The United States government already has the claims.
It already has the valuations.
It already has decades of documentation.
And the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has already done much of the work necessary to establish which claims were compensable and their certified principal amounts.
What is missing is not another political speech.
What is missing is negotiation.
The FCSC itself states that settlement negotiations are not its responsibility. That responsibility belongs to the diplomatic process in which the U.S. Department of State would be involved.
Then perhaps it is time for the Department of State to begin treating these claims as what they ultimately are:
An unresolved international financial dispute that requires negotiation.
There are currently 5,913 certified awards representing $1,902,202,284.95 in principal.
They remain unpaid.
Another ten years of confrontation will not pay them.
Another fifty sanctions will not automatically pay them.
Another political rally in Miami will not pay them.
And waiting indefinitely for regime change will not pay them.
Negotiation might.
Diplomacy Is Not Surrender
Opening negotiations with Havana would not require Washington to forgive the claims.
Quite the opposite.
The purpose of negotiations would be to obtain compensation.
The United States should arrive at the negotiating table representing the interests of American claimants and demanding a credible settlement.
Cuba would understandably negotiate the amount, interest, payment schedule and other outstanding bilateral claims.
That is what governments do.
The objective should be an enforceable agreement capable of transforming certified claims into actual payments.
There Is Precedent
The United States has resolved claims against governments with which it had profound political disagreements.
Claims settlement is not an endorsement of another country’s political system.
It is diplomacy applied to an outstanding financial obligation.
The question Washington should ask is not whether it approves of the Cuban government.
The question is whether negotiating with that government today offers American creditors a better possibility of recovering money than waiting indefinitely for another government to appear someday.
After more than sixty years, the answer deserves serious consideration.
Negotiate From Strength — But Negotiate
Washington does not have to abandon leverage before negotiations begin.
Sanctions relief, commercial access, investment opportunities and eventual broader economic normalization all have potential negotiating value.
Use that leverage.
Cuba wants greater access to capital and markets.
The United States wants outstanding claims addressed.
Those interests create the basis for negotiation.
A settlement could establish measurable stages:
Cuba makes payments.
Washington provides agreed economic measures.
Cuba implements additional obligations.
Additional restrictions are reconsidered where legally possible.
Compliance is verified.
And the process continues.
Where congressional action is required, Congress should participate.
That is not appeasement.
That is negotiation backed by leverage.
Replace the Language of War With the Language of Settlement
There are voices that continue talking about military intervention in Cuba.
But an invasion will not deposit $1.9 billion into the accounts of American claimants.
War could destroy precisely the infrastructure and productive capacity Cuba would need to generate revenue for compensation.
If the objective is recovering money, destroying the debtor’s capacity to produce money makes little economic sense.
American creditors need something very different.
They need a Cuba capable of producing.
A Cuba capable of attracting investment.
A Cuba capable of exporting.
A Cuba capable of generating revenue.
And ultimately:
A Cuba capable of paying its debts.
The Department of State should therefore begin exploring whether the moment has arrived for serious government-to-government discussions over the certified American claims.
Not because Washington should forget history.
Not because Havana should receive a blank check.
And certainly not because the United States should abandon its legitimate concerns about Cuba.
But because foreign policy should eventually produce results.
After more than sixty years, American creditors deserve more than promises that someday, somehow, someone will pay them.
They deserve an attempt to negotiate a settlement.
It is time to replace speculation about war with the difficult work of diplomacy.
Mr. Secretary of State: the claims are certified. The numbers are known. The creditors are waiting.
It is time to negotiate.