economy becomes increasingly capable of producing.

    That would transform an unresolved dispute into an economic mechanism.

    It would require lawyers.

    Economists.

    Financial specialists.

    Investors.

    Claimant representatives.

    Government negotiators.

    Infrastructure experts.

    And professionals capable of connecting projects, capital, legal requirements and commercial opportunities across two countries separated by more than sixty years of political confrontation.

    That will not be simple.

    But complicated does not mean impossible.

    After more than six decades, perhaps Washington and Havana should begin with the most basic accounting question of all:

    How do we turn $1,902,202,284.95 on paper into money actually paid to creditors?

    Because if American creditors truly want to be paid, they should also want something else:

    A Cuba capable of paying them.

    Pastor Herrera Macurán is the founder of Horizonte Cubano News. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

  • English Edition

    Horizonte Cubano News is committed to making its constitutional and public policy research accessible to a broader international audience.

    For that reason, selected articles in the Cuban Constitutionalism Series and the future Project for the Future Republic of Cuba will also be published in English.

    Our objective is to encourage dialogue among scholars, policymakers, journalists, students, and readers around the world who are interested in Cuba’s constitutional development and future.

    We believe that ideas should cross borders, and that an informed international dialogue can contribute to a better understanding of Cuba’s past, present, and future.

  • Próximamente: Proyecto País para una futura República de Cuba

    Como parte de esta serie especial, Horizonte Cubano News comenzará la publicación de un conjunto de artículos dedicados al Proyecto País para una futura República de Cuba.

    El propósito de esta iniciativa será presentar propuestas para el desarrollo institucional, económico, social y jurídico del país, promoviendo un debate abierto sobre los desafíos y las oportunidades que enfrentará una futura República.

    Entre los temas que serán abordados se encuentran la organización del Estado, la independencia del Poder Judicial, el sistema electoral, la descentralización administrativa, la infraestructura, el transporte, la energía, la educación, la salud, la economía, la protección del medio ambiente, la inversión, las relaciones internacionales, el desarrollo tecnológico y otros asuntos de interés nacional.

    Nuestra aspiración es que este Proyecto País contribuya a generar un espacio donde todos los cubanos, dentro y fuera de la Isla, puedan encontrar un lugar para participar con respeto, responsabilidad y espíritu constructivo.

    Creemos que el futuro de Cuba no debe edificarse sobre la exclusión, sino sobre la capacidad de escuchar, dialogar y construir consensos dentro del marco del Estado de Derecho y del respeto a la dignidad de cada persona.

    Horizonte Cubano News invita a todos los ciudadanos, académicos, profesionales, trabajadores, empresarios, estudiantes y miembros de la diáspora cubana a acompañarnos en este esfuerzo. Las mejores ideas para el futuro de Cuba surgirán cuando se escuchen todas las voces y cuando el interés nacional esté por encima de las diferencias.

    Porque una República sólida no pertenece a un grupo determinado. Pertenece a todos los cubanos.

  • ¿Qué Constitución necesita la futura República de Cuba?

    Por Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News


    Introducción

    Durante más de un siglo, Cuba ha experimentado profundas transformaciones constitucionales. Desde la Constitución de 1901 hasta la Constitución de 2019, el país ha conocido distintos modelos de organización del Estado, cada uno reflejo de su tiempo, de sus circunstancias políticas y de las aspiraciones de quienes participaron en su elaboración.

    Sin embargo, toda nación que mira hacia el futuro debe formular una pregunta esencial: ¿qué Constitución necesita la futura República de Cuba?

    Este artículo no pretende ofrecer una respuesta definitiva, sino abrir un debate nacional sobre los principios que deberían servir de base para una nueva etapa institucional.


    Aprender de la historia

    Las constituciones no son simples documentos jurídicos. Representan el acuerdo fundamental mediante el cual una nación organiza el ejercicio del poder, protege los derechos de sus ciudadanos y establece las reglas de convivencia.

    La historia constitucional de Cuba ofrece valiosas lecciones. Cada texto constitucional respondió a un momento histórico determinado, pero también dejó enseñanzas sobre los aciertos y las dificultades de cada etapa.

    Conocer esa historia resulta indispensable para evitar repetir errores y fortalecer las instituciones del futuro.


    El principio de continuidad institucional

    En mi criterio, una futura República debe construirse sobre la base del respeto al Estado de Derecho, la separación de poderes, la independencia judicial, la protección efectiva de los derechos humanos y la celebración periódica de elecciones libres y competitivas.

    También considero que toda transición constitucional debe examinar cuidadosamente la continuidad jurídica del Estado, la situación de los tratados internacionales vigentes y las obligaciones asumidas por la República ante la comunidad internacional.

    Estos temas no deben evitarse por razones políticas o ideológicas. Deben ser objeto de un debate abierto, transparente y fundamentado en el Derecho.


