By Horizonte Cubano News

Carlos Giménez has spent a significant portion of his public life in positions of power.

Before entering Congress, he served approximately nine years as mayor of Miami-Dade County, from 2011 until 2020.

Today, he represents South Florida in the United States Congress and has become one of Washington’s most vocal Cuban-American voices on Cuba, communism and the policies the United States should pursue toward Havana.

That gives voters something valuable:

A record.

Carlos Giménez does not have to be judged by promises about what he might do someday.

He can be evaluated by what he has already done.

And after years of political power, the appropriate question is no longer whether Carlos Giménez knows how to win elections.

The question is:

Where are the results of his leadership?

Nine Years Running Miami-Dade

When Giménez became mayor in 2011, he inherited an extraordinarily powerful position.

Miami-Dade’s strong-mayor system placed the executive branch of one of America’s largest local governments under his control.

By the end of his tenure, county government had a budget of approximately $9 billion and more than 28,000 employees.

The mayor exercised authority over major institutions including Miami International Airport, PortMiami, transportation and county departments.

That is substantial governmental power.

And Giménez did achieve things that should be acknowledged.

He entered office presenting himself as a fiscal conservative.

He reduced the property-tax rate early in his administration.

He reorganized county government.

He negotiated labor concessions.

He emphasized keeping taxes under control.

Those accomplishments belong in any fair evaluation of his record.

But leadership cannot be measured exclusively by tax rates.

It must also be measured by what happened to the community those taxes were supposed to serve.

Transportation Became the Great Test

Few issues illustrate the problem better than transportation.

Miami-Dade residents had approved a half-percent sales tax for transportation in 2002 after being promised substantial expansion of mass transit.

Giménez did not create those promises.

They preceded his mayoralty.

That distinction is important.

But when he became mayor in 2011, he inherited the responsibility of dealing with the consequences.

Years passed.

Billions of dollars flowed through the transportation tax.

Miami-Dade continued growing.

Traffic worsened.

Residents continued waiting for major rail expansion.

And the county searched repeatedly for alternatives.

Giménez increasingly argued that conventional Metrorail expansion was prohibitively expensive.

That argument deserves consideration.

Rail construction can cost enormous amounts of money.

But leadership cannot consist solely of explaining why something cannot be built.

Eventually, the public needs to know:

What are you going to build instead?

From Rail to Buses

One of the most consequential examples came in South Dade.

Rather than extending Metrorail south, the Giménez administration championed a substantially less expensive rapid-transit bus system.

The financial argument was straightforward.

Bus rapid transit could be constructed for far less money than heavy rail.

Supporters believed that would allow Miami-Dade to improve transportation while preserving resources for other corridors.

Critics believed South Dade was being denied the rail expansion residents had expected.

Giménez chose buses.

That was his prerogative as an executive advocating what he believed was financially responsible.

But it also became part of his transportation legacy.

And then comes one of the most fascinating chapters of that legacy.

When Miami-Dade Needed Answers, Carlos Giménez Went to Communist China

In 2017, Giménez publicly expressed interest in an unusual transportation technology manufactured in China.

It looked something like a train.

But it ran on rubber tires.

It was electric.

And instead of conventional rails, it followed a designated path on the roadway.

The manufacturer was CRRC.

And CRRC was not simply another private international transportation company.

It was a Chinese state-owned enterprise.

Giménez wanted to see the technology.

So in 2018, while mayor of Miami-Dade County, Carlos Giménez traveled to the People’s Republic of China.

He led a large Miami-Dade delegation on an Asian trade mission that also included Japan.

The official purpose was legitimate.

Miami-Dade was looking for transportation solutions, business opportunities and commercial relationships.

The delegation examined transportation technology.

Giménez toured a facility operated by state-owned CRRC.

He looked at China’s so-called “trackless train.”

He met business interests.

And the delegation explored what Asian companies might potentially offer Miami-Dade.

Let us be perfectly clear:

Horizonte Cubano News does not criticize Carlos Giménez merely for going to China.

Quite the opposite.

Government leaders should study ideas wherever useful ideas exist.

China.

Japan.

Germany.

France.

Canada.

Brazil.

Cuba.

Or anywhere else.

What makes the trip relevant today is the political contrast.

Apparently, Talking to Communists Wasn’t Always Appeasement

Today Carlos Giménez is one of Congress’s strongest anti-communist voices.

He regularly warns about communist governments.

He attacks engagement with Havana.

He supports extensive economic pressure on Cuba.

He presents political and economic confrontation with the Cuban government as essential to American interests.

Yet when Miami-Dade had a practical transportation problem, Mayor Carlos Giménez did not refuse to travel to China because China was governed by a Communist Party.

He went there.

He looked at the technology.

He toured a state-owned company’s facility.

He listened.

He investigated.

He explored whether doing business could benefit Miami-Dade.

There was nothing inherently wrong with that.

But it raises a question Congressman Giménez should be willing to answer today:

If an American government official can visit communist China to examine state-owned transportation technology when doing so might benefit Miami-Dade, why should engagement, investigation and negotiation automatically become unacceptable when the communist country involved is Cuba?

China is not Cuba.

The geopolitical circumstances are different.

The national-security considerations are different.

But the principle is worth examining.

Talking is not surrender.

Visiting is not surrender.

Studying another country’s technology is not surrender.

Negotiating is not surrender.

Carlos Giménez’s own record demonstrates that.

The China Trip Raised Other Questions

The story does not end with transportation technology.

The trip itself generated controversy.

The 2018 delegation included 19 public officials and more than 30 businesspeople and lobbyists.

Univision subsequently reported that approximately 35 percent of the trip’s cost — about $31,800 — came from contributions by lobbyists who had or sought substantial business with Miami-Dade County.

That does not establish that Carlos Giménez committed wrongdoing.

It does establish why the trip deserved scrutiny.

And scrutiny eventually came.

The Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust investigated aspects of the trip.

Among the issues examined were meetings during the Hong Kong portion of the journey involving Genting, a company interested in a potential transit connection between mainland Miami and Miami Beach.

Some of those meetings were not included in itineraries initially provided to journalists.

The ethics investigation later documented how those meetings occurred.

No criminal charge against Giménez resulted from the investigation.

That fact must also be included.

But transparency surrounding a major government trade mission is a legitimate issue when companies and lobbyists participating in the trip have interests before the same government.

Political Connections and Transportation

The transportation story became still more complicated.

Two lobbyists with important roles in Giménez’s 2016 reelection effort were associated with the consortium pursuing the proposed Miami Beach monorail project.

One of them, Ralph Garcia-Toledo, had also participated in meetings supporting the Giménez administration’s bus-rapid-transit approach for South Dade.

Again, political relationships do not by themselves prove corruption.

People involved in politics frequently participate in business and lobbying.

The relevant question is transparency.

Who had access?

Who influenced decisions?

Who stood to benefit?

Were taxpayers receiving the best transportation solution?

And were political relationships properly separated from public decision-making?

Those are questions journalists are supposed to ask.

Giménez Eventually Changed His Mind About China

There is another fact that deserves inclusion because fairness requires it.

Carlos Giménez eventually became skeptical of Chinese involvement in Miami-Dade transportation.

He later said his trip to China helped change his perspective.

After seeing China firsthand, he said he returned with a different assessment.

He expressed concerns about security and Chinese technology.

Eventually, he supported keeping Chinese companies away from certain Miami-Dade transportation projects.

That evolution should not automatically be criticized.

Changing one’s mind after gathering information can be a sign of responsible decision-making.

But think about what happened.

Giménez had an idea.

He traveled.

He investigated.

He saw the country himself.

He examined the technology.

He obtained additional information.

And then he changed his position.

That is precisely why engagement can have value.

Engagement does not require agreement.

Sometimes engagement convinces you that cooperation is possible.

Sometimes it convinces you of the opposite.

But first you have to gather information.

Why Doesn’t That Principle Apply to Cuba?

This brings us back to Cuba.

Carlos Giménez was willing to travel thousands of miles to communist China because Miami-Dade needed transportation solutions.

Cuba is roughly 90 miles from Florida.

Millions of Cubans are experiencing economic hardship.

Cuba’s electrical system is struggling.

Its transportation infrastructure needs modernization.

Its agricultural sector requires investment.

Its private sector is evolving.

Migration directly affects Florida.

And the consequences of Cuban instability do not remain in Havana.

They arrive in South Florida.

Why, then, should serious negotiation be treated as weakness?

Why shouldn’t Washington explore what measurable reforms Havana might accept in exchange for measurable American responses?

Why shouldn’t American officials investigate economic opportunities that strengthen legitimate private Cuban businesses while excluding sanctioned entities?

Why shouldn’t the United States determine whether carefully structured engagement can advance American interests?

Carlos Giménez apparently believed information was valuable enough to travel to China to obtain it.

Cuba deserves at least the same intellectual seriousness.

And What About Cuban Families Here?

There is another leadership question much closer to home.

Cuban families in the United States are confronting the consequences of federal immigration policy.

Some Cuban nationals have been removed to third countries in Africa.

Horizonte Cubano News has examined the cases of:

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade Correoso.

Their individual circumstances differ.

Their immigration histories differ.

Where criminal convictions exist, they should be reported.

Where lawful removal orders exist, they should be acknowledged.

But their cases raise legitimate questions about third-country deportations, family notification, medical care, access to lawyers, diplomatic agreements and due process.

Carlos Giménez is no longer a county mayor.

He is a member of the United States Congress.

Congress possesses oversight authority.

Where is the urgency?

Where are the demands for records?

Where are the hearings?

Where are the questions for DHS?

Where is the investigation into what happens when Cuban nationals are transported from the United States to countries in Africa with which they have little or no apparent connection?

Leadership Cannot Only Point Toward Havana

This may be the central problem with South Florida’s Cuba politics.

It is politically easy to point toward Havana.

Condemn the Communist Party.

Condemn repression.

Condemn political imprisonment.

Condemn failed economic policies.

Many of those criticisms are entirely legitimate.

But a member of the United States Congress has another responsibility.

He must also scrutinize Washington.

If Havana violates someone’s rights, demand accountability.

If Washington may have violated someone’s rights, demand accountability there too.

If Havana implements a harmful policy, criticize it.

If Washington implements a policy harming your constituents, examine that too.

Representation cannot stop at the Florida Straits.

A Long Record Deserves a Serious Examination

Carlos Giménez has served the public for many years.

That means he has accomplishments.

It means he has made mistakes.

It means he has changed positions.

And it means voters have enough evidence to evaluate him based on something more substantial than television appearances and political slogans.

Look at transportation.

Look at county spending.

Look at the promises made to South Dade.

Look at the China trip.

Look at the relationships surrounding transportation proposals.

Look at his subsequent reversal on Chinese technology.

Look at his record in Congress.

Look at his Cuba policy.

Look at his response to immigration policies affecting Cuban families.

Then ask:

What does leadership look like?

The China Lesson

Perhaps Carlos Giménez’s trip to China contains a lesson he should reconsider today.

He went to a communist country because he believed Miami-Dade might learn something useful.

He examined technology produced by a state-owned enterprise.

He talked with people with whom he did not necessarily share political values.

He gathered information.

He came home.

And eventually he decided that some of what he saw was not in Miami-Dade’s interest.

That is not appeasement.

That is government doing its homework.

So perhaps the question for Congressman Carlos Giménez is remarkably simple:

If you were willing to go all the way to communist China to determine whether engagement served Miami-Dade’s interests, why are negotiation and engagement so often treated as unacceptable ideas when the subject is Cuba?

Nobody is asking Carlos Giménez to become a communist.

Nobody is asking the United States to abandon human rights.

Nobody is asking Washington to write Havana a blank check.

We are asking for something much simpler.

Leadership.

Examine the evidence.

Talk when talking advances American interests.

Pressure when pressure produces results.

Negotiate when negotiation can produce change.

Protect Cuban families.

Demand accountability from Havana.

And demand accountability from Washington.

Because after nine years running Miami-Dade and years representing South Florida in Congress, Carlos Giménez should be judged by more than how forcefully he can condemn communism.

He should be judged by whether the policies he advocates actually improve the lives of the people he was elected to represent.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, South Florida and the future of the hemisphere.

There is another question that cannot be avoided.

South Florida is represented in Congress by some of the most prominent Cuban-American political voices in the United States.

María Elvira Salazar.

Mario Díaz-Balart.

Carlos Giménez.

They speak frequently and forcefully about Cuba.

They demand accountability from Havana.

They advocate sanctions against Cuban officials and entities.

They speak about political prisoners, repression and the suffering of the Cuban people.

Those issues deserve attention.

But representation cannot stop at the Florida Straits.

There are also Cuban families living in the United States who are suffering because of decisions made by their own government.

There are Cuban-American children whose parents face removal.

There are families trying to understand how Cuban nationals ended up thousands of miles away in African countries.

There are questions about third-country deportations, access to attorneys, family notification, medical treatment and due process.

Where is the same congressional urgency for them?

This is not to say that Florida’s Cuban-American members of Congress have done nothing on immigration.

That would be inaccurate.

Representative María Elvira Salazar, for example, has publicly pressed the Department of Homeland Security over the situation of Cubans holding I-220A documents and has advocated for Cubans caught in immigration and naturalization uncertainty.

Those actions should be acknowledged.

But the larger question remains.

Who in Florida’s Cuban-American congressional delegation is demanding a full accounting of what happened to the Cubans sent to Africa?

Who is asking DHS for the records?