    La soberanía y los compromisos internacionales

    Una futura Constitución deberá abordar con claridad la relación entre la soberanía nacional y los compromisos internacionales del Estado cubano.

    En mi criterio, asuntos como los tratados internacionales, la Base Naval de Guantánamo, las obligaciones internacionales de la República y otros temas de relevancia constitucional deben discutirse públicamente y con absoluta transparencia.

    Ocultar esos asuntos o posponer indefinidamente su análisis no contribuirá a fortalecer las instituciones democráticas del futuro.


    Una Constitución para todos los cubanos

    Toda Constitución debe aspirar a representar a la nación en su conjunto.

    Por esa razón, considero que una futura Constitución debería garantizar la igualdad ante la ley, el respeto a la dignidad humana, la libertad de expresión, la libertad de asociación, la libertad religiosa, la protección de la propiedad conforme al marco jurídico que se adopte, el debido proceso y la independencia de las instituciones.

    Una Constitución duradera no pertenece a un partido político ni a un gobierno. Pertenece a toda la nación.


    Una invitación al debate

    Las ideas expuestas en este artículo representan mi criterio personal y tienen como único propósito contribuir al debate sobre el futuro constitucional de Cuba.

    No pretenden cerrar la discusión ni presentar una única respuesta posible.

    Invito a juristas, historiadores, académicos, estudiantes y ciudadanos, dentro y fuera de Cuba, a estudiar nuestra historia constitucional, examinar los documentos originales y participar respetuosamente en este debate.

    Las grandes decisiones nacionales deben construirse mediante el diálogo, el conocimiento y el respeto a la pluralidad de ideas.


    Reflexión final

    El futuro constitucional de Cuba no debe edificarse sobre el olvido.

    Debe construirse sobre el conocimiento de nuestra historia, el respeto al Derecho y la voluntad de crear instituciones que sirvan a todos los cubanos.

    Solo así será posible fortalecer una República basada en la justicia, la libertad, la responsabilidad y el Estado de Derecho.

    Porque las constituciones pueden cambiar, pero los principios de dignidad humana, libertad y respeto a la ley deben permanecer como fundamento permanente de toda nación democrática.


    Este artículo forma parte de la serie «Constitucionalismo Cubano», publicada por Horizonte Cubano News con el propósito de promover el estudio, el análisis y el debate sobre la evolución constitucional de la República de Cuba.

  • La Constitución de 1976: el nacimiento del Estado socialista en Cuba

    Por Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News


    Introducción

    La aprobación de la Constitución de 1976 marcó una de las transformaciones jurídicas e institucionales más importantes de la historia contemporánea de Cuba.

    Tras diecisiete años de Gobierno Revolucionario bajo la Ley Fundamental de 1959, el país adoptó un nuevo texto constitucional que reorganizó completamente la estructura del Estado y definió oficialmente a Cuba como un Estado socialista.

    Este artículo analiza el contexto histórico en que fue aprobada la Constitución de 1976, sus principales características y su impacto sobre la organización institucional de la nación.


    El camino hacia una nueva Constitución

    Entre 1959 y 1976 Cuba fue gobernada bajo la Ley Fundamental de la República.

    Durante ese período ocurrieron profundas transformaciones políticas, económicas y sociales.

    En 1975 se celebró el Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, donde se impulsó la institucionalización del proceso revolucionario y la elaboración de una nueva Constitución.

    Posteriormente, el proyecto constitucional fue sometido a consulta popular y aprobado mediante referendo en 1976.


    El nuevo modelo de Estado

    La Constitución de 1976 introdujo una estructura estatal diferente a la existente bajo las constituciones anteriores.

    Entre sus principales características se encontraban:

    • La definición de Cuba como un Estado socialista.
    • La reorganización de los órganos superiores del Estado.
    • La creación de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular como órgano supremo del poder del Estado.
    • La creación del Consejo de Estado y del Consejo de Ministros.
    • El reconocimiento del papel dirigente del Partido Comunista de Cuba dentro del sistema político.

    Estas disposiciones representaron un cambio profundo respecto al modelo constitucional anterior.


    La organización institucional

    La Constitución de 1976 estableció un sistema político e institucional basado en los principios definidos por el nuevo modelo de organización del Estado.

    A partir de entonces, las instituciones republicanas pasaron a funcionar conforme al marco constitucional aprobado en 1976.

    Ese texto constitucional continuó siendo reformado en años posteriores, particularmente en 1992, 2002 y, finalmente, con la adopción de una nueva Constitución en 2019.


    Una reflexión para el debate constitucional

    La Constitución de 1976 constituye uno de los documentos jurídicos más importantes de la historia contemporánea de Cuba.

    Su estudio permite comprender la evolución institucional del país durante las últimas décadas y analizar cómo fueron redefinidas las funciones de los órganos del Estado.

    Al mismo tiempo, considero que corresponde a juristas, historiadores y ciudadanos continuar estudiando sus fundamentos, su evolución y sus efectos sobre el desarrollo constitucional de la República.

    El análisis de estos temas no debe realizarse desde posiciones preconcebidas, sino mediante el estudio de los textos constitucionales, la legislación y los hechos históricos.


    Reflexión final

    Toda Constitución refleja un determinado momento histórico.

    Comprender la Constitución de 1976 exige analizar el contexto político, económico y social en que fue aprobada, así como las transformaciones institucionales que introdujo.

    Más allá de las distintas interpretaciones políticas existentes, considero que el estudio riguroso de este texto constitucional constituye una tarea indispensable para quienes desean comprender la evolución jurídica de Cuba y reflexionar sobre el futuro constitucional de la nación.

    Solo mediante el conocimiento de nuestra historia constitucional será posible construir un debate serio, informado y respetuoso sobre el porvenir de la República.


    Este artículo forma parte de la serie «Constitucionalismo Cubano», publicada por Horizonte Cubano News con el propósito de promover el estudio, el análisis y el debate sobre la evolución constitucional de la República de Cuba.

  • La Ley Fundamental de 1959: el nuevo orden constitucional de Cuba

    Por Pastor Herrera Macurán
    Horizonte Cubano News


    Introducción

    El triunfo de la Revolución Cubana el 1 de enero de 1959 marcó el inicio de una nueva etapa en la historia política y constitucional de Cuba.

    A partir de ese momento surgió una pregunta fundamental desde el punto de vista jurídico: ¿qué ocurriría con el orden constitucional vigente y con la Constitución de 1940?

    La respuesta llegó pocas semanas después con la promulgación de la Ley Fundamental de la República, instrumento jurídico que pasó a regir el país durante los primeros años del nuevo Gobierno Revolucionario.

    El estudio de este período resulta indispensable para comprender la evolución constitucional de Cuba y los cambios institucionales que transformaron la República.


    Del triunfo revolucionario al nuevo marco jurídico

    Tras la salida del presidente Fulgencio Batista del país el 1 de enero de 1959, el nuevo gobierno asumió el poder en un contexto de profundas transformaciones políticas.

    Aunque inicialmente se hicieron referencias públicas a la Constitución de 1940, poco después fue promulgada la Ley Fundamental de 1959, que modificó aspectos esenciales de la organización del Estado y redefinió el funcionamiento de las instituciones.

    Desde ese momento, la Ley Fundamental pasó a constituir el principal instrumento jurídico del nuevo Gobierno.


    La Ley Fundamental de 1959

    La Ley Fundamental mantuvo parte del texto de la Constitución de 1940, pero introdujo modificaciones significativas en la organización de los poderes públicos.

    Entre otros aspectos, reorganizó el funcionamiento del Estado, modificó las competencias de distintos órganos y otorgó nuevas facultades al Gobierno Revolucionario.

    Estas transformaciones marcaron el comienzo de un nuevo período constitucional dentro de la historia de Cuba.


    Un debate jurídico e histórico

    La promulgación de la Ley Fundamental de 1959 continúa siendo objeto de análisis por historiadores y constitucionalistas.

    Existen diferentes interpretaciones sobre su naturaleza jurídica, su relación con la Constitución de 1940 y el alcance de las modificaciones que introdujo en el sistema institucional cubano.

    Precisamente por ello, considero que este tema merece ser estudiado con profundidad, analizando los documentos originales y el contexto histórico en que fueron adoptadas aquellas decisiones.


    Una reflexión para el debate constitucional

    En mi criterio, el estudio de la Ley Fundamental de 1959 plantea preguntas que siguen siendo relevantes para comprender la evolución constitucional de Cuba.

    Entre ellas destacan:

    • ¿Cuál fue exactamente su fundamento jurídico?
    • ¿Hasta qué punto mantuvo la continuidad con la Constitución de 1940?
    • ¿Cuáles fueron los límites y alcances de las modificaciones introducidas?
    • ¿Qué consecuencias institucionales produjo para la organización del Estado?

    Estas preguntas no deben responderse desde posiciones ideológicas, sino mediante el estudio de las normas jurídicas, los documentos históricos y el contexto en que fueron aprobadas.

    Solo así será posible enriquecer el conocimiento sobre una etapa decisiva de la historia republicana.


    Reflexión final

    Toda nación necesita conocer su propia evolución constitucional para comprender el presente y proyectar el futuro.

    El estudio de la Ley Fundamental de 1959 no pretende reabrir divisiones entre los cubanos, sino fomentar un análisis serio sobre uno de los momentos más importantes de la historia jurídica de la República.

    Solo mediante el respeto a los documentos históricos, al Derecho y al debate libre de ideas podremos construir una visión más completa de nuestra historia constitucional.


    Este artículo forma parte de la serie «Constitucionalismo Cubano», publicada por Horizonte Cubano News con el propósito de promover el estudio, el análisis y el debate sobre la evolución constitucional de la República de Cuba.