Who is asking how the receiving countries were selected?

Who is demanding to know what protections were guaranteed?

Who is asking whether American spouses and children were properly informed?

Who is following the money?

Who is demanding that Congress examine these third-country agreements?

And who is sitting down with the affected Cuban families?

Cuban-American political representation should mean more than confronting the government in Havana.

It should also mean confronting Washington when Washington’s decisions cause legitimate concern among Cuban-American constituents.

The standard should be the same in both capitals.

If Havana violates someone’s rights, speak.

If Washington may have violated someone’s rights, investigate.

If a Cuban political prisoner has a name, say the name.

And if a Cuban deportee sent thousands of miles away has a name, say that name too.

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade Correoso.

Their political beliefs should not determine whether their cases deserve scrutiny.

Their immigration histories should not determine whether Congress performs oversight.

And criticizing the Cuban government should never require remaining silent when questions arise about the conduct of the American government.

Florida’s Cuban-American members of Congress possess something these families do not:

A seat at the table of the United States government.

They should use it.

Not to guarantee that every Cuban remains in the United States.

Not to interfere with lawful immigration enforcement.

But to ensure that when America exercises its enormous power, it does so lawfully, transparently and humanely.

The Cuban-American community should expect nothing less from the people elected to represent it.

By Horizonte Cubano News

A child does not choose where her father was born.

She does not choose his immigration status.

She does not choose whether he made mistakes before she was born.

She does not write immigration law.

And she certainly does not decide where the United States government sends him when it orders him removed from the country.

Yet children can live with the consequences of those decisions for years.

That is why America’s expanding use of third-country deportations raises a question that deserves considerably more attention:

When the United States deports a parent, what does the United States owe the American child left behind?

Citizenship Does Not Cancel Immigration Law

We should begin with something that needs to be said clearly.

Having an American child does not automatically give a foreign national the right to remain in the United States.

Nor should parenthood erase a criminal conviction.

Immigration law has rules.

Courts issue removal orders.

The executive branch has authority to enforce those orders within the boundaries established by law.

This article is not arguing otherwise.

The question begins after acknowledging all of that.

Because a government can possess the authority to do something while still having responsibilities concerning how it does it.

Carlos Rodríguez López Has an American Daughter

Consider the case we have already examined.

Carlos Rodríguez López is Cuban.

According to reporting by EFE, he came to the United States in 2013.

His wife, Igrayne Ribot Hernández, is an American citizen.

Their daughter is also an American citizen.

Carlos was removed from the United States and ultimately ended up in Equatorial Guinea after refusing to remain in Liberia.

Whether Carlos had a legal right to remain in America is an immigration-law question.

But his daughter’s situation raises another question entirely.

What happens to the American child when her father is suddenly thousands of miles away in a country with which the family apparently had no meaningful connection?

She Was Not Deported

This distinction matters.

Carlos’s daughter was not subject to a removal order.

She is an American.

Yet an immigration decision involving her father inevitably affects her life.

The government has not legally deported the child.

But the consequences of deportation do not stop at the individual named on the order.

They enter homes.

They enter marriages.

They enter children’s lives.

That human consequence does not automatically override immigration law.

But neither should government pretend it does not exist.

A Child Should At Least Know Where Her Parent Is

This is where the issue becomes difficult to dismiss.

Suppose the government lawfully removes a parent.

Should the family know the destination?

Yes.

Should the person’s attorney know?

Yes.

Should there be a reliable mechanism for establishing where the person is after an international transfer?

There should be.

Should families be informed when the original destination changes?

That deserves serious consideration.

Should reasonable communication between a deported parent and minor children be facilitated when circumstances permit?

That should also be considered.

None of these protections creates an automatic right to remain in the United States.

They create accountability after removal.

Third-Country Deportations Make the Problem Harder

Traditional deportation usually contains an understandable geographical logic.

A person is a citizen of Country A.

The United States removes that person to Country A.

Third-country deportations introduce something radically different.

A Cuban can be sent to Liberia.

If Liberia does not become the final destination, he can end up in Equatorial Guinea.

Now imagine explaining that process to a child.

Where is Dad?

Africa.

Where in Africa?

Liberia.

Can I call him?

We don’t know.

When is he coming back?

We don’t know.

Then the destination changes.

Now he is in Equatorial Guinea.

What happens next?

Again:

We don’t know.

No immigration policy should casually produce that level of uncertainty for families.

American Children Have Interests Too

Immigration debates frequently focus on the rights or status of the noncitizen parent.

That is understandable.

But when an American citizen child is involved, policymakers should recognize that another American has entered the equation.

That does not mean the child controls the parent’s immigration case.

It means the child’s interests deserve consideration.

Is the child financially dependent on the parent?

Does the parent provide daily care?

Does the child have medical or educational needs?

Will the child remain in the United States?

Will the family attempt to reunite abroad?

Is communication realistically possible?

These are human consequences of government action.

They should not be invisible simply because immigration law permits removal.

There Must Be a Better Notification System

At minimum, third-country removals involving parents should have clear procedures for family notification, consistent with applicable privacy and security laws.

Before departure, the person should understand the intended destination whenever legally and operationally possible.

Attorneys should receive appropriate information.

When the destination changes materially, there should be a process for updating authorized family contacts or counsel.

Once the individual arrives, there should be a mechanism for confirming location and legal status.

And when minor American children are involved, the government should consider how reasonable parent-child communication can be maintained.

These are administrative safeguards.

They are not amnesty.

Family Unity Is Not a Partisan Principle

Republicans speak frequently about the importance of families.

Democrats speak frequently about immigrant rights.

Here is an opportunity for both sides to recognize something simpler:

Children should not become invisible collateral consequences of government policy.

A conservative can support strong immigration enforcement and still believe an American child deserves information about a deported parent.

A progressive can defend immigrant rights while acknowledging that parenthood does not automatically cancel immigration law.

Those positions can coexist.

The Government Should Know the Consequences of Its Decisions

This is another reason the next administration and Congress should examine third-country deportations carefully.

How many deportees sent to third countries had American citizen children?

How many had American spouses?

Were families informed of destinations?

How frequently did destinations change?

How quickly were relatives able to establish communication?

Were deportees allowed access to telephones?

Were attorneys able to locate clients?

What happened to families financially after removal?

We cannot improve policy without measuring its consequences.

This Is About More Than Carlos

Carlos Rodríguez López gives this question a name.

But the principle extends far beyond one Cuban family.

Immigration enforcement affects thousands of mixed-status American families.

Some involve people who committed serious crimes.

Some involve people whose immigration violations were their principal legal problem.

Some have lived in the United States for decades.

Some arrived recently.

Each case is different.

That is precisely why government procedures matter.

A system should be capable of enforcing immigration law without treating every family circumstance as irrelevant.

Accountability Does Not Mean Immunity

We should repeat this because immigration politics too often forces Americans into false choices.

You can believe:

Carlos Rodríguez López should have been deported if the law required his removal.

And simultaneously believe:

His American daughter deserves to know where her father was taken and how she can communicate with him.

There is no contradiction.

One concerns immigration enforcement.

The other concerns humane and accountable government.

Ask the Child’s Question

Political leaders argue about borders.

Courts argue about statutes.

Administrations argue about executive authority.

Congress argues about immigration reform.

Those debates matter.

But somewhere in America, a child can ask a much simpler question:

Where is my father?

A government powerful enough to transport that father thousands of miles across an ocean should also be organized enough to provide the family with an answer.

Not immunity.

Not automatic legal status.

Not a guarantee that the parent returns.

An answer.

Because American citizenship should mean something even when the American citizen involved is a child whose parent violated immigration law.

Enforce the law.

Protect the border.

Execute lawful removal orders.

But remember the families affected by those decisions.

A deportation order applies to an individual. Its consequences can reach an entire American family.

Good government should be capable of recognizing both.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, immigration policy and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

The United States unquestionably has a Cuba policy.

It has an embargo.

It has sanctions.

It has restrictions.

It has lists of prohibited entities.

It has regulations governing travel, financial transactions and commerce.

It has laws defining the conditions under which assistance could be provided to a Cuban transition government.

It has political objectives involving democracy, human rights and private enterprise.

What is much less clear is whether all of those instruments form a coherent strategy capable of answering one fundamental question:

How does the United States get from the Cuba that exists today to the free, prosperous and democratic Cuba Washington says it wants tomorrow?

Policy tells you what you are doing.

Strategy explains how what you are doing gets you where you want to go.

After more than six decades, that distinction matters.

Sanctions Are Not a Strategy

Sanctions can be useful instruments of foreign policy.

They can restrict financial resources.

They can isolate individuals responsible for abuses.

They can create negotiating leverage.

They can protect national-security interests.

But sanctions themselves are not a destination.

The relevant question is not simply:

How much pressure can Washington place on Havana?

The relevant question is:

What political or economic behavior is that pressure designed to change, and what happens if Cuba actually changes it?

If there is no clear answer to the second question, pressure risks becoming permanent policy rather than strategic leverage.

Washington Should Define the Destination

The United States says it wants a democratic Cuba.

Fine.

What does the road from today’s Cuba to that Cuba look like?

Does it begin with economic reform?

Political-prisoner releases?

Expansion of private enterprise?

Greater freedom of expression?

Property rights?

Independent civic organizations?

Electoral reform?

Negotiations?

Some combination of all of them?

And perhaps most importantly:

Must everything happen before Washington responds to anything?

That is where strategy becomes necessary.

Cuba Does Not Have to Change in One Day

Political discussions about Cuba frequently imagine two completely different countries.

Today’s Cuba.

And a future democratic Cuba.

But there is an enormous space between those two points.

That space is called transition.

Transitions can take years.

They can advance.

They can stall.

They can reverse.

They can involve economic liberalization before political liberalization.

They can involve negotiations between people who profoundly distrust each other.

They can involve incremental compromises.

Washington should have a strategy for that space between the present and the desired future.

Build a Ladder, Not Just a Wall

For decades, American policy has been very good at constructing walls.

Restrictions.

Prohibitions.

Conditions.

Sanctions.

Perhaps it is time to construct something else alongside them:

A ladder.

A ladder does not eliminate pressure.

It creates a visible path upward.

Cuba takes a verifiable step.

Washington responds with a proportionate step.

Cuba takes another.

Washington responds again.

If Havana reverses course, Washington retains the ability to reverse incentives.

That is not appeasement.

That is leverage.

Step One: Protect the Cuban Family

Any American strategy should begin with one principle:

Do not confuse the Cuban government with the Cuban population.

A mother looking for medicine is not the Cuban government.

A farmer is not the Communist Party.

A mechanic is not Cuban intelligence.

A restaurant owner is not the Ministry of the Interior.

A private entrepreneur is not automatically GAESA.

Policy should increasingly distinguish between institutions Washington wants to pressure and people Washington says it wants to support.

That means evaluating sanctions partly by their effects on ordinary families.

Step Two: Strengthen Genuine Economic Independence

Washington already recognizes qualifying independent Cuban private-sector entrepreneurs under American regulations.

Build upon that principle.

Allow carefully verified independent businesses to establish legitimate commercial relationships where U.S. law permits.

Require beneficial-ownership disclosure.

Screen participants against sanctions lists.

Exclude military-controlled entities.

Require transparent payments.

Verify end users.

Then expand opportunities as Cuban economic freedom expands.

The objective should be straightforward:

Make Cuban citizens less economically dependent on the Cuban state.

Step Three: Establish Political Benchmarks

Economic reform cannot substitute indefinitely for political freedom.

Washington should therefore establish measurable political benchmarks.

Release of political prisoners.

Greater freedom of expression.

Independent civic organizations.

Greater legal protections.

Movement toward competitive elections.

Judicial independence.

The benchmarks should be public.

And so should the American response associated with each benchmark.

That creates incentives.

Step Four: Negotiate

Eventually Washington and Havana must talk.

Not because they trust each other.

They do not.

Not because either side must surrender its principles.

It should not.

They must talk because geography does not change.

Cuba will remain roughly 90 miles from Florida regardless of which political system governs Havana.

Migration matters.

Security matters.

Drug trafficking matters.

Property claims matter.

Environmental protection matters.

Commerce matters.

Telecommunications matter.

Regional stability matters.

Two neighboring countries can disagree profoundly and still negotiate.

Step Five: Address American Property Claims

A serious strategy cannot pretend certified American property claims do not exist.

They do.

And they will eventually require negotiation.

But there is an economic reality that should also be acknowledged:

A bankrupt Cuba cannot meaningfully compensate anybody.

If American creditors ultimately expect settlements, Cuba must develop the economic capacity to negotiate and honor those settlements.

That means economic growth and resolution of claims are not necessarily opposing objectives.

They can be connected.

A negotiated framework could combine compensation mechanisms, investment arrangements, bonds, long-term payments or other structures permitted by law.

Those possibilities should be studied rather than reduced to political slogans.

Step Six: Prepare the Reconstruction Plan

If Washington’s strategy succeeds, Cuba will need enormous investment.

Electricity.

Water.

Housing.

Railways.

Roads.

Agriculture.

Ports.

Telecommunications.

Hospitals.

Banking.

Private enterprise.

Commercial law.

Property registries.

Institutional capacity.

The United States should not wait until a transition begins to calculate those needs.

The planning should happen now.

Congress already established a legal foundation for assistance to a future Cuban transition in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.

Thirty years later, that framework needs a modern economic strategy behind it.

Call it a Marshall Plan.

Call it a Cuban Reconstruction Initiative.

The label is less important than the preparation.

Step Seven: Bring Private Capital to the Table

American taxpayers should not be expected to finance Cuba’s reconstruction alone.

Nor should they.

A successful strategy should mobilize multiple sources of capital.

Cuban private capital.

Cuban-American investment.

American companies.

International investors.

Development institutions.

Allied governments.

Commercial lenders.

Infrastructure financing.

And carefully targeted public assistance where appropriate.

The objective should be to use public policy to unlock substantially larger amounts of productive private investment.

Cuba should eventually finance its own prosperity.

Step Eight: Prevent Corruption

Billions of dollars entering a transitioning economy can produce opportunity.

They can also produce corruption.

Any reconstruction framework should therefore include safeguards from the beginning.

Competitive procurement.

Beneficial-ownership transparency.

Independent auditing.

Public reporting.

Anti-money-laundering controls.

Conflict-of-interest rules.

Congressional oversight of American funds.

No politically connected Cuban official should simply replace one privileged economic structure with another.

Political transition without institutional accountability can reproduce many of the problems it was supposed to eliminate.

Step Nine: Give Cubans a Reason to Stay

Perhaps the greatest measure of success would be remarkably simple.

Do Cubans still believe they must leave Cuba to have a future?

If the answer remains yes, something has failed.

A successful strategy should eventually allow a young Cuban to imagine:

Starting a business.

Buying a home.

Raising children.

Building savings.

Working professionally.

Investing.

Traveling.

Returning.

And growing old in Cuba without believing that emigration is the only path toward economic dignity.

That would be transformational.

Step Ten: Measure Everything

Washington should publish measurable objectives.

Not slogans.

Results.

Is private employment growing?

Are political prisoners being released?

Is freedom of expression expanding?

Is agricultural production increasing?

Is migration decreasing?

Is electricity becoming more reliable?

Are American claims moving toward settlement?

Are Cuban businesses gaining legitimate access to international markets?

Are families becoming economically stronger?

If the answer is no, change the strategy.

Foreign policy should be evaluated by outcomes, not by how long a policy has existed.

Avoid Two Disasters

There are two outcomes American policy should try to prevent.

The first is indefinite authoritarian stagnation.

The second is uncontrolled national collapse.

Neither serves the Cuban people.

Neither serves the United States.

Collapse could mean mass migration, humanitarian emergency, criminal activity, institutional breakdown and regional instability only 90 miles from Florida.

The objective should therefore not simply be:

Make the current system fail.

It should be:

Help create conditions in which something better can succeed.

Those are very different strategies.

Washington Has the Pieces

The United States already possesses many of the pieces.

Sanctions.

Diplomatic power.

Economic influence.

Private capital.

Humanitarian mechanisms.

A large Cuban-American community.

Commercial expertise.

International alliances.

And legislation contemplating assistance during a Cuban transition.

What remains unclear is how all those pieces fit together.

That is why Washington needs more than a Cuba policy.

It needs a Cuba strategy.

A strategy connecting:

Pressure to reform.

Reform to incentives.

Incentives to negotiation.

Negotiation to transition.

Transition to reconstruction.

Reconstruction to prosperity.

And ultimately:

Prosperity to stability.

The Final Question

After more than six decades, perhaps Washington should ask itself a very simple question.

If American Cuba policy works exactly as intended tomorrow, what happens the morning after?

Who keeps the electricity running?

Who prevents a migration crisis?

Who finances businesses?

Who stabilizes the banking system?

Who repairs infrastructure?

Who resolves property claims?

Who protects institutions?

Who prevents corruption?

Who gives Cuban families confidence that staying home is better than leaving?

If Washington cannot answer those questions, then Washington has prepared extensively for confrontation but insufficiently for success.

The United States has a Cuba policy.

Now it needs a strategy for what happens when that policy actually produces change.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

Every American administration eventually leaves office.

Its policies do not necessarily leave with it.

Documents remain.

Orders remain.

Government agreements remain.

Families remain affected by decisions made years earlier.

And sometimes unanswered questions remain too.

That is why the next administration — regardless of which political party controls the White House — should conduct a serious review of America’s third-country deportation program.

Not to seek political revenge.

Not to criminalize immigration enforcement.

Not to punish officials simply because they served a previous president.

But neither should a change of administration produce institutional amnesia.

If rights were violated, America should know.

If laws were followed, America should know that too.

Start With the Records

The first step should be remarkably simple:

Preserve the records.

The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the State Department and other agencies involved should retain the documents necessary to reconstruct how third-country deportations were authorized and executed.

Which countries agreed to receive deportees?

What commitments did those governments make?

What did the United States provide in return?

Who approved each agreement?

What legal analysis supported it?

What protections were established for deportees?

What happened when deportees refused to remain in the receiving country?

Those questions can be answered with records.

And those records belong to the institutional history of the United States government.

Review Individual Cases

A policy can look very different when examined through individual cases.

That is why a future review should not examine only diplomatic agreements.

It should examine people.

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade Correoso.

And others transferred to third countries under similar arrangements.

For each person, reviewers should establish a timeline.

What was the person’s immigration status?

What removal order existed?

What criminal convictions existed, if any?

Had criminal sentences been completed?

Were there pending court proceedings?

What country was identified as the destination?

When was the individual informed?

When was the attorney informed?

What happened during transportation?

Was force used?

Was medical care required?

Where did the individual ultimately end up?

And what happened afterward?

Those are factual questions.

They should have factual answers.

Criminal History Should Not Be Hidden

This review should not become an exercise in portraying every deportee as innocent.

If someone committed a serious crime, put it in the record.

If someone repeatedly violated immigration law, put it in the record.

If someone received multiple opportunities to challenge removal, document them.

If a judge issued a valid final removal order, document that too.

Accountability must work in both directions.

The government deserves a fair assessment of its actions.

So do the people subjected to those actions.

But Criminal History Does Not Eliminate Rights

A person’s criminal record does not give government unlimited authority.

That principle is fundamental.

American constitutional government was not designed to protect only popular people.

Government power is constrained precisely because people affected by it may be unpopular.

Someone can have committed a crime and still possess legal rights.

Someone can be deportable and still be entitled to whatever procedural protections the law provides.

Someone can have served a prison sentence and still deserve humane treatment.

Those ideas are not contradictory.

They are the foundation of the rule of law.

Examine What Happened in Africa

The cases involving Liberia and Equatorial Guinea deserve particular scrutiny.

The United States entered arrangements allowing people to be removed to countries other than their own.

Liberia agreed to accept third-country nationals.

Some Cuban deportees subsequently refused to remain there.

They ultimately ended up in Equatorial Guinea.

A future review should reconstruct exactly what happened.

What were they told before leaving the United States?

What happened aboard the aircraft?

What happened when they refused to disembark?

Was physical force used?

If so, by whom?

Under whose authority?

What medical evaluations occurred?

What instructions were given after Liberia did not become their final destination?

Who selected Equatorial Guinea?

When was that decision made?

And what diplomatic agreement permitted the transfer?

We should not prejudge those answers.

We should demand them.

Follow the Money

There is another element requiring scrutiny.

Money.

Third-country deportation agreements can involve American financial assistance to receiving governments.

That makes this not merely an immigration question but a taxpayer question.

How much money was committed?

Which government received it?

For what purpose?

How was it spent?

Were there auditing requirements?

Were there human-rights conditions?

Were contractors involved?

Did any private company benefit?

Were payments connected to the number of people accepted?

The American public deserves transparency when public money accompanies controversial government policy.

Congress Has a Role

A future administration should not conduct this review entirely behind closed doors.

Congress has oversight responsibilities.

Relevant committees should be able to obtain records, question officials and examine how the program operated.

That does not require turning every hearing into partisan theater.

The fundamental questions are institutional.

What authority does a president have to send deportees to third countries?

What protections must exist?

What notice should be provided?

What standards determine whether a destination is safe?

What happens when the receiving country is not the person’s country of nationality?

And should Congress establish clearer statutory boundaries for future administrations?

Those questions will remain relevant long after the current president leaves office.

Inspectors General Should Follow the Evidence

Independent oversight also matters.

Inspectors general exist partly to examine allegations of misconduct, waste, abuse and failures within government agencies.

Where credible allegations exist, investigators should examine them.

Not every allegation will be substantiated.

That needs to be understood.

Some government employees may have followed lawful orders appropriately.

Some accusations may prove inaccurate.

Others may reveal administrative failures.

And in exceptional circumstances, evidence could potentially indicate violations requiring referral to appropriate authorities.

The evidence should determine the outcome.

Politics should not.

Do Not Prosecute Policy Differences

This distinction is essential.

America cannot function if every new administration attempts to imprison officials from the previous administration simply because it disagrees with their policies.

That would be dangerous.

A harsh immigration policy is not automatically a criminal policy.

A controversial presidential decision is not automatically a crime.

An official implementing a lawful order should not automatically become a target when political power changes hands.

That would transform legitimate accountability into retaliation.

But the opposite extreme is equally dangerous.

Do Not Create Presidential Impunity

Government officials should not assume that leaving office erases unlawful conduct.

If evidence establishes that someone knowingly violated a court order, falsified records, unlawfully abused a detainee, obstructed an investigation or committed another offense, political affiliation should not provide immunity.

The same principle should apply regardless of party.

Republican administration.

Democratic administration.

Conservative official.

Progressive official.

The standard should remain:

What happened?

What does the law say?

What does the evidence establish?

That is accountability.

Families Deserve Answers Too

There is another group that should not be forgotten.

Families.

Some relatives have struggled to understand where deportees were taken and what happened after they left American custody.

A future review should establish procedures allowing families to obtain appropriate information about what happened to their relatives, consistent with privacy law and legitimate security concerns.

No mother should have to reconstruct an international deportation route from social media.

No American child should have to wonder where a parent was sent without being able to obtain basic information.

No attorney should have to search across continents to determine where a client ended up.

Government should be capable of providing basic accountability.

Correct What Went Wrong

The purpose of reviewing history is not simply to write a report.

It is to prevent repetition.

If notification procedures failed, change them.

If medical screening was inadequate, improve it.

If agreements lacked safeguards, establish safeguards.

If attorneys could not locate clients, create a tracking and notification mechanism.

If Congress lacks sufficient oversight, legislate it.

If financial arrangements were insufficiently transparent, require disclosure.

And if the existing system worked properly in particular areas, preserve what worked.

That is how institutions learn.

Accountability Is Not Revenge

America needs to rediscover the difference between accountability and retaliation.

Retaliation begins with a conclusion:

We know who is guilty. Now find something to charge them with.

That is unacceptable.

Accountability begins with a question:

What happened?

Then investigators follow the evidence.

Sometimes the answer will vindicate government officials.

Sometimes it will expose mistakes.

Sometimes it may uncover misconduct.

But the conclusion comes after the investigation, not before it.

No Political Revenge. No Institutional Amnesia.

The next president should not enter office promising revenge against immigration officers, Cabinet officials or political opponents.

That would undermine the very rule of law such an investigation should protect.

But the next president should also not say:

That belonged to the previous administration. Forget about it.

Government cannot learn if government refuses to remember.

Preserve the records.

Review the agreements.

Follow the money.

Examine the individual cases.

Interview the officials.

Interview the deportees.

Hear from their attorneys.

Hear from their families.

Determine what happened.

Correct what failed.

And where credible evidence establishes unlawful conduct, allow the appropriate independent institutions to determine the consequences.

That is not political revenge.

That is how a constitutional government examines itself.

Administrations change.

The rule of law should not.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, immigration policy and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

Cuba is not legally a “transition government” under the definition established by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.

That distinction matters.

The law establishes specific political conditions that must be satisfied before a Cuban government can receive that designation.

Cuba has not satisfied them.

But there is another question Washington should be asking:

Could Cuba already be entering a different kind of transition — an economic one?

And if the answer is even possibly yes, is the United States prepared to respond intelligently?

Something Is Changing in Cuba

Cuba remains a socialist state governed by the Communist Party.

That has not changed.

But parts of the Cuban economy are changing.

The government has announced a broad package of economic reforms.

Private businesses have become increasingly important.

Foreign investment is being reconsidered in areas previously dominated by the state.

Private companies are participating in activities that would have been difficult to imagine under Cuba’s traditional economic model.

Even energy — one of the most strategically sensitive sectors of the Cuban economy — is beginning to experience limited private participation.

None of this constitutes political transition.

But neither should Washington pretend that nothing is happening.

Transition Does Not Always Begin at the Presidential Palace

Americans often imagine political transitions as dramatic events.

A government falls.

A president resigns.

An election is announced.

A constitution changes.

But history is rarely so neat.

Sometimes political change is preceded by economic change.

New economic actors emerge.

Citizens become less dependent on the state.

Private property expands.

Businesses accumulate capital.

International commercial relationships develop.

People begin making economic decisions without waiting for government instructions.

Over time, those economic changes can alter the relationship between citizens and political power.

That possibility deserves serious attention in Cuba.

Helms-Burton Defines a Political Transition

The LIBERTAD Act established specific requirements for determining when a transition government exists in Cuba.

Among them are legalization of political activity, release of political prisoners, changes involving state-security structures and commitments to free and fair multiparty elections.

Those are substantial political requirements.

Today’s Cuban government does not meet that standard.

So Washington should not pretend otherwise.

But the law was written in 1996.

Thirty years later, Cuba presents a situation the architects of the law could not fully anticipate.

A private sector exists.

Cuban entrepreneurs engage in international commerce.

American regulations themselves recognize qualifying independent Cuban private-sector entrepreneurs.

And Cuba is experimenting with greater private participation in areas traditionally controlled by the state.

That creates a policy question that is not answered simply by declaring:

“Cuba has not yet met Section 205.”

What Happens Before Section 205?

This may be one of the most important questions in contemporary U.S.-Cuba policy.

Suppose Cuba moves gradually.

Suppose Havana expands private enterprise.

Then permits greater foreign investment.

Then gives entrepreneurs greater control over their businesses.

Then expands property rights.

Then permits greater access to international finance.

Then makes limited political reforms.

Then releases prisoners.

Then permits broader political participation.

At what point should Washington respond?

Only at the end?

Should the United States wait until every statutory requirement of a formal political transition has been satisfied before recognizing any positive movement?

Or should American policy use carefully calibrated incentives to encourage Cuba to keep moving?

Sanctions Should Create Leverage

This is where sanctions become strategically important.

A sanction should not merely punish.

A sanction should create leverage.

Leverage means:

If you do this, we are prepared to do that.

Cuba takes a measurable step.

Washington responds with a measurable step.

Cuba takes another.

Washington responds again.

The process continues as long as measurable progress continues.

If Cuba reverses course, Washington retains tools to respond.

That is negotiation.

And negotiation does not require trust.

It requires verification.

Imagine a Road Map

Washington could develop a public road map.

For example:

If Cuba expands genuinely independent private enterprise, the United States expands authorized private commercial channels.

If Cuba improves protections for private property, additional financing mechanisms become available.

If Cuba releases political prisoners, specific restrictions are suspended.

If Cuba permits independent civic organizations, another category of restrictions is reconsidered.

If Cuba commits to internationally monitored multiparty elections, Washington begins implementing the transition assistance contemplated by American law.

The specific sequence would require negotiation, legislation and legal review.

But the principle is straightforward:

Progress should produce opportunity.

Otherwise Washington is demanding movement while refusing to identify the destination.

The Cuban People Need to See the Road Too

This is not only a negotiation between governments.

Ordinary Cubans need to understand what change could mean for them.

A farmer should know what greater economic freedom might allow.

A private entrepreneur should know what international markets could become available.

A young Cuban should understand why remaining in Cuba and building a business might eventually become preferable to emigrating.

A family should understand what economic opportunities could accompany political reform.

That matters because the Cuban people will ultimately determine whether any transition succeeds.

Washington Already Has a Legal Foundation

The United States does not have to start from zero.

The LIBERTAD Act itself declares that American policy should support Cuban self-determination and be prepared to provide humanitarian, developmental and other economic assistance during a transition.

It also contemplates assistance designed to facilitate movement toward representative democracy and a market economy.

And once the statutory conditions are met, the law provides mechanisms for economic assistance and steps toward removing the embargo.

The architecture exists.

The problem is that Americans and Cubans rarely hear anyone explain what that architecture would look like in practice in 2026.

Cuba Is Not Cuba of 1996

This point cannot be overstated.

Thirty years have passed.

Cuba’s infrastructure has deteriorated.

Its population has changed.

Millions of Cubans have migrated.

The electrical system is under extraordinary pressure.

Housing requires enormous investment.

Transportation requires modernization.

Agriculture requires capital and technology.

The railway requires reconstruction.

The private sector has emerged as an important economic actor.

The international financial system has changed.

Technology has transformed commerce.

And Cuba’s relationship with the Cuban diaspora has changed dramatically.

Any serious American transition policy must recognize today’s Cuba, not the Cuba policymakers imagined three decades ago.

Economic Transition Could Create Political Opportunity

There is another possibility Washington should consider.

Economic independence can create political independence.

A citizen whose livelihood depends entirely on the state is economically vulnerable to state power.

A citizen who owns a legitimate business, earns independent income, employs workers and trades internationally occupies a different position.

That does not automatically create democracy.

China demonstrates that market activity can coexist with authoritarian political control.

Other countries demonstrate similar complexities.

So Washington should not assume capitalism automatically produces political freedom.

But economic independence can create social space that did not previously exist.

That possibility should not be dismissed.

Havana Has to Decide How Far It Will Go

The Cuban government faces its own contradiction.

It needs private businesses because the state economy cannot currently satisfy many of the country’s needs.

But genuinely independent businesses create economic power outside the state.

How much independence is Havana actually prepared to tolerate?

Can entrepreneurs become wealthy?

Can businesses grow without political connections?

Can they hire freely?

Can they import?

Can they export?

Can they attract foreign investment?

Can they own substantial productive assets?

Can they criticize government policy without losing their businesses?

Those questions will reveal whether Cuba is experiencing genuine economic transformation or merely temporary economic accommodation.

Washington Should Prepare Before the Moment Arrives

The worst time to design transition policy is during a transition.

Washington should prepare now.

Congress should examine the 1996 framework.

Economists should update reconstruction estimates.

Lawyers should identify which sanctions can be modified administratively and which require congressional action.

American businesses should understand what future commercial opportunities could exist.

Cuban private entrepreneurs should be consulted.

Cuban civil society should be consulted.

Cuban Americans should participate.

International financial institutions should examine possible scenarios.

And the United States should begin thinking seriously about the economic reconstruction framework that would accompany a genuine political transition.

Preparation does not mean predicting that Cuba’s government will collapse tomorrow.

It means avoiding improvisation if circumstances change.

Do Not Confuse Transition With Collapse

This distinction may be the most important of all.

The objective should not be the collapse of Cuba.

It should be the successful transformation of Cuba.

Those are radically different outcomes.

Collapse means:

No electricity.

No functioning institutions.

No investment.

Mass migration.

Food shortages.

Crime.

Political instability.

Desperation.

Transition should mean something different:

Increasing economic freedom.

Increasing political freedom.

Functional institutions.

Investment.

Private enterprise.

Rule of law.

Infrastructure reconstruction.

And ultimately a government chosen freely by Cubans.

If Washington’s policy cannot distinguish between collapse and transition, then Washington does not yet have a complete Cuba strategy.

Cuba May Already Be Moving

We should be cautious.

Cuba has not become a democracy.

It has not satisfied the LIBERTAD Act’s definition of a transition government.

Its political system remains fundamentally unchanged.

But economically, something is moving.

Perhaps those reforms will fail.

Perhaps Havana will reverse them.

Perhaps they will remain too limited to produce meaningful transformation.

But perhaps they are also the beginning of something larger.

Washington should be prepared for all of those possibilities.

Because good foreign policy does not simply react to history after history happens.

It prepares for possibilities before they arrive.

Thirty years ago, Congress wrote a legal framework for a Cuban transition.

Today Cuba is changing economically while remaining politically unchanged.

That leaves Washington with a question it should answer now:

If economic transition begins before political transition, will American policy know how to recognize it — and how to use it to encourage what comes next?

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

His name is Emilio Destrade Correoso.

He is Cuban.

He was placed aboard a U.S. deportation flight bound for Liberia.

He refused to remain there.

And today he is in Equatorial Guinea, thousands of miles from Cuba and the United States.

We know his name.

We know where the United States attempted to send him.

We know where he ultimately ended up.

But there is still much we do not know about Emilio Destrade Correoso.

And that absence of information raises its own question:

How can the United States send a human being across an ocean to a third country while the public knows so little about the process that put him there?

His Name Should Not Disappear

Over the past several days, Horizonte Cubano News has been putting names to this policy.

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

And now:

Emilio Destrade Correoso.

These men should not become anonymous entries in immigration statistics.

They are also not automatically heroes simply because they were deported.

If they committed crimes, those facts should be reported.

If they violated immigration law, that should be reported.

If courts ordered their removal, that should be reported.

But government power deserves scrutiny regardless of whether the person affected by that power is popular, sympathetic or politically convenient.

That principle is fundamental to a democratic society.

What Happened in Liberia?

Emilio was among a small group aboard the deportation flight that arrived in Liberia on August 20.

He was not alone.

Darwin Hernández was there.

Carlos Rodríguez López was there.

Leonardo Sánchez was there.

Brazilian national Pietro Graza de Lima was also there.

They refused to remain in Liberia.

The circumstances surrounding what happened next remain deeply important.

Members of the group have alleged that force was used against them when authorities attempted to remove them from the aircraft.

Carlos Rodríguez López has publicly described being restrained while shackled.

Leonardo Sánchez, who suffers from a serious abdominal condition, has described his own disturbing experience.

Those allegations deserve independent scrutiny.

But then something even more unusual occurred.

The group did not remain in Liberia.

And they did not return to the United States.

They ended up in Equatorial Guinea.

From One African Country to Another

That sequence should concern anyone interested in government accountability.

A person is removed from the United States.

He is transported to a country that is not his country of nationality.

He refuses to remain there.

That country does not keep him.

Then he is transported to another country that is also not his country of nationality.

At what point does the government explain the rules governing this process?

What criteria determine the second destination?

What agreements exist with that government?

What legal status does the deportee receive?

How long can that person remain there?

Can he leave?

Can he travel elsewhere?

Can he communicate privately with an attorney?

Those questions have nothing to do with whether someone supports strict immigration enforcement.

They concern what strict immigration enforcement is permitted to look like.

We Do Not Yet Know Emilio’s Full Story

There is something Horizonte Cubano News needs to state plainly.

We do not yet have enough reliable information to tell readers Emilio Destrade Correoso’s complete personal history.

We are still looking for answers.

How long did Emilio live in the United States?

What was his immigration status?

What specific proceedings led to his removal?

Did he have a criminal record?

If so, what were the convictions?

Did he complete any criminal sentence imposed upon him?

Did he have pending litigation?

Does he have children in the United States?

A spouse?

Parents?

Brothers or sisters?

Did his family know he was being sent to Liberia?

What was he told before boarding the aircraft?

And what has happened to him since arriving in Equatorial Guinea?

We will not fill those blanks with speculation.

When credible evidence answers those questions, we will report it.

The Government Knows More Than the Public

There is one institution that presumably possesses many of these answers:

The United States government.

Immigration authorities know Emilio’s immigration history.

They know the legal basis for his removal.

They know why he was selected for transfer to Liberia.

American officials know what diplomatic arrangements permitted Liberia to receive third-country nationals.

And they should know what arrangements permitted the subsequent transfer to Equatorial Guinea.

Congress should be asking for those records.

Not because Congress should individually adjudicate every deportation.

But because Congress has an oversight responsibility when the executive branch develops a significant new immigration-enforcement mechanism involving foreign governments.

A Safe Third Country Should Be Demonstrably Safe

The government has defended third-country removals by describing receiving nations as safe destinations.

Then demonstrate it.

What standards are used?

Does the receiving country guarantee access to medical treatment?

Does it guarantee access to lawyers?

Can deportees communicate with their families?

Can they leave detention?

Can they work?

Can they obtain legal residency?

Can they travel?

What happens if the receiving country subsequently decides it no longer wants them?

Calling a destination safe should be the beginning of the explanation, not the end of it.

There Is Also a Question of Consent

Another issue deserves greater examination.

What were these individuals told before departure?

Did they know they were going to Liberia?

Were they given an opportunity to object?

Were their attorneys notified?

Were their families notified?

What documentation accompanied them?

And when Liberia did not become their final destination, were they informed that Equatorial Guinea would be next?

Government transparency becomes particularly important when individuals are moved between jurisdictions thousands of miles apart.

Immigration Enforcement Is Still Government Power

There is a principle running through every article in this series.

Immigration enforcement is legitimate government power.

But it is still government power.

And government power should have boundaries.

A final removal order does not eliminate oversight.

A criminal conviction does not eliminate human dignity.

An immigration violation does not eliminate the government’s obligation to follow the law.

And putting someone aboard an aircraft does not eliminate the public’s right to understand what the government is doing.

Americans can support enforcement and demand accountability simultaneously.

Four Names We Should Remember

The names are now part of the public record.

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade Correoso.

Four Cubans.

Four different lives.

Four different immigration histories that deserve to be examined individually.

One extraordinary journey from the United States to Liberia and then, for this group, onward to Equatorial Guinea.

Horizonte Cubano News will continue following what happens to them.

If new court records emerge, we will examine them.

If their families speak, we will listen.

If government officials provide explanations, we will publish those explanations.

If facts contradict something previously reported, we will correct the record.

Because the objective of this series is not to tell readers what they should think about these men.

It is to make sure Americans know who they are and what their government did with them.

Today, His Name Is Emilio Destrade Correoso

We cannot yet tell you Emilio’s complete story.

That is an uncomfortable admission for a newspaper.

But it is preferable to publishing something we cannot prove.

What we can tell you is this:

His name is Emilio Destrade Correoso.

He is Cuban.

The United States attempted to remove him to Liberia.

He refused to remain there.

He subsequently ended up in Equatorial Guinea with other men from the same flight.

Those facts alone justify further questions.

Who is Emilio?

What happened to him?

What legal protections does he have today?

And where does the United States government’s responsibility end when it sends someone to a country thousands of miles from his homeland?

We intend to keep looking for the answers.

Because putting a name to a government policy is only the beginning.

His name is Emilio Destrade Correoso.

America should know what happened next.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

Washington has spent decades preparing sanctions for Cuba.

It has prepared conditions.

It has prepared restrictions.

It has prepared lists of prohibited entities.

It has defined what it considers a transition government and what it considers a democratically elected government.

But there is another document the Cuban people deserve to see:

A serious, modern and publicly understandable economic reconstruction plan for the day Cuba changes.

Call it a Marshall Plan.

Call it a Cuban Reconstruction Initiative.

Call it something else.

The name is secondary.

The principle is what matters.

If the United States wants profound political change in Cuba, it should be equally serious about preventing that political transition from becoming an economic catastrophe for the Cuban people.

Democracy Alone Will Not Turn the Lights On

Suppose political change occurred tomorrow.

What happens Monday morning?

Cuba would still have an electrical system in crisis.

Its housing would still be deteriorated.

Its railway would still require enormous modernization.

Its agricultural system would still struggle to produce sufficient food.

Its water and sanitation infrastructure would still require investment.

Its transportation system would still need vehicles, parts and fuel.

Its hospitals would still need medicines, equipment and supplies.

Its private businesses would still need capital.

Its families would still need food.

Political change would not make any of those problems disappear.

An election does not repair an electrical grid.

A new constitution does not rebuild a railway.

A change of government does not automatically put food in a supermarket.

Political freedom matters enormously.

But political freedom without economic stability can become political instability very quickly.

Washington Has Thought About the Day After

Fairness requires acknowledging an important historical fact.

The United States has not completely ignored the economic consequences of a Cuban transition.

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act created a legal framework for American assistance to a transition government and, subsequently, a democratically elected Cuban government.

Previous American planning documents also contemplated humanitarian assistance, economic recovery, institution building, private-sector development, international financial assistance, employment programs and infrastructure needs.

That history matters.

But it raises a new question:

Where is the updated 2026 version?

Cuba today is not Cuba of 1996.

Its infrastructure is older.

Its demographics have changed.

Its economy has changed.

Its population has experienced enormous migration.

Its private sector is different.

Technology is different.

Energy markets are different.

International finance is different.

And the geopolitical environment is different.

A transition strategy written decades ago cannot simply be pulled from a filing cabinet and treated as a complete plan for tomorrow.

Humanitarian Aid Is Not Reconstruction

This distinction is essential.

Food is humanitarian assistance.

Medicine is humanitarian assistance.

Emergency fuel can be humanitarian assistance.

All of those things may save lives and reduce suffering.

They matter.

But humanitarian assistance and national reconstruction are not the same thing.

A country cannot rebuild itself permanently with food packages.

Cuba would need productive capital.

Electric generation.

Transmission infrastructure.

Water systems.

Agricultural equipment.

Ports and logistics.

Railways.

Telecommunications.

Housing.

Hospitals.

Small-business financing.

Banking.

Insurance.

Modern accounting systems.

Commercial law.

Property registries.

And institutions capable of managing billions of dollars without allowing those resources to disappear through corruption.

That is reconstruction.

The Original Marshall Plan Was About Scale

After World War II, the United States did not simply send Europe emergency food and declare the mission accomplished.

The Marshall Plan represented something much larger.

It recognized that political stability and economic recovery were connected.

The circumstances of postwar Europe and contemporary Cuba are obviously very different.

Cuba has not emerged from a continental war.

The comparison therefore should not be literal.

The lesson is strategic:

If Washington considers the political future of another country important to American interests, economic reconstruction cannot be an afterthought.

That principle applies directly to Cuba.

How Much Would Cuba Actually Need?

That question should be studied now.

Not after a crisis.

Not after a government collapses.

Not after another mass migration wave begins.

Now.

How much would modernization of Cuba’s electrical system require?

How much for water?

How much for rail?

How much for agriculture?

How much for telecommunications?

How much capital would Cuban small and medium-sized businesses require?

How much housing investment?

How much emergency financing would be necessary during the first year?

Horizonte Cubano News is not going to invent a number.

A credible reconstruction figure requires serious engineering, economic and financial analysis.

But one conclusion is already obvious:

A genuine national reconstruction program would operate on a completely different scale from ordinary humanitarian assistance.

Do Not Give a Blank Check to Havana

A Marshall Plan for the Cuban people should not mean handing billions of dollars to whichever government happens to occupy Havana.

That would invite corruption.

Assistance should be structured.

Audited.

Conditional.

Transparent.

Infrastructure projects should have measurable milestones.

Contracts should be competitively awarded.

Beneficial ownership should be disclosed.

Independent auditors should follow the money.

Congress should receive regular reports.

International financial institutions could participate where legally possible.

Private capital should carry much of the long-term investment burden.

And Cuban entrepreneurs should be participants, not spectators.

This would not be charity.

It would be reconstruction with accountability.

Cubans Must Build Cuba

The greatest mistake would be imagining Americans arriving to rebuild Cuba while Cubans watch.

No.

Cubans should rebuild Cuba.

Cuban engineers.

Cuban electricians.

Cuban railway workers.

Cuban construction workers.

Cuban farmers.

Cuban entrepreneurs.

Cuban doctors.

Cuban accountants.

Cuban technicians.

Cuban university graduates.

International assistance should provide capital, equipment, knowledge and access to markets.

But the objective should be creating Cuban capacity.

Otherwise one dependency simply replaces another.

The Private Sector Should Be at the Center

Washington already says it wants a larger independent Cuban private sector.

Then a reconstruction strategy should put that sector at the center.

Imagine credit facilities for qualifying independent Cuban businesses.

Agricultural financing.

Equipment leasing.

Small-business loans.

Construction financing.

Transportation investment.

Renewable-energy projects.

Telecommunications investment.

Professional training.

Commercial partnerships with American companies.

Every participant could be screened.

Every beneficial owner could be identified.

Military-controlled and sanctioned entities could be excluded.

The United States does not have to choose between economic engagement and compliance.

It can demand both.

Avoid the Caribbean’s Worst Outcomes

The objective of American policy should never be simply:

The current Cuban political system disappears.

That is not enough.

What replaces it matters.

Whether people can eat matters.

Whether electricity works matters.

Whether institutions function matters.

Whether businesses can create employment matters.

Whether corruption consumes international assistance matters.

Whether young Cubans see a future at home matters.

The Caribbean already demonstrates how persistent poverty, institutional weakness, political instability and inadequate infrastructure can devastate generations.

Cuba must not be allowed to become another case in which political aspirations are followed by decades of economic desperation.

That is not a prediction.

It is a risk worth planning against.

There Is an American Interest Here Too

This is not merely altruism.

A prosperous and stable Cuba 90 miles from Florida could benefit the United States.

A collapsing Cuba could produce enormous costs.

Migration.

Humanitarian emergencies.

Regional instability.

Criminal networks.

Political turmoil.

Pressure on Florida and federal resources.

American taxpayers would eventually pay some of those costs anyway.

The question is whether money is spent strategically to support stability and economic development or reactively to manage crisis after crisis.

Washington Should Start Planning Now

The United States does not need to wait for political change in Havana to begin designing an updated reconstruction framework.

Congress can hold hearings.

Economists can model financing requirements.

Engineers can estimate infrastructure needs.

Cuban entrepreneurs can participate.

Cuban-American business leaders can participate.

International financial institutions can examine scenarios.

Universities can contribute technical expertise.

Property claims can be incorporated into long-term economic negotiations.

Private investors can identify viable sectors.

And the Cuban people themselves can be asked what they need.

Planning is not intervention.

Planning is preparation.

Give the Cuban People Something to See

Washington tells Cubans what it opposes.

Communism.

Repression.

Political imprisonment.

Military control of the economy.

Fine.

Now tell them what Washington believes could come next.

Show the farmer.

Show the electrician.

Show the railway worker.

Show the small-business owner.

Show the young Cuban considering migration.

Show the family wondering whether its children have a future on the island.

Not a promise of paradise.

A plan.

A serious one.

With numbers.

With stages.

With conditions.

With financing mechanisms.

With safeguards.

With responsibilities for Cuba.

And responsibilities for the United States.

Because if Washington truly wants political change in Cuba, it must prepare for the economic consequences of succeeding.

The day after political change, eleven million speeches will not rebuild Cuba.

Capital will matter.

Institutions will matter.

Infrastructure will matter.

Work will matter.

And above all, the Cuban people will matter.

Washington has spent decades explaining how the current system should end.

It is time to show Cubans that someone has seriously thought about what should begin.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

His name is Darwin Hernández.

That is one of the facts we know.

He is Cuban.

He was among the group of men the United States attempted to deport to Liberia.

He was among those who refused to remain there.

And he subsequently ended up in Equatorial Guinea, thousands of miles from Cuba and the United States.

But compared with some of the other Cuban men transferred with him, remarkably little is publicly known about Darwin Hernández.

That absence of information is itself part of the story.

Four Cubans, Four Individual Stories

Horizonte Cubano News has decided not to describe these men simply as “four Cuban deportees.”

They have names.

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade.

They traveled through the same extraordinary deportation process.

But they are not interchangeable.

They may have different immigration histories.

Different criminal records, if any.

Different families.

Different lengths of residence in the United States.

Different legal arguments.

Different reasons for refusing to remain in Liberia.

Responsible journalism requires treating those differences seriously.

That is why we will not fill gaps in Darwin Hernández’s history with assumptions.

What We Know

Darwin Hernández was identified among the Cuban nationals who resisted being left in Liberia after being removed from the United States.

The group subsequently traveled to Equatorial Guinea.

That sequence alone deserves scrutiny.

A Cuban national was removed from the United States.

He was transported across the Atlantic.

He arrived in Liberia.

He refused to remain there.

He then ended up in another African nation.

That raises the same fundamental question we have asked throughout this series:

What legal and diplomatic process determines where a person goes when the United States cannot or does not deport that person to his country of nationality?

What We Do Not Yet Know Matters Too

There are questions about Darwin Hernández that Horizonte Cubano News is not yet prepared to answer.

How long did he live in the United States?

What was his precise immigration status?

Did he have a criminal conviction?

If so, what was it?

Did he serve a sentence?

Did he have pending immigration litigation?

Does he have a spouse?

Children?

Parents or siblings in the United States?

What reason was he given for being sent to Liberia?

What documentation was provided to him?

What legal status does he currently have in Equatorial Guinea?

We will not manufacture answers simply because those details would make a more dramatic article.

We want the answers.

And that is different.

Government Transparency Should Not Depend on Journalism

This illustrates a larger problem with third-country deportations.

Families, attorneys and journalists should not have to reconstruct the movement of human beings across continents from scattered interviews, government statements and foreign news reports.

The United States government knows who was placed aboard these aircraft.

It knows the immigration orders under which they were removed.

It knows which foreign governments agreed to receive them.

It knows the diplomatic arrangements involved.

And it should be capable of explaining the process without compromising legitimate personal privacy.

Congress should also be able to obtain those answers.

What Agreement Governed Liberia?

Liberia agreed to accept third-country nationals removed from the United States.

That raises important policy questions.

What criteria determined which individuals could be sent there?

What protections did Liberia agree to provide?

Was each deportee informed before departure that Liberia would be the destination?

Could an individual object?

What happened legally when someone refused to disembark?

And what mechanism allowed another destination — Equatorial Guinea — to become the next option?

These questions go beyond Darwin Hernández.

They concern the architecture of an emerging American immigration policy.

A Deportation Order Does Not Answer Every Question

Suppose Darwin Hernández had a completely valid final order of removal.

That would answer one question:

Whether the United States had legal authority to remove him from American territory.

It would not automatically answer every question that followed.

Why Liberia?

Why Equatorial Guinea?

What rights did he have in either country?

What agreements governed his reception?

Could he leave?

Could he contact an attorney?

Could he communicate with his family?

What happened to his personal documents?

A deportation order is important.

But it is not a blank check that makes every subsequent government decision irrelevant to public scrutiny.

We Will Report His History When We Can Verify It

Horizonte Cubano News is making a commitment in this series.

If credible documentation establishes that Darwin Hernández committed a serious crime, we will report it.

If he served a criminal sentence, we will report that.

If he violated immigration law, we will report that.

If court records demonstrate that the government acted lawfully, we will report that.

If his family provides information that can be corroborated, we will report that.

And if government agencies provide explanations, we will include them.

The purpose of putting names to these cases is not to transform deportees automatically into heroes or victims.

It is to transform an abstract government policy into something the public can examine.

Immigration Policy Should Survive Individual Scrutiny

Good government policy should become stronger when individual cases are examined.

If the policy is lawful, explain the law.

If the destination is safe, explain why.

If adequate protections exist, identify them.

If the receiving government has assumed responsibility, explain what that responsibility includes.

If attorneys retain access, demonstrate that access.

Transparency should strengthen legitimate immigration enforcement rather than threaten it.

Secrecy and confusion do the opposite.

Today, His Name Is Darwin Hernández

We know less about Darwin Hernández than we currently know about Leonardo Sánchez or Carlos Rodríguez López.

We are saying that openly.

But we know enough to ask questions.

A Cuban man was removed from the United States.

He was transported to Liberia.

He refused to remain there.

He subsequently arrived in Equatorial Guinea.

And Americans deserve to understand the government policy that made that journey possible.

His biography will become clearer as additional verified information emerges.

When it does, we will report it.

Until then, we will not substitute speculation for facts.

His name is Darwin Hernández.

That is where responsible reporting begins — not where it ends.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

For decades, one sentence has appeared again and again in American political discussions about Cuba:

“The United States stands with the Cuban people.”

Republican administrations have said it.

Democratic administrations have said it.

Members of Congress have said it.

Cuban-American politicians have said it.

It is a powerful statement.

But after more than six decades of confrontation between Washington and Havana, perhaps it is time to ask a more difficult question:

What does standing with the Cuban people actually mean?

Because solidarity cannot exist only in speeches.

Eventually, it must become policy.

The Cuban People Are Not the Cuban Government

This distinction should be obvious.

Yet American policy has struggled with it for decades.

The Cuban government is one thing.

The Cuban population is another.

A farmer in Matanzas is not the Cuban government.

A mechanic in Havana is not the Communist Party.

A mother trying to feed her children is not the Ministry of the Interior.

A private restaurant owner is not the Cuban military.

An electrician trying to build a small business is not GAESA.

If American policy says it opposes the Cuban government’s conduct while supporting the Cuban people, then its policies should increasingly demonstrate that distinction.

That is where the real test begins.

What Does America Want the Cuban Family to Do?

Washington regularly tells Havana what it wants.

Release political prisoners.

Respect human rights.

Allow greater economic freedom.

Reduce state control.

Permit independent enterprise.

Those demands can be debated.

But consider the issue from the perspective of an ordinary Cuban family.

What is Washington asking them to do?

Wait?

Protest?

Leave Cuba?

Survive another economic crisis?

Depend on relatives in Miami?

Open a small business but struggle to obtain financing, equipment and supplies?

What is the economic proposition being offered directly to that family?

That question deserves an answer.

A Country Is Ultimately Sustained by Its People

Governments exercise political power.

But societies are sustained by people.

Cubans grow food.

Cubans repair electrical systems.

Cubans drive buses.

Cubans operate restaurants.

Cubans teach children.

Cubans maintain buildings.

Cubans care for elderly parents.

Cubans work in hospitals.

Cubans repair cars.

Cubans keep railways functioning.

Cubans create businesses.

Whatever political system exists in Havana, Cuba continues functioning every morning because millions of ordinary people get out of bed and keep the country alive.

That reality should matter enormously to American policymakers.

Because if Washington truly wants a different Cuba, those same people will eventually have to build it.

Change Cannot Mean Economic Destruction

There is a dangerous assumption that sometimes appears in discussions about authoritarian governments:

Make economic conditions sufficiently difficult and eventually the political system will collapse.

History demonstrates that societies do not always work that way.

Economic desperation can produce political change.

But it can also produce migration.

It can produce black markets.

It can produce social fragmentation.

It can produce crime.

It can produce dependency.

And it can produce enormous human suffering without producing the political outcome policymakers expected.

Cuba’s geographic location makes this especially important for the United States.

When economic conditions collapse in Cuba, Washington does not experience the consequences from thousands of miles away.

Florida is roughly 90 miles away.

A failed Cuba policy can become an American immigration problem very quickly.

Give Cubans a Reason to Stay in Cuba

This should become an important objective of American policy.

For decades, many of Cuba’s most ambitious citizens have concluded that their best economic opportunity is to leave.

That represents an enormous loss for Cuba.

Doctors leave.

Engineers leave.

Mechanics leave.

Entrepreneurs leave.

Young people leave.

Families separate.

Communities lose productive citizens.

Then Washington confronts another migration crisis.

There is another possible strategy:

Help create conditions in which Cubans have an economic reason to remain in Cuba.

That does not mean financing the Cuban government.

It means expanding legitimate opportunities for Cuban citizens.

Support Independence, Not Dependency

The objective should be economic independence.

A Cuban entrepreneur should not have to depend permanently on the Cuban government.

But that entrepreneur should not have to depend permanently on remittances from Miami either.

The goal should be a functioning business capable of generating its own revenue.

A farmer should be able to produce food and sell it profitably.

A transportation company should be able to purchase equipment and provide services.

A construction company should be able to employ workers and rebuild housing.

A technology company should be able to sell services internationally.

A restaurant should be able to purchase supplies through transparent commercial channels.

A family should be able to accumulate legitimate savings.

That is what economic independence looks like.

Washington Has Already Recognized the Private Sector

American policy already contains an important foundation.

U.S. regulations distinguish certain independent Cuban private-sector entrepreneurs from prohibited Cuban government and Communist Party officials.

That distinction matters.

It means Washington has already accepted the principle that economic relationships with independent Cubans can serve American policy objectives.

The next question is how far that principle should go.

Could legitimate Cuban private businesses eventually obtain broader access to American suppliers?

Could qualifying entrepreneurs receive financing under carefully regulated conditions?

Could American companies provide equipment and technology?

Could agricultural producers access machinery?

Could private transportation businesses obtain parts?

Could Cuban businesses receive professional training in accounting, compliance and international commerce?

These are the kinds of questions Washington should be debating.

Target the Powerful More Precisely

If American policymakers believe particular Cuban officials are responsible for repression, sanction those officials.

If military-controlled companies present national-security concerns, restrict those companies.

If individuals participate in corruption, investigate and target them according to law.

If an entity secretly operates for sanctioned interests, prohibit the transaction.

But increasingly sophisticated sanctions should become more precise, not simply broader.

The objective should be simple:

Make it difficult for sanctioned power structures to benefit while making it easier for legitimate independent economic activity to develop.

That requires serious compliance.

Beneficial-ownership checks.

Financial transparency.

End-use verification.

Auditable transactions.

And enforcement.

It is more complicated than simply prohibiting everything.

But serious foreign policy is complicated.

Havana Cannot Demand Benefits Without Reform

The Cuban government also needs to understand something.

Washington cannot reasonably be expected to expand economic opportunities while Havana refuses meaningful economic freedom.

If Cuba wants access to greater international commerce, it must allow its citizens to participate genuinely in that commerce.

Private ownership must mean something.

Contracts must mean something.

Investment protections must mean something.

Entrepreneurs must be able to grow without surrendering control of their companies.

The rules cannot change every time an independent business becomes successful.

And private enterprise cannot merely become another mechanism through which politically connected interests enrich themselves.

Havana has responsibilities too.

The Cuban Family Should Become the Measure

Perhaps American Cuba policy needs a new measurement.

Instead of asking only:

Is the Cuban government weaker?

Ask:

Is the Cuban citizen stronger?

Can a Cuban family earn more independently?

Can it purchase food?

Can it obtain medicine?

Can it start a business?

Can it access information?

Can it accumulate savings?

Can its children imagine a future inside Cuba instead of immediately planning to leave?

Those are measurable outcomes.

And they may ultimately tell us more about Cuba’s future than another round of political declarations.

Standing With the Cuban People Must Mean Something

Words matter.

But after six decades, words are not enough.

If Washington says it stands with the Cuban people, then Washington should define what that solidarity means economically, politically and practically.

Not unconditional aid.

Not financing the Cuban state.

Not abandoning legitimate human-rights concerns.

Not ignoring American national-security interests.

Something more intelligent:

Create opportunities for Cubans to become less dependent on government power.

Help legitimate private enterprise connect with the international economy.

Target sanctions where responsibility actually lies.

Demand reforms from Havana.

Reward measurable progress.

Protect American interests.

And measure success by whether ordinary Cubans become more capable of controlling their own economic lives.

Because ultimately there is one question Washington should ask whenever it designs another Cuba policy:

Does this make the Cuban government more accountable — or does it simply make the Cuban family poorer?

Those are not the same thing.

And if the United States truly stands with the Cuban people, it should never stop examining the difference.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

His name is Carlos Rodríguez López.

He is 35 years old.

He arrived in the United States in 2013.

His wife is an American citizen.

His daughter is an American citizen.

And today, Carlos Rodríguez López is thousands of miles away from them in Equatorial Guinea.

His story is the second in a Horizonte Cubano News series examining, by name, the Cuban men the United States attempted to deport to Liberia and who ultimately ended up in Equatorial Guinea.

Yesterday we told the story of Leonardo Sánchez.

Today, the name is Carlos Rodríguez López.

His Family Is in America

Carlos’s wife is Igrayne Ribot Hernández.

She lives in Florida.

Their daughter is also a U.S. citizen.

That fact does not automatically give Rodríguez a legal right to remain in the United States.

We need to say that clearly.

American citizenship of a spouse or child does not erase an immigration order, nor should family relationships place anyone above immigration law.

But those relationships matter enormously when evaluating the human consequences of government policy.

Because when the United States sends Carlos Rodríguez López to Africa, it is not only moving an immigration case from one jurisdiction to another.

An American wife loses the physical presence of her husband.

An American daughter loses the physical presence of her father.

That consequence deserves public scrutiny.

Carlos Has His Own Immigration History

Horizonte Cubano News will not sanitize the histories of the people whose cases we examine.

Carlos Rodríguez López had a final order of removal.

He has also said that litigation concerning his case remained pending and that he believed he had legal protections preventing his removal.

Those competing claims belong in court.

We will not pretend to be the judge.

But something happened after the United States decided to put Carlos on an airplane that raises a separate set of questions.

He was not flown to Cuba.

He was flown to Liberia.

“We Didn’t Feel Safe”

Carlos was traveling with other deportees aboard an ICE flight that left Louisiana on August 20.

The aircraft crossed the Atlantic and eventually arrived in Liberia.

Carlos and several others refused to remain there.

The group included fellow Cubans:

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade.

Leonardo Sánchez.

There was also Brazilian national Pietro Graza de Lima.

Carlos has described a violent confrontation during the effort to remove them from the aircraft.

According to his account, the deportees were restrained, forced from the plane and held down while still shackled.

These are Carlos Rodríguez López’s allegations.

They deserve investigation.

And the U.S. government deserves the opportunity to provide its complete account of what occurred.

They Thought They Were Going Back to America

Then something remarkable happened.

According to Rodríguez, after Liberia declined to keep the group, they were told aboard the aircraft that they would return to the United States.

That is what Carlos says he believed was happening.

But approximately three hours later, according to his account, the aircraft arrived somewhere else.

Equatorial Guinea.

Carlos described arriving at night and seeing a large contingent of armed personnel waiting for them.

Imagine experiencing that without knowing where you are going.

Imagine your spouse experiencing it.

Imagine your father experiencing it.

Then imagine trying to explain it to your daughter from thousands of miles away.

“They Are Trafficking With My Life”

Carlos Rodríguez López used extraordinary language to describe what he felt.

He said he felt as though his life was being trafficked.

We should be careful with that statement.

It is his characterization of his experience, not a legal conclusion by Horizonte Cubano News that human trafficking occurred.

That distinction matters.

But his words tell us something about the level of fear and uncertainty experienced by someone moved between countries without understanding where the process would end.

And that deserves attention.

Where Is Carlos Free to Go?

According to reporting from Guinea Ecuatorial, Carlos and the others have been staying in a hotel functioning effectively as a detention location under security supervision.

That creates another important question.

What exactly is their legal status?

Are they detained?

Are they guests of the government?

Can they leave the hotel?

Can they leave Equatorial Guinea?

What immigration documents were they given?

Can they purchase an airline ticket and travel somewhere else?

Who has possession of their passports or identification documents?

Who is legally responsible for them?

These should not be difficult questions for governments to answer.

His Wife Deserves Answers

Igrayne Ribot Hernández should not have to become an international investigator to understand what happened to her husband.

She should be able to receive clear information.

Where is Carlos?

What is his legal status?

Which government currently has responsibility for him?

What agreement permitted his transfer?

What rights does he have in Equatorial Guinea?

Can he leave?

Can his attorney communicate with him privately?

What happens next?

These questions are especially significant because Igrayne herself is an American citizen.

So is their daughter.

When they ask what the American government did with their husband and father, their government should answer them.

Immigration Enforcement Does Not End at the Airport

There is a dangerous temptation in immigration politics to believe that the government’s responsibility ends when a deportation aircraft leaves American airspace.

It does not.

If the United States negotiates an agreement with another government to receive people removed from America, Americans have a legitimate interest in knowing the terms of that agreement.

If taxpayers finance those arrangements, Congress has a legitimate oversight interest.

If people are transferred between multiple foreign governments, attorneys have a legitimate interest in knowing where their clients are.

And families have perhaps the most basic interest of all.

They need to know where someone they love has been taken.

This Is Not an Argument for Open Borders

We will repeat this throughout this series because the distinction matters.

The United States has the right to enforce immigration law.

People without legal authorization to remain in the country can be removed according to law.

People who commit crimes can face criminal and immigration consequences.

But supporting immigration enforcement does not require abandoning oversight of immigration enforcement.

Those are entirely different propositions.

Americans should be capable of saying simultaneously:

Enforce the law.

And:

Explain what the government is doing in our name.

Four Cuban Names

We now know the names:

Leonardo Sánchez.

Carlos Rodríguez López.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade.

Their individual histories are different.

Their immigration cases may be different.

Their criminal histories, if any, may be different.

Their family circumstances are different.

Horizonte Cubano News will not lump them together.

We will examine them individually.

We will report unfavorable facts when they are documented.

We will report government explanations.

And we will continue asking questions when those explanations leave important issues unresolved.

Because immigration policy should be debated using facts, not caricatures.

Today, His Name Is Carlos Rodríguez López

Carlos says he fears for his life.

His wife is in Florida.

His daughter is an American citizen.

And he is in Equatorial Guinea.

Whether one believes Carlos Rodríguez López should have been allowed to remain in the United States is one question.

Whether the American government should explain clearly how a Cuban man with an American wife and daughter ended up in Equatorial Guinea is another.

The second question deserves an answer regardless of how Americans answer the first.

Yesterday, his name was Leonardo Sánchez.

Today, his name is Carlos Rodríguez López.

Tomorrow there will be another name.

And we intend to keep asking what happened to each of them.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

Washington has spent decades telling Cuba what must change.

More political freedom.

More economic freedom.

More respect for human rights.

More private enterprise.

Less government control.

Less military involvement in the economy.

These demands are not difficult to understand.

But there is another question that receives far less attention:

If Cuba begins to change, what exactly is the United States offering the Cuban people?

Not the Cuban government.

Not the Communist Party.

Not GAESA.

The Cuban people.

Because ultimately, governments do not build economies.

People do.

The Cuban People Are the Economy

A government can issue decrees.

It can regulate businesses.

It can collect taxes.

It can control banks.

It can impose restrictions.

But a government does not wake up at five in the morning to work a farm.

It does not repair a refrigerator.

It does not drive a taxi.

It does not prepare food in a restaurant.

It does not repair a railway.

It does not build a house.

It does not operate a small factory.

It does not raise a family.

People do those things.

And if Cuba is ever going to build a functioning economy, it will ultimately be ordinary Cubans who build it.

That is why American policy should not only explain what Washington wants the Cuban government to stop doing.

It should explain what Washington is prepared to help the Cuban people start doing.

Washington Does Offer Something

Fairness requires acknowledging an important fact.

The United States has already created some mechanisms intended to support independent Cuban entrepreneurs.

American regulations recognize independent private-sector entrepreneurs in Cuba.

Certain authorized transactions can occur with them.

Some qualifying Cuban entrepreneurs can access U.S. banking services for authorized transactions.

Certain goods and services produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs can enter the United States under existing rules.

And American policy explicitly distinguishes between independent Cuban businesses and prohibited government or Communist Party officials.

These are meaningful distinctions.

They demonstrate that Washington already understands something important:

The Cuban government and the Cuban people are not the same thing.

But these mechanisms raise another question.

Are they enough?

Where Is the Larger Economic Vision?

Imagine that tomorrow Cuba dramatically expands private enterprise.

Imagine that thousands of Cubans are permitted to create genuinely independent businesses.

Imagine farmers receive greater economic freedom.

Imagine entrepreneurs can import and export.

Imagine private transportation companies expand.

Imagine independent construction companies begin rebuilding deteriorated housing.

Imagine private businesses begin participating in energy, logistics, telecommunications, manufacturing and services.

What would Washington do?

Would American banks finance legitimate Cuban private businesses?

Would American companies be encouraged to sell equipment to them?

Would Cuban entrepreneurs be able to establish commercial relationships with American suppliers?

Could farmers obtain machinery?

Could transportation companies purchase vehicles and parts?

Could electricians and contractors obtain modern equipment?

Could private businesses purchase generators, solar equipment or other energy technology?

Could Cuban entrepreneurs receive training in accounting, compliance, logistics and international trade?

Could Cuban businesses eventually sell more products legally in the American market?

These are practical questions.

And practical questions require practical answers.

A Policy of Pressure Needs an Exit

Sanctions can create pressure.

But pressure alone is not a destination.

If Washington tells Cuba:

Change your economic model.

Expand private enterprise.

Reduce military control.

Respect individual economic freedom.

Then Washington should also be prepared to say:

And if you do those things, here is what becomes possible.

That second sentence is essential.

Without it, sanctions risk becoming permanent punishment rather than leverage.

Leverage requires an exchange.

One side does something.

The other side responds.

Then another step becomes possible.

That is how negotiations move.

The Cuban Government Cannot Be Excused

None of this absolves Havana.

The Cuban government bears enormous responsibility for the economic system it created and maintained.

For decades, excessive centralization, restrictions on private enterprise, distorted incentives, weak productivity and government control have damaged Cuba’s ability to produce what its population needs.

Cuba cannot blame every economic failure on Washington.

Havana must allow Cubans to produce.

To invest.

To own.

To hire.

To import.

To export.

To accumulate legitimate wealth.

To enter contracts.

And ultimately, to build businesses without needing political permission for every stage of economic life.

If Havana refuses to permit that transformation, responsibility belongs in Havana.

But if Havana begins permitting it, Washington should be ready.

Do Not Replace Government Dependency With American Dependency

There is another principle that should guide American policy.

The objective should not be to make Cubans economically dependent on the United States.

The objective should be to help create conditions in which Cubans can become economically independent.

That distinction matters.

Cuba does not need another permanent benefactor.

It needs functioning businesses.

It needs productive farms.

It needs transportation.

It needs electricity.

It needs housing.

It needs telecommunications.

It needs modern logistics.

It needs capital.

And above all, it needs Cuban citizens capable of creating wealth through their own work.

American policy should facilitate that independence where U.S. law and national interests permit it.

Give the Cuban Family a Stake in Change

This is where political strategy and economic reality meet.

Governments survive partly because societies continue functioning underneath them.

Workers continue working.

Families continue surviving.

Farmers continue producing.

Businesses continue operating.

The Cuban people sustain Cuban society every day, regardless of what political system governs them.

Any serious strategy for change therefore has to speak directly to those people.

A Cuban family should be able to ask Washington:

If our country changes, what changes for us?

Can we build a business?

Can we trade?

Can we obtain financing?

Can we purchase American equipment?

Can we sell something to an American customer?

Can our children build prosperous lives without leaving Cuba?

Those questions may ultimately matter more to ordinary Cubans than another political speech in Washington or Havana.

Imagine a Cuban Economic Opportunity Framework

Washington could begin developing something far more ambitious.

Call it a Cuban Economic Opportunity Framework.

It would not give money to the Cuban government.

It would not finance GAESA.

It would not eliminate sanctions against officials accused of repression.

Instead, it could establish clearly defined opportunities that become available when measurable conditions are satisfied.

Independent Cuban farmers could gain greater access to American agricultural equipment.

Verified private transportation businesses could gain access to vehicles and parts.

Independent energy businesses could purchase authorized equipment and fuel.

Private construction companies could obtain tools and materials.

Entrepreneurs could receive legitimate financing where legally permissible.

American and Cuban private businesses could develop transparent commercial relationships.

Training could be expanded in accounting, compliance, technology and business management.

Every transaction could require beneficial-ownership verification.

Every participating company could be screened to ensure that sanctioned or military-controlled entities are not the true beneficiaries.

This would not be charity.

It would be economic policy.

Washington Should Speak to the Cuban People, Not Only About Them

American officials frequently say that the United States stands with the Cuban people.

That statement should have an economic meaning.

Tell Cuban farmers what opportunities could become available.

Tell Cuban entrepreneurs what requirements they must satisfy.

Tell Cuban families what greater economic freedom could mean.

Tell American companies what legitimate Cuban commerce Washington is prepared to permit.

And tell Havana exactly what changes would unlock additional opportunities.

Then everyone understands the proposition.

Havana Has a Choice. Washington Does Too.

Havana must decide whether it truly wants an independent private sector.

Because a genuinely independent business community eventually creates citizens who are less dependent on government.

Washington must decide whether it genuinely wants that private sector to succeed.

Because supporting independent Cuban enterprise means accepting something important:

Economic change may come gradually.

It may begin with a farmer.

A restaurant.

A transportation company.

A mechanic.

A contractor.

A small manufacturer.

A technology entrepreneur.

Change does not always begin inside a presidential palace.

Sometimes it begins inside a workshop.

The Question Remains

Washington wants Cuba to change.

Fine.

Then Washington should define the bargain.

Tell Havana what it must do.

Tell the Cuban people what opportunities will become available when those changes occur.

Maintain targeted sanctions where justified.

Protect American national-security interests.

Demand transparency.

Exclude sanctioned and military-controlled entities.

But create a visible path for ordinary Cubans.

Because ultimately, the future of Cuba will not be built in Washington.

And it will not be built inside the offices of the Cuban government.

It will be built by Cubans.

If the United States truly wants change in Cuba, its policy should give those Cubans something more powerful than another promise of political change.

It should give them a credible economic reason to believe that change can improve their lives.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

For more than six decades, Washington has pursued one overriding objective toward Cuba:

Change.

Administrations have disagreed profoundly about how to achieve it.

Some have favored engagement.

Others have favored isolation.

Some have expanded travel and financial channels.

Others have tightened sanctions.

But behind virtually every American policy toward Cuba stands the same fundamental assumption: something in Cuba must change.

That raises a surprisingly difficult question.

What exactly would Washington consider success?

If the United States wants change in Cuba, it should be able to explain what that change looks like, how it would be measured, and what Washington would be prepared to do if meaningful change actually occurred.

Washington Has Already Stated Some of Its Goals

The current U.S. policy is not entirely ambiguous.

The White House has said that American policy should promote greater freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, increased free enterprise, and a stable and prosperous Cuba.

Washington has also emphasized directing economic benefits toward the Cuban people rather than institutions controlled by the Cuban government, military, intelligence, or security apparatus.

Those are identifiable objectives.

But objectives become meaningful only when governments establish ways to measure progress toward them.

If Cuba releases political prisoners, does that count?

If private businesses become more independent, does that count?

If Cubans gain greater access to private property and international commerce, does that count?

If Havana expands freedom of expression, does that count?

If the two governments reach agreements on migration, security, property claims or economic disputes, does that count?

And most importantly:

What would the United States offer in return for measurable progress?

Sanctions Are a Tool, Not an Objective

This distinction matters.

Sanctions are not themselves a foreign-policy outcome.

They are a tool intended to produce an outcome.

The effectiveness of a sanction therefore cannot be measured simply by how restrictive it is.

It must be measured by what it accomplishes.

If a sanction changes government behavior, that is measurable.

If it prevents money from reaching individuals responsible for repression, that is measurable.

If it protects American national-security interests, that is measurable.

But if a sanction remains in place decade after decade without producing its intended political result, policymakers should be willing to examine why.

That does not automatically mean removing the sanction.

It means evaluating it.

Serious policy requires measurement.

The Private Sector Provides a Test

Washington says it wants a Cuban private sector independent of government control.

That objective deserves attention because something important has already happened.

The United States itself recognizes a category of independent private sector entrepreneurs in Cuba.

Current Treasury regulations provide pathways for certain authorized transactions involving qualifying Cuban private businesses and entrepreneurs.

American regulations even distinguish between genuinely independent economic actors and prohibited Cuban officials or Communist Party officials.

That distinction is significant.

Washington is already acknowledging, through its own regulations, that the Cuban government and every Cuban business are not the same thing.

So here is a reasonable policy test:

If Cuba permits its private sector to expand, become more independent and conduct legitimate international commerce, should Washington make lawful commerce with those businesses easier?

If the answer is yes, then the United States has created an incentive for economic independence.

If the answer is no regardless of what Cuba does, then Havana has little reason to believe economic reform will produce any change in its relationship with Washington.

Foreign policy needs incentives as well as penalties.

Havana Must Be Tested Too

None of this places responsibility exclusively on Washington.

The Cuban government has its own decisions to make.

If Havana wants international recognition of its economic reforms, it must demonstrate that private businesses are actually private.

Entrepreneurs must be able to operate without political favoritism.

Ownership must be transparent.

Contracts must be enforceable.

Foreign suppliers must know who their counterparties really are.

Businesses should not secretly function as fronts for state or military-controlled enterprises.

And successful entrepreneurs should not have to fear that the government will arbitrarily change the rules after they invest.

The United States has legitimate reasons to demand these safeguards.

But safeguards can also become benchmarks.

And benchmarks create something that U.S.-Cuba policy has lacked for too long:

a measurable path forward.

Human Rights Need Benchmarks Too

The same principle applies to human rights.

Washington regularly criticizes Havana for political imprisonment, restrictions on expression and suppression of political opposition.

Those concerns should not disappear.

But the United States should specify what measurable improvements would produce measurable American responses.

Suppose Cuba releases a significant number of prisoners detained for political activity.

What happens next?

Suppose restrictions on private media are reduced.

What happens next?

Suppose Cubans receive greater freedom to travel, organize businesses or participate in civic life.

What happens next?

If the answer is always nothing, then American policy provides punishment without incentive.

Negotiation works differently.

Negotiation says:

If you do X, we are prepared to do Y.

Then both sides can decide whether the exchange serves their interests.

Property Claims Cannot Be Ignored

There is another issue Washington and Havana eventually must confront: unresolved American property claims.

Those claims have survived administration after administration.

They cannot simply be wished away.

But neither will they be resolved if Cuba remains permanently isolated from the economic mechanisms that could allow it to negotiate settlements and generate resources.

This is where economic reform, private investment, sanctions policy and historical claims begin to intersect.

A future negotiation could establish measurable stages.

Cuba takes one step.

The United States takes another.

Cuba meets another benchmark.

Washington responds.

That is not surrender.

That is diplomacy.

What Would Success Look Like in Five Years?

Imagine Washington establishing a public Cuba policy scorecard.

Not propaganda.

Not slogans.

Actual measurements.

How many political prisoners have been released?

How many genuinely independent Cuban businesses are operating?

How much authorized trade is occurring between American and independent Cuban businesses?

Has access to information expanded?

Have bilateral migration disputes improved?

Have negotiations begun over certified property claims?

Has Cuba increased economic opportunities for ordinary citizens?

Has the United States reduced economic relationships with entities controlled by the Cuban military while expanding relationships with independent Cubans?

Those are outcomes that can be measured.

Then Americans could determine whether their Cuba policy was working.

And Cubans could understand exactly what Washington was asking them to accomplish.

Cuba Should Know What Is on the Other Side of the Door

This may be the most important issue.

If Washington asks Havana to change, Havana should know what happens if it does.

Does one restriction disappear?

Does a commercial authorization expand?

Does a diplomatic channel reopen?

Does a sanction get suspended?

Does negotiation begin on another issue?

The answer does not need to be everything at once.

In fact, it shouldn’t be.

Progress can be incremental.

But there must be something on the other side of the door.

Otherwise the United States is not creating leverage.

It is simply maintaining pressure.

And pressure without a defined destination can eventually become policy by inertia.

Define the Destination

The United States does not need to abandon its principles to negotiate with Cuba.

It does not need to abandon human rights.

It does not need to finance the Cuban military.

It does not need to ignore political prisoners.

It does not need to forget American property claims.

And it certainly does not need to accept every proposal Havana makes.

What Washington needs is something much simpler:

a definition of success.

Tell Havana what measurable changes matter.

Tell the Cuban people what opportunities those changes could create.

Tell American businesses what lawful economic activity Washington wants to encourage.

Tell Cuban private entrepreneurs what standards they must meet.

And tell the American public how we will know whether six decades of policy are finally producing results.

Because demanding change is easy.

Defining the change you are willing to recognize is much harder.

And if Washington truly wants a different Cuba, it should be prepared to explain what that Cuba would have to do — and what the United States would do in return.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

If Washington Wants Change in Cuba, It Should Define What Change Actually Means

By Horizonte Cubano News

For more than six decades, Washington has pursued one overriding objective toward Cuba:

Change.

Administrations have disagreed profoundly about how to achieve it.

Some have favored engagement.

Others have favored isolation.

Some have expanded travel and financial channels.

Others have tightened sanctions.

But behind virtually every American policy toward Cuba stands the same fundamental assumption: something in Cuba must change.

That raises a surprisingly difficult question.

What exactly would Washington consider success?

If the United States wants change in Cuba, it should be able to explain what that change looks like, how it would be measured, and what Washington would be prepared to do if meaningful change actually occurred.

Washington Has Already Stated Some of Its Goals

The current U.S. policy is not entirely ambiguous.

The White House has said that American policy should promote greater freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, increased free enterprise, and a stable and prosperous Cuba.

Washington has also emphasized directing economic benefits toward the Cuban people rather than institutions controlled by the Cuban government, military, intelligence, or security apparatus.

Those are identifiable objectives.

But objectives become meaningful only when governments establish ways to measure progress toward them.

If Cuba releases political prisoners, does that count?

If private businesses become more independent, does that count?

If Cubans gain greater access to private property and international commerce, does that count?

If Havana expands freedom of expression, does that count?

If the two governments reach agreements on migration, security, property claims or economic disputes, does that count?

And most importantly:

What would the United States offer in return for measurable progress?

Sanctions Are a Tool, Not an Objective

This distinction matters.

Sanctions are not themselves a foreign-policy outcome.

They are a tool intended to produce an outcome.

The effectiveness of a sanction therefore cannot be measured simply by how restrictive it is.

It must be measured by what it accomplishes.

If a sanction changes government behavior, that is measurable.

If it prevents money from reaching individuals responsible for repression, that is measurable.

If it protects American national-security interests, that is measurable.

But if a sanction remains in place decade after decade without producing its intended political result, policymakers should be willing to examine why.

That does not automatically mean removing the sanction.

It means evaluating it.

Serious policy requires measurement.

The Private Sector Provides a Test

Washington says it wants a Cuban private sector independent of government control.

That objective deserves attention because something important has already happened.

The United States itself recognizes a category of independent private sector entrepreneurs in Cuba.

Current Treasury regulations provide pathways for certain authorized transactions involving qualifying Cuban private businesses and entrepreneurs.

American regulations even distinguish between genuinely independent economic actors and prohibited Cuban officials or Communist Party officials.

That distinction is significant.

Washington is already acknowledging, through its own regulations, that the Cuban government and every Cuban business are not the same thing.

So here is a reasonable policy test:

If Cuba permits its private sector to expand, become more independent and conduct legitimate international commerce, should Washington make lawful commerce with those businesses easier?

If the answer is yes, then the United States has created an incentive for economic independence.

If the answer is no regardless of what Cuba does, then Havana has little reason to believe economic reform will produce any change in its relationship with Washington.

Foreign policy needs incentives as well as penalties.

Havana Must Be Tested Too

None of this places responsibility exclusively on Washington.

The Cuban government has its own decisions to make.

If Havana wants international recognition of its economic reforms, it must demonstrate that private businesses are actually private.

Entrepreneurs must be able to operate without political favoritism.

Ownership must be transparent.

Contracts must be enforceable.

Foreign suppliers must know who their counterparties really are.

Businesses should not secretly function as fronts for state or military-controlled enterprises.

And successful entrepreneurs should not have to fear that the government will arbitrarily change the rules after they invest.

The United States has legitimate reasons to demand these safeguards.

But safeguards can also become benchmarks.

And benchmarks create something that U.S.-Cuba policy has lacked for too long:

a measurable path forward.

Human Rights Need Benchmarks Too

The same principle applies to human rights.

Washington regularly criticizes Havana for political imprisonment, restrictions on expression and suppression of political opposition.

Those concerns should not disappear.

But the United States should specify what measurable improvements would produce measurable American responses.

Suppose Cuba releases a significant number of prisoners detained for political activity.

What happens next?

Suppose restrictions on private media are reduced.

What happens next?

Suppose Cubans receive greater freedom to travel, organize businesses or participate in civic life.

What happens next?

If the answer is always nothing, then American policy provides punishment without incentive.

Negotiation works differently.

Negotiation says:

If you do X, we are prepared to do Y.

Then both sides can decide whether the exchange serves their interests.

Property Claims Cannot Be Ignored

There is another issue Washington and Havana eventually must confront: unresolved American property claims.

Those claims have survived administration after administration.

They cannot simply be wished away.

But neither will they be resolved if Cuba remains permanently isolated from the economic mechanisms that could allow it to negotiate settlements and generate resources.

This is where economic reform, private investment, sanctions policy and historical claims begin to intersect.

A future negotiation could establish measurable stages.

Cuba takes one step.

The United States takes another.

Cuba meets another benchmark.

Washington responds.

That is not surrender.

That is diplomacy.

What Would Success Look Like in Five Years?

Imagine Washington establishing a public Cuba policy scorecard.

Not propaganda.

Not slogans.

Actual measurements.

How many political prisoners have been released?

How many genuinely independent Cuban businesses are operating?

How much authorized trade is occurring between American and independent Cuban businesses?

Has access to information expanded?

Have bilateral migration disputes improved?

Have negotiations begun over certified property claims?

Has Cuba increased economic opportunities for ordinary citizens?

Has the United States reduced economic relationships with entities controlled by the Cuban military while expanding relationships with independent Cubans?

Those are outcomes that can be measured.

Then Americans could determine whether their Cuba policy was working.

And Cubans could understand exactly what Washington was asking them to accomplish.

Cuba Should Know What Is on the Other Side of the Door

This may be the most important issue.

If Washington asks Havana to change, Havana should know what happens if it does.

Does one restriction disappear?

Does a commercial authorization expand?

Does a diplomatic channel reopen?

Does a sanction get suspended?

Does negotiation begin on another issue?

The answer does not need to be everything at once.

In fact, it shouldn’t be.

Progress can be incremental.

But there must be something on the other side of the door.

Otherwise the United States is not creating leverage.

It is simply maintaining pressure.

And pressure without a defined destination can eventually become policy by inertia.

Define the Destination

The United States does not need to abandon its principles to negotiate with Cuba.

It does not need to abandon human rights.

It does not need to finance the Cuban military.

It does not need to ignore political prisoners.

It does not need to forget American property claims.

And it certainly does not need to accept every proposal Havana makes.

What Washington needs is something much simpler:

a definition of success.

Tell Havana what measurable changes matter.

Tell the Cuban people what opportunities those changes could create.

Tell American businesses what lawful economic activity Washington wants to encourage.

Tell Cuban private entrepreneurs what standards they must meet.

And tell the American public how we will know whether six decades of policy are finally producing results.

Because demanding change is easy.

Defining the change you are willing to recognize is much harder.

And if Washington truly wants a different Cuba, it should be prepared to explain what that Cuba would have to do — and what the United States would do in return.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.

By Horizonte Cubano News

His name is Leonardo Sánchez.

That matters.

Because immigration debates have a way of turning human beings into numbers: deportees, detainees, migrants, removals, cases.

Leonardo Sánchez is not a number.

He is a Cuban man whose mother, Caridad, and sister, Dorty Sánchez, are in Florida. According to reporting by El País, Sánchez was a lawful permanent resident of the United States. He also has a serious medical condition: a large ventral hernia that causes significant pain and requires medical attention.

And today he is thousands of miles away from his family, in Equatorial Guinea.

The question Horizonte Cubano News believes deserves an answer is simple:

How did a Cuban permanent resident of the United States end up in an African country with which he apparently had no meaningful connection?

His Family Has a Name Too

Leonardo’s mother is Caridad.

His sister is Dorty Sánchez.

According to El País, they were desperately trying to determine what had happened to him.

His family reportedly learned that Leonardo was in Equatorial Guinea after seeing information on social media describing a deported Cuban man with a severe abdominal condition.

Imagine learning where your brother or son has been sent not through a formal government notification, but through a video circulating online.

Whatever one’s position on immigration enforcement, that should concern Americans.

Leonardo Sánchez Had an Immigration Case

This article is not arguing that immigration laws should disappear.

Nor are we suggesting that having family in the United States automatically prevents someone from being deported.

According to his family, Sánchez had been arrested for drug possession and had been completing community-service requirements. He was later detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Those facts belong in this story.

We will not hide them.

But neither should those facts end the story.

There is another question:

What happened after the United States decided to remove him?

From the United States to Liberia

On August 20, an ICE flight left Louisiana carrying migrants who were being removed from the United States.

Leonardo Sánchez was among them.

The flight eventually arrived in Liberia.

But Liberia was not Leonardo’s country.

He is Cuban.

Sánchez and several other deportees refused to remain there.

Among the Cubans who resisted disembarking were Darwin Hernández, Emilio Destrade, Carlos Rodríguez and Leonardo Sánchez.

Their names matter too.

They will not remain anonymous statistics in our coverage.

Then the Plane Went Somewhere Else

After the group resisted remaining in Liberia, they did not return to the United States.

They were transported to Equatorial Guinea.

That raises an extraordinary question about third-country deportation:

If one country is rejected as a destination, how quickly can another country become the destination?

What legal status does the deportee have upon arrival?

What documents does that person receive?

Who assumes responsibility for medical treatment?

Can the person leave?

Can an attorney reach the person?

Can the family locate him?

These questions are not arguments against immigration enforcement.

They are questions about government accountability.

Leonardo’s Medical Condition Cannot Be Ignored

Sánchez’s case deserves particular scrutiny because of his health.

El País reported that he suffers from a severe ventral hernia following earlier abdominal injuries and surgeries.

According to the newspaper’s interview with Sánchez, he was experiencing significant pain in Equatorial Guinea and faced uncertainty about obtaining adequate treatment.

That changes the nature of the discussion.

The question is no longer simply where the United States has authority to deport someone.

It becomes:

What responsibility does the United States have when it transfers a medically vulnerable person to a third country?

Enforcing immigration law and protecting human dignity are not mutually exclusive responsibilities.

The United States can do both.

The Government Has Its Position

The Department of Homeland Security has defended these removals.

A DHS spokesperson told El País that the migrants had been deported to what the government considers a safe third country and said the administration was enforcing immigration law.

That position deserves to be reported.

But government assertions should also be subject to scrutiny.

If Equatorial Guinea is considered a safe third country for Leonardo Sánchez, the government should be able to explain what protections exist for him there.

Who is responsible for his medical care?

What is his legal status?

Can he communicate freely with his family and attorneys?

Can he leave the facility where he is staying?

And what happens next?

Transparency would answer those questions.

This Is Why Names Matter

It is easy to debate immigration when we speak only in numbers.

Thousands deported.

Hundreds detained.

Dozens transferred.

Numbers create distance.

Names remove that distance.

Leonardo Sánchez.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade.

Carlos Rodríguez.

These are four Cuban men who refused to remain in Liberia and were subsequently transported to Equatorial Guinea.

We intend to learn more about each of them.

If they committed crimes, we will report that.

If they served sentences, we will report that.

If they had immigration violations, we will report that.

If the government followed the law, we will say so.

And if legitimate questions remain about what happened to them, we will ask those questions too.

That is journalism.

This Is Bigger Than Leonardo Sánchez

Leonardo’s story represents something larger.

The United States is increasingly using agreements with third countries as part of its immigration enforcement strategy.

Americans therefore need to understand what happens after an aircraft leaves American soil.

Deportation should not mean disappearance from public accountability.

A family should know where its relative is.

An attorney should know how to reach a client.

A medically vulnerable person should know who is responsible for his treatment.

And the American public should know what agreements its government is making with foreign countries to receive people removed from the United States.

None of those principles requires open borders.

They require accountable government.

Tomorrow, Another Name

Today the name is Leonardo Sánchez.

But there are others.

Darwin Hernández.

Emilio Destrade.

Carlos Rodríguez.

And potentially many more Cuban families whose stories have not yet been told.

Horizonte Cubano News will continue examining these cases individually.

Not because immigration laws should not be enforced.

But because government power should never become more difficult to examine simply because the person affected has been placed on an airplane.

His name is Leonardo Sánchez.

And wherever the United States sends him, Americans have a right to ask what happened next.

Horizonte Cubano News — Analysis and commentary on Cuba, the United States, and the future of the hemisphere